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Conventional wisdom holds that a dissertation is all about the author and his or 
her solitary struggle to stay focused, to stay on track, to simply stay the course until the 
project is done. But that is not entirely true. In reality, a dissertation is about a multitude 
people all working toward the same goal … its completion. This is certainly the case with 
my dissertation. That it is finished is as much a tribute to the efforts, support, and love of 
family and friends as it is to the work on my part.  
At the top of the list of people to thank is the chair of my dissertation committee, 
Dr. David Kurpius. He listened when I needed to vent, pushed when I was dragging my 
feet, and offered encouragement when I was ready to throw in the towel. That this 
dissertation came to fruition at all is a reflection of his generosity in letting me work with 
him on one of his research projects, from which the idea for this study was born. Dr. 
Kurpius is the epitome of a committed, involved chair, and I am grateful to have had his 
guidance and friendship in this project. I want to thank committee members Dr. Robert 
Kirby Goidel and Dr. Eileen Meehan as well for their generous gifts of time and insight. 
Dr. Goidel helped me add a quantitative aspect to my dissertation by letting me 
piggyback some questions onto a survey he and other faculty members put together, 
which provided some unexpected and worthwhile data, while Dr. Meehan gave me new 
ways to think about what I was doing. I also want to acknowledge the contributions of 
Dr. Timothy Cook and Dr. James Garand. When I put my committee together, Dr. Cook 
was one of the original members and helped me develop the theoretical underpinning for 
the project. Dr. Cook was a masterful teacher, among whose gifts was the ability to 
challenge his students to look beyond the conventional and consider alternate 
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possibilities. Dr. Cook passed away earlier this year after a valiant struggle with brain 
cancer, but his voice runs throughout this dissertation, and I am glad we had the chance to 
work together. With Dr. Cook’s death, I had to find another committee member, and Dr. 
Garand willingly stepped in on very short notice. I am grateful to him and appreciative of 
his help in expanding the quantitative component of this project. I also want to thank Dr. 
Carole Jurkiewicz for her patience in wading through a dissertation that was out of her 
field. 
In addition, I want to acknowledge Dr. John Maxwell Hamilton, dean of the 
Manship School of Mass Communication; Dr. Margaret DeFleur, associate dean of the 
graduate students at the Manship School; and Dr. Ralph Izard, the former associate dean 
of the graduate students at the Manship School, all of whom offered their support and 
wisdom throughout this long process. 
My father, Dr. Charles M. Rowley, was one of the first people to encourage me to 
pursue a Ph.D. His lifelong love of learning and his belief that education never ends have 
guided me all of my life, and I am grateful to him for his steadfast belief that I could 
succeed in this. 
Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my friend and partner, Ed 
Anderson. He has borne the brunt of the emotional roller-coaster that is a dissertation, 
and he has done so with love and humor, somehow always knowing when to step in and 
when to back off. I could not have finished this without him. 
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A study of 10 states that have statewide public affairs television networks finds 
that these systems have become an integral part of the state governmental process in the 
same way that C-SPAN has become an institution in Washington, D.C. That is, 
lawmakers, legislative staff members, lobbyists, and statehouse reporters ignore it at their 
peril. At the same time, the content produced by these state versions of C-SPAN has 
altered the way in which the members of these groups do their jobs by providing a 
monitoring capacity that makes it easier for them to be more productive. This study uses 
a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies to examine data gathered 
through in-depth interviews with network managers and employees, legislative staff 
members, lobbyists, and statehouse reporters and through a national telephone survey that 
sought to determine if there was an audience for statewide public affairs television. The 
study seeks to expand the applicability of institutionalism theory by using it as the 
framework to examine statewide public affairs television through the lenses of civic 
engagement, policy-making, norms and routines, social network analysis, and diffusion 


















Statewide public affairs television first appeared 28 years ago when Kentucky 
Educational Television—the state’s PBS network—took its cameras into the legislative 
chambers and began broadcasting coverage around the state. Although it was little 
noticed at the time, this different model of legislative coverage resonates today as the 
beginning of the statewide public affairs television movement. The spark for the 
movement came a year later in 1979 when the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network—
C-SPAN—broadcast its first coverage of the U.S. House of Representatives. In the 
process, C-SPAN brought this new model for providing the public with information 
about how government functions to the forefront.  
From the beginning when its programming consisted primarily of unfiltered, 
minimally edited coverage of congressional floor sessions, C-SPAN’s offerings have 
grown to include call-in shows, weekly wrap-up programs, and interviews with 
government leaders. This innovation in government coverage did not go unnoticed and as 
C-SPAN became a fixture of cable programming, a parallel movement aimed at 
providing similar coverage of state government gained momentum. Known as statewide 
public affairs television, these entities can be described best as smaller versions of C-
SPAN—although they have no formal affiliation with it. At least 20 such systems operate 
now, and more are in the development stages.  
The development of a new model for disseminating information about 
government coincided as well with a marked decrease in statehouse coverage by 
traditional media. Market pressures, cost considerations, and a strong belief that members 
of the public cared little about government news drove many newspaper and local 
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television companies to cut back on their statehouse coverage beginning in the 1990s, if 
not eliminate it altogether. After all, news is expensive to produce, Hamilton (2004) says, 
and media managers were looking to cut costs any way they could. The accompanying 
consolidation of media companies simply exacerbated the problem. Why does this 
matter? It is important because, over the same time frame, the federal government has 
made a concerted effort to shift more and more policy-making power to the states. As a 
result, policies and laws increasingly are being determined at the state level (Ehrenhalt, 
1999; Garand, 1988; Gurwitt, 1996; Gurwitt; 1990; Jewell, 1982; Layton & Dorroh, 
2002; Layton & Walton, 1998), while the media’s traditional watchdog role has been 
diminished. The public, in turn, has fewer and fewer ways to obtain the information it 
needs to understand or provide input into the democratic process. 
Statewide public affairs television offers one possible alternative. At their most 
basic, these state versions of C-SPAN provide minimally edited, gavel-to-gavel coverage 
of legislative proceedings. Some of the more developed networks also cover legislative 
committee hearings and state Supreme Court oral arguments, and provide their own 
public affairs programming. In other words, these networks offer viewers a tremendous 
amount of detailed information about state policy development.  
The mission of statewide public affairs television is to provide the public with 
information about how state government works, but previous research suggests the 
primary audience for these systems is not the general public (Kurpius & Rowley, 2004a). 
Rather, it is an elite audience composed of legislators, legislative staff members, 
journalists, lobbyists, and the small percentage of the general public that takes a strong 
interest in how government operates. Other researchers argue that this is not necessarily a 
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bad thing, nor is it unexpected (Graber, 2004; Schudson, 1998; Zaller, 2003). It is not that 
the general public is not paying attention, they say. Rather, the public is selective in what 
it pays attention to and is willing to depend on a small group of elites to oversee the 
governing process. 
The question, then, is what role does statewide public affairs television play? This 
study argues that over its nearly 30 years of existence, statewide public affairs television 
has become an integral part of the state governmental process in the same way that C-
SPAN has become an institution in Washington, D.C. Thus institutional theory provides 
the foundation for this project. The theory has a long and complex history in academia. 
Its research tradition spans both Europe and America and has been used extensively to 
study human behavior in economics, sociology, and political science. For more than a 
century, institutionalism has proved to be an adaptable theory that can be used in a 
variety of ways. One of the areas in which the theory has not been widely applied, 
however, is mass communication.  
This study seeks to expand the applicability of institutionalism by using it as the 
theoretical framework to examine statewide public affairs television through the lenses of 
civic engagement, policy-making, norms and routines, social network analysis, and 
diffusion of innovation. Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, data were gathered from 10 states that have operational statewide public 
affairs television systems and one state where efforts are underway to establish a 
network. The qualitative data were gathered through in-depth interviews with network 
managers and employees, legislative staff members, lobbyists, and statehouse reporters 
and through site visits to each of the systems. The quantitative data come from a national 
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telephone survey that sought to determine if there actually was an audience for statewide 
public affairs television.  
With the increasing policy-making power of the states, the continuing decline in 
traditional media statehouse coverage, and the changes being wrought by legislative term 
limits, the need for statewide public affairs television has never been greater. For all of 
these reasons, it is crucial to understand whether these networks have achieved 
institutional status and if so, what that means for elite and non-elite audiences and for the 

















REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Background 
Statewide public affairs television started at roughly the same time the Cable-
Satellite Public Affairs Network—C-SPAN—broadcast its first coverage of the U.S. 
House of Representatives.1 In the process, C-SPAN created a new model for 
disseminating information about how government functions. From the beginning in 1979 
when its programming consisted primarily of minimally edited coverage of congressional 
floor sessions, C-SPAN’s offerings have grown to include call-in shows, weekly wrap-up 
programs, and interviews with government leaders. This innovation in government 
coverage did not go unnoticed, and soon after C-SPAN became a fixture of cable 
programming, a parallel movement aimed at providing similar coverage of state 
government gained momentum. The creation of statewide public affairs television grew 
out of a desire by legislators, citizens, and grass-roots groups to give the public more 
access to government. The first statewide public affairs television entity started in 
Kentucky in 1978 as a partnership between state government and Kentucky Educational 
Television, the state’s public broadcasting organization. Then throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s, systems were established in other states, many the result of partnerships with 
the cable industry. 
These systems, which can be described best as state versions of C-SPAN, cover 
state government to varying degrees. Twenty such television services are in operation 
now, with at least one more in the developmental stage. Located predominantly in the 
Northeast, Midwest, and West, these networks vary in their structure, programming, and 
funding mechanisms (see Appendices A, B, and C). Some operate year-round, others 
                                                 
1 Portions of this chapter reprinted with permission of Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. 
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only when their legislature is in session. Some provide only gavel-to-gavel coverage of 
legislative sessions, others also cover state House and Senate committee hearings, and 
still others offer public affairs programming such as call-in shows, legislative highlights 
programs, journalist round tables, and cultural programs. A few of the networks also are 
tied into their state’s emergency operations center. The system in Florida, for instance, 
provides the pool coverage for media outlets in the state when disasters are declared, 
while in Connecticut, the network has set up the emergency broadcast equipment officials 
use when they need to reach residents. 
At the same time statewide public affairs television began to gain acceptance as a 
source of state government news, commercial media coverage of the statehouse began to 
decline. Beginning in the 1990s, Layton and Walton (1998) found, television stations and 
newspapers around the country began cutting back on their state government coverage—
capital bureaus were reduced, if not closed altogether; the news hole allocated for 
government news shrank in numerous cases; and the use of wire services increased. Chief 
among the reasons for this have been the need for cost containment, the lack of interest in 
state government news among editors, publishers, and news directors, and the noticeable 
apathy of the public when it comes to the democratic process (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 
1996; Hirsch & Thompson, 1994; Layton & Walton, 1998). In terms of cost containment, 
the media have to work much harder in today’s economy to remain as profitable as 
management and shareholders wish. The ever-increasing expenses of technology, labor, 
and in the case of newspapers, old-fashioned paper and ink, have many publishers and 
general managers scrambling to find areas where they can cut, and state capital bureaus 
have been at the top of their list because news is an expensive commodity to produce 
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(Gurwitt, 1996; Hamilton, 2004; Hickey, 1998; Kaniss, 1991; Layton & Walton, 1998; 
McChesney, 2000; McManus, 1994).  
In addition, many of these media companies are traded publicly, and their 
management must contend with boards of directors and shareholders who demand a 
certain profitability. Traditionally, if that goal has not been met, Wall Street has been 
swift to punish the offending company via lower stock prices (Hirsch & Thompson, 
1994). The response has been to cut costs as much as possible to keep profits at an 
acceptable level (Champlin & Knoedler, 2002). This increasing pressure for profits has 
been exacerbated, as well, Champlin and Knoedler say, by the massive consolidation of 
the media, particularly throughout the 1990s. They and others point out, too, that this 
pressure to control costs has led newsrooms to rely heavily on pre-packaged news, such 
as that generated by press conferences, press releases, and video news releases, while 
giving investigative reporting efforts short shrift (Boorstin, 1992; Champlin & Knoedler, 
2002; McChesney, 2000; McManus, 1994). 
Further compounding the problem is the lack of interest many editors and news 
directors have in state government news (Gurwitt, 1996; Layton & Walton, 1998; 
McManus, 1994). Typically, government news has been categorized as dull-but-
important, and the persistent belief among editors and news directors has been that 
readers just aren’t interested in these types of stories—despite research that shows that is 
not the case (Audience interest by question, 2002; Gurwitt, 1996; Layton & Walton, 
1998; Poindexter & McCombs, 2001). Poindexter and McCombs, for instance, found a 
clear relationship between those who believed they needed to keep informed and their use 
of newspapers and television news to do so. 
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There is another factor at work, also, in the media’s move away from the intense 
government coverage that was common in the past, as McManus (1994) and Hamilton 
(2004) observe. They believe that market forces are driving the change. McManus (1994) 
argues that with the consolidation of broadcast media, the definition of news has 
changed. In the market-driven model he proposes, news “becomes a commodity to fit the 
market demands of a collection of special interests” (McManus, 1994, p. 37). The goal is 
not so much to inform viewers, as it is to sell them to advertisers. Hamilton (2004) takes 
the argument further, pointing out that when the news is treated as a market product, 
simplicity and cost-effectiveness become the driving forces behind what is covered. The 
result is that public affairs content, which is seldom simple or cheap to produce, is at best 
marginalized and at worst left out altogether. Nor has the cable industry lived up to its 
potential for providing access for local and state governments, education, and community 
news, despite the proliferation of channel space (Kellner, 1990). Instead, cable has 
become a place to “repurpose” or rerun news content from other network properties. For 
example, content from NBC is used on the NBC Nightly News, CNBC, and MSNBC. 
What has been the practical effect of all this? “In capital press rooms around the 
country, there are more and more empty desks and silent phones. Bureaus are shrinking, 
reporters are younger and less experienced, stories get less space and poorer play, and all 
too frequently editors just don’t care” (Layton & Walton, 1994, p. 44). Fewer reporters 
mean fewer stories, as Layton and Walton (1994) point out. As well, less experienced 
reporters mean less knowledge of how the governmental process works, who the players 
are, and how a given issue might affect the public.  
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The changing face of media capital bureaus has not gone unnoticed by those they 
cover, either. As long ago as 1990, Gurwitt highlighted the increasingly younger and 
inexperienced reporters being sent to cover state capitals. Prior to Watergate, in 
particular, many reporters made whole careers out of covering statehouses. While 
Gurwitt (1990) and Ehrenhalt (1999) acknowledged that perhaps it was not a bad thing 
that the coziness that had prevailed in earlier days between legislators and reporters was 
gone, they also bemoaned the lack of expertise that now exists.  
… state government is more complicated today than it was 30 years ago. Budgets 
are far larger, the number of state agencies and departments has mushroomed, and 
the complexity of the issues that state governments now tackle has grown 
immeasurably. The question is, as reporters lose the intimate familiarity with 
legislatures that they once had, how well are they keeping up with the changes? 
(Gurwitt, 1990, para. 31).  
 
That, in turn, affects how well the public is informed. The question of how well 
the public is being informed is a concern because state government is big business. In the 
1990s, state government ranked eighth on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ list of 
national growth industries (Layton & Walton, 1998). Layton and Walton also estimated 
that, in total, the states spend $854 billion a year—about $9,000 for every American. 
More importantly, for some time now, state government has been leading the charge on 
all sorts of issues that affect people’s daily lives, not Congress (Layton & Walton, 1998), 
while the commercial media have systematically reduced their coverage of these same 
state governments. 
Historically, the political communications literature has centered on the federal 
process. Rosenthal (1981) observed that “despite the importance of the function, 
relatively little is known about how policy making is performed by legislatures in the 
states” (p. 256). Garand (1988), in his study of the growth of state government from 
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1945-1984, found that “to date, the states have been virtually ignored as a focus of 
research on government growth” (p. 838). By the early 1990s, the situation had not 
changed much, as Brace and Jewett (1995) pointed out. “Consciously or unconsciously, 
too many studies of American politics ignore the important role that the states play in 
shaping political behavior and outcomes in the United States” (Brace & Jewett, 1995, p. 
646).  
Some 20 years ago, Rosenthal (1981), Jewell (1982), and Bowman and Kearney 
(1988) wrote about how policy development responsibility was being shifted from the 
federal to the state level. More recently, Elazar (1994) argued that the states are 
frequently public policy pioneers, long before the federal government takes a position. 
“Many states have pioneered programs that fit into their traditions before the initiation of 
similar ones on the federal plane or on a nationwide basis through federal aid” (1994, p. 
281).  
Elazar is best known for his three-part political culture typology. Three factors 
shape how state political systems operate, he says: “(1) the set of perceptions of what 
politics is and what can be expected from government …; (2) the kinds of people who 
become active in government and politics …; and (3) the actual way in which the art of 
government is practiced …” (1972, p. 90). Using all of these elements, Elazar crafted a 
three-part typology of political culture that has become a cornerstone of political science 
research. He argued that American political culture can be subdivided into three 
categories—moralistic, traditionalistic, and individualistic—and that projections can be 
made about how a state will act based on which category it belongs to.  
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Elazar defines the individualistic political culture as one that  
emphasizes the conception of the democratic order as a marketplace. In its view, 
government is instituted for strictly utilitarian reasons, to handle those functions 
demanded by the people it is created to serve. … In general, government action is 
to be restricted to those areas primarily in the economic realm, which encourage 
private initiative and widespread access to the market place. (1972, p. 94). 
  
In this culture then, the role of government is limited and the purpose of a statewide 
public affairs television system would be to show the public that officials are not 
overstepping their bounds. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the moralistic political culture. This culture, 
Elazar says,  
emphasizes the commonwealth conception as the basis for democratic 
government. Politics, to the moralistic political culture, is considered one of the 
great activities of man in his search for the good society—a struggle for power, it 
is true, but also an effort to exercise power for the betterment of the 
commonwealth. … Good government, then, is measured by the degree to which it 
promotes the public good and in terms of the honesty, selflessness, and 
commitment to the public welfare of those who govern (1972, p. 96-97) 
  
The goal of a statewide public affairs television system in this culture would be to give 
members of the public all of the information they need to participate actively in the 
democratic process. 
Finally, there is the traditionalistic political culture. Falling somewhere between 
the other two,  
the traditionalistic political culture is rooted in an ambivalent attitude toward the 
market place coupled with a paternalistic and elitist conception of the 
commonwealth. It reflects an older, precommercial attitude that accepts a 
substantially hierarchical society as part of the ordered nature of things, 
authorizing and expecting those at the top of the social structure to take a special 
and dominant role in government (Elazar, 1972, p. 99) 
 
In this case, demand for a statewide public affairs television system likely would be small 
because there would be little sense among members of the public that they could take an 
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active role in government. Elazar says as much, noting that the traditionalistic culture 
“functions to confine real political power to a relatively small and self-perpetuating group 
drawn from an established elite who often inherit their ‘right’ to govern through family 
ties or social position” (1972, p. 99). 
Elazar (1972) further points out that although components of each of the 
categories can be found in every state, one culture tends to dominate and the states tend 
to cluster according to which culture is dominant. His political culture map shows the 
states of the Old South characterized by the traditionalistic political culture, while the 
individualistic political culture dominates in the mid-section of the country, and the 
moralistic political culture can be found in the states of the far North, Northwest, and 
Pacific Coast. 
Mead (2004), who examined state political culture and welfare reform, found 
support for Elazar’s typology. He summarized Elazar’s categories this way: 
In “moralistic” states, political positions are typically justified by appeals to the 
“public interest,” rather than narrower interests, and public administration is 
strong. In “individualistic” states, in contrast, government tends to serve more 
specific interests. Parties are strong, each standing for coalitions of groups 
seeking advantages from government. Bureaucracy is well-developed but less 
enterprising than in the moralistic culture. Finally, in the “traditionalistic” culture, 
chiefly in the South, government is limited largely to defending traditional values 
(originally the racial caste system). Parties count for less than in other cultures 
and the bureaucracy is underdeveloped and distrusted. (2004, p. 274) 
  
Not surprisingly, Mead said, his study found that those states Elazar categorized as 
moralistic handled welfare reform the best. 
If policy development is started and tested at the state level before enactment on a 
national basis, then it makes sense that the public should have a means to properly 
oversee government at work. And, in fact, the states have taken the lead on policy issues 
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as diverse as welfare and Medicaid, gun control and education. Wisconsin, for instance, 
developed the welfare reform model that ultimately was adopted by the federal 
government and filtered back down to the states. In Louisiana, the state government 
established a school accountability program some years before President Bush created No 
Child Left Behind. Reforms in areas as disparate as health care and no fault insurance all 
started at the state level (Ehrenhalt, 1999; Gurwitt, 1996; Jewell, 1982; Layton & Walton, 
1998; Rosenthal, 1981). It is a devolution of power and policy-making that shows no sign 
of abating (Elazar, 1994; Gurwitt, 1996). Layton and Walton (1998) pointed out that state 
legislatures consider approximately 185,000 bills each year and pass about 25 percent of 
them. “And all of it—the money, the bills, the lobbyists, the elections, the bureaucrats—
is covered by a diminishing number of reporters” (Layton & Walton, 1998, p. 47).  
The problem, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) say, is that without adequate 
information on policy development and the political process, the public loses one more 
way to evaluate whether the work being done by government reflects its interests. In 
order for new policies to be successful, they point out, the public must support them, and 
to do that, it must have at least a modicum of understanding of why policies are 
established and what they are intended to accomplish. “We are not arguing that 
contemporary democracy requires that all citizens be expert on all facets of national 
politics, but we do suggest that the more citizens are passingly informed about the issues 
of the day, the behavior of political leaders, and the rules under which they operate, the 
better off they are” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 61). The media can play a crucial 
role in providing that understanding. Yet, as Yankelovich (1991) argues, too often when 
the commercial media actually do provide such public policy information, they do so 
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with little context or perspective. And that, he maintains, can be just as harmful as not 
providing any information at all because it leaves the public to fend for itself in reaching 
thoughtful, deliberative judgments about issues and policies. 
What is needed, Yankelovich (1991) says, is a way for people to develop “public 
judgment,” and he proposed a model for such a process. His model begins with 
“consciousness raising.” This is where people learn about issues. Once the public is 
aware of an issue, which may happen quickly as a result of an event or a news story, it 
moves into a “working through” process by which “an individual must confront the need 
for change” (Yankelovich, 1991, p. 64). It is in this “working through” process that 
people become engaged in addressing an issue, while at the same time determining their 
own beliefs and recognizing the value of others’ beliefs. The final stage of this model is 
resolution, or what Yankelovich terms “public judgment.” At this stage, “the public must 
resolve where it stands cognitively, emotionally, and morally” (Yankelovich, 1991, p. 
65). The most important part of the resolution stage is the deliberation people must 
engage in to reconcile their own values with those of others. The relevancy of this three-
stage model lies in its potential to create a place for both knowledge gain and information 
processing by citizens. The question is whether the media can create this place.  
The Newspaper Industry 
Press and politics have been intertwined in this country since its earliest days. The 
pattern was set with the creation of the early postal system in 1792 and Congress’s 
decision to grant newspaper publishers special postal privileges, including “free exchange 
of newspapers among editors, delivery of publications for minimal postage, free in-
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county delivery of papers, expresses to speed the news, the international conveyance of 
periodicals, and special arrangements to handle subscriptions” (Kielbowicz, 1989, p. 3). 
Although their decision was couched in terms of giving the media the ability to 
provide information to as large an audience as possible, congressional leaders were also 
cognizant of the need to unify the fledgling country and to establish a common culture. 
The combination of the post office and the press provided a way to do that. The postal 
system “provided for redundancy in the circulation of news, supplied a varied diet of 
information, accommodated complex messages, and permitted any point in the network 
to send information to any other point” (Kielbowicz, 1989, p. 183). 
The importance of that decision cannot be overstated. In one motion, Congress 
gave newspaper owners the tools they needed to lay the foundation for a wide-ranging 
mass communication system and established a precedent for government/press relations 
in which each side was dependent on the other. This dependency can be seen clearly not 
only in the postal privileges granted to newspapers, but also in the official printing 
contracts federal, state, and local governments bestowed on specific newspapers in the 
early days of the industry. Such contracts continue today with local newspapers vying for 
the right to publish legal notices. The tie between government and newspaper owners, 
therefore, was built on both informational and financial levels. This relationship has 
endured for more than two centuries, adapting as society and technology changed and 
fending off critics who believe the two groups are too closely intertwined, to the 




The Broadcast Industry 
The broadcast industry’s relationship with politicians is more complex, although, 
again, Congress and the federal government have played an equally critical part in its 
development. Today’s model of a commercially owned, government-regulated broadcast 
industry was not the only option available when technology developed sufficiently for the 
early radio industry to gain popularity. There were other possibilities for the way radio, 
and then television, could have developed. Streeter (1996), in particular, touches on the 
different frameworks available for a radio model before the commercial model prevailed. 
Initially, radio could have taken the form of a medium run by amateurs, small business 
entrepreneurs, or even the government. The large corporations were uninterested. But that 
changed with Marconi, who figured out how to make a profit by marketing radio as a 
service and then controlling the technology used to produce it.   
Marconi’s historically significant legacy was the practice of extracting profit from 
radio by treating it as a service instead of as a manufactured product, and by 
controlling that service through the control of critical technology and through 
policies restricting how that technology should be used (Streeter, 1996, p. 72-73).  
 
Marconi was extremely successful with his model—too successful for the U.S. 
Navy’s comfort. His operation was based in the United Kingdom, and Marconi, himself, 
was not a citizen of the United States. In the early 20th century, Navy officials were 
concerned about the security implications involved with a non-citizen controlling the 
American radio industry. Ultimately, Congress yielded to pressure from the Navy and its 
own concerns about U.S. maritime safety and passed the Radio Act of 1912 (Streeter, 
1996). That measure established the right of the government to license access to the radio 
spectrum and left enforcement of the law to federal agencies instead of the courts. 
Tillinghast (2000) reiterated the impact of the 1912 act, pointing out that for the first time 
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the government had introduced the idea that it could require licenses for anyone who 
wanted to transmit a message over the airwaves. Since corporations held considerably 
more sway over the federal government than small business owners or amateur radio 
enthusiasts, it did not take long for government to hand over the choicest segments of the 
spectrum to big business and push everyone else to the fringes.  
In particular, the Radio Act of 1912, the follow-up Radio Act of 1927, and the 
Communications Act of 1934 made it possible for the corporations to develop an 
oligopolistic radio model instead of a competitive, entrepreneurial model (Streeter, 1996). 
This model was best embodied by radio station WEAF. The station, which was owned by 
AT&T, first went on the air in 1922. “What AT&T intended was that the station should 
be considered a phone booth from which persons could send any message they wished to 
the public at large—for a fee, of course” (Tillinghast, 2000, p. 35). Kellner (1990) 
described the larger impact of the model. Radio developed as a commercial enterprise at 
the same time the nation’s corporations figured out how to expand their systems of mass 
production and mass consumption, thus laying the foundation for today’s consumer-
driven capitalist society. The mass media were the means to direct the public’s attention 
toward the benefits of a consumer-driven society.  
By the latter part of the 20th century, thanks to Congress and the courts, control of 
the broadcast industry model had moved from amateurs and entrepreneurs to licensed 
corporate operators to corporate operators governed by chain-broadcasting and fairness 
doctrine rules. The reality is that there were other directions the broadcast industry could 
have taken, but the social and political forces of the 1920s and 1930s pushed aside such 
alternatives as spectrum regulation, amateur radio operators, and nonprofit broadcasters 
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(Streeter, 1996). Instead, the industry was set up so that it was vertically integrated, 
highly regulated, and placed in the hands of just a few corporations. One of the 
consequences of vertical integration is that the corporations involved control everything 
from the development, manufacture, and sale of the technology to the creation and 
dissemination of the programming. With all of these interlocking components, changing 
the system becomes difficult, if not impossible. Commercial television, in particular, has 
developed into both a business enterprise designed to maximize profit and an enterprise 
dependent on government intervention for its survival. While statewide public affairs 
television is also dependent on some form of government intervention for its creation and 
survival, it has no need to make a profit. That alters the commercial television model 
substantially and opens up the possibilities for the kinds of information that can be 
offered. Nor are these networks necessarily trying to garner an audience. In fact, in most 
cases they refuse to subscribe to ratings services or conduct research that would provide 
data about who is watching. They also lack a profit motive, which theoretically should 
allow them to focus on producing content that offers the greatest civic value. However, 
these systems are constrained by the need to produce content that is acceptable to the 
legislators who provide funding and access and by the cable system operators who carry 
their programming and also provide funding in some cases.  
In the 1970s, the broadcast model changed again with the rise of cable, and 
suddenly the potential existed for citizens to take back some control with the requirement 
that cable franchises provide local access channels. For a brief moment in television 
history, the public had a chance to put together programming it deemed of value under a 
1972 Federal Communications Commission rule that compelled cable systems to set 
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aside at least three public access channels for community, local government, and 
educational use (Kellner, 1990). The victory was short-lived, however, because in 1979 
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the FCC’s requirement, ruling the agency did not have 
the authority to enact such a mandate. Nevertheless, Kellner (1990) points out, the 
precedent had been set, and many local cable systems already were providing access 
channels by the time the Supreme Court ruled. Such was the environment when Kentucky 
Educational Television and the Kentucky General Assembly set up what would become 
the first statewide public affairs television coverage in 1978. 
The 1980s saw both the end of the Fairness Doctrine, which meant the 
commercial networks no longer had to maintain the pretense of worrying about the public 
interest, and the deregulation of cable. The Cable Communications Act of 1984 
essentially cleared the way for cable companies to set up local monopolies. Hailed as a 
clear example of deregulation, the act allowed cable operators to secure enough 
government regulation to protect their industry and still run it as they wished. The irony, 
Streeter (1996) says,  
is that the economic conditions driving cable and generating pressures for passage 
of the 1984 act are the same ones that have motivated most regulation of the 
corporate economy in general: economies of scale that generate pressures toward 
vertical integration, oligopolistic behavior, and the practice of using regulation to 
generate industry stability and political legitimacy (p. 179).  
 
The 1990s saw a further change in the electronic media model with the growth of 
the Internet, the transnationalization of corporations, and the push to spread market 
capitalism around the world. Schiller (1999) attributes the change to three factors—the 
creation of in-house computer networks as corporations worked to improve efficiency, 
cut costs, and increase profits; the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that the Internet should be 
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free of government oversight; and the implementation of the Clinton administration 
policy calling for an Internet free of foreign tariffs, trade barriers, and other restrictions. 
Still, the latest incarnation of the electronic media model is essentially a variation on a 
theme and offers little encouragement that it can be a useful source of public affairs 
information.  
Far from delivering us into a high-tech Eden, in fact, cyberspace itself is being 
rapidly colonized by the familiar workings of the market system. Across their 
breadth and depth, computer networks link with existing capitalism to massively 
broaden the effective reach of the marketplace (Schiller, 1999, p. xiv). 
 
Other Models 
The work to increase coverage of public affairs on television is not new. In 
response to the perceived crisis of democratic participation (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; 
Entman, 1989; Fallows, 1997; Jamieson et al., 1993; Jamieson & Cappella, 1994; 
Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Norris, 1997; Parenti, 1986), major reform attempts have 
taken several broad forms. The earliest attempt to redevelop and invigorate public 
television public affairs programming took place in the 1990s. A good example of this 
was the Wisconsin Collaborative Project, which in many ways was the precursor to the 
PBS Democracy Project. These efforts focused on collaborative work among local public 
television stations to develop quality public affairs programming for regional and 
national presentation following the model set by the Wisconsin Collaborative Project. 
Friedland (1995) found that the WCP stations pushed the national Public Broadcasting 
System to better understand the role of television in a participatory democracy. In part, 
this effort led to the creation of the PBS Democracy Project, which encourages member 
stations to produce content focusing on state and local issues (Sirianni & Friedland, 2001, 
p. 225-226). This work continues today. 
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Public journalism was another attempt to alter the commercial broadcast model. 
Around 1993, some commercial and public television stations began forming 
partnerships with local newspapers to produce better quality public affairs content. Where 
the WCP and the PBS Democracy Project focused on the creation of more regional and 
local public affairs programming, public journalism focused on changing journalistic 
routines to create better connections with communities and citizens (Sirianni & Friedland, 
2001). Several of these partnerships have lasted more than a decade and continue today. 
The early 1990s also led to increased business pressures on local television 
stations, particularly on commercial stations. A few of these stations saw public 
journalism as a way to combat market forces and to devote more air time and resources to 
state and local public affairs coverage. Early on, these efforts focused on election 
coverage, with citizens at the forefront in setting the agenda for the news coverage. Other 
projects emphasized quality public affairs coverage. One of the best examples was 
KRON-TV in San Francisco. For more than two years, the station produced regularly 
scheduled pieces on race in its series “About Race,” which won national attention, praise, 
and awards. KRON’s efforts make it clear that television was and is capable of providing 
in-depth coverage of public issues over a longer period of time, provided the resources 
and the will are in place (Kurpius & Rowley, 2004b). 
The C-SPAN Model 
C-SPAN offered still another answer to how television could provide meaningful 
public affairs programming, with its focus on unedited content that requires no support 
from commercial market forces. The network is not completely free of financial 
pressures, however. C-SPAN is dependent on that portion of subscriber fees cable 
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systems across the country are willing to dedicate to it. Without the cable systems’ good 
will, C-SPAN would have a difficult time continuing to operate.  
While its primary emphasis is on gavel-to-gavel coverage of the floor sessions 
and committee and policy hearings of the U.S. Congress, C-SPAN also produces original 
public affairs programming that works to provide information and encourage citizens to 
participate in the discussions and deliberations about national issues. Kurpius and 
Mendelson (2002) found that C-SPAN’s call-in shows, in particular, allowed interested 
individuals to find entry points into the deliberations, and that these shows offered a high 
level of discussion. 
Despite this, C-SPAN has never claimed that its purpose is to engage people in 
the deliberative process. Rather, the network says its mission is to cover relevant national 
events, unedited and, for the most part, in their entirety (C-SPAN Mission, 2006). While 
this fulfills the watchdog role of journalism by allowing interested citizens to view an 
entire congressional floor debate, it does not help them work through the deliberative 
process as described by Yankelovich (1991). In other words, while C-SPAN provides 
massive amounts of information to the public, it only works in limited ways to engage 
people in the process of finding solutions to society’s problems and issues. 
Civic Engagement 
Political science and mass communication researchers disagree over whether the 
public really cares about governmental processes and, by extension, about news coverage 
of those processes. Numerous studies have tracked the declining rate of voter turnout, the 
lack of civic participation, and the limited knowledge of current affairs among the public 
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Jeffres, Atkin, & Neuendorf, 2002; Rosenthal, 1999; 
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Scheufele, Shanahan, & Kim, 2002; Tewksbury, Weaver, & Maddex, 2001, among 
others). The Project for Excellence in Journalism’s 2004 media report found declining 
viewership for both network and local television news. As the report points out, 
“Network television news was once the most trusted source of information in America. It 
also had a monopoly over pictures and television reporting from across the country and 
around the world. Neither of these things is true anymore” (The state of the news media, 
2004).  
The organization found that by 2002, 32 percent of the public watched network 
television news, compared to 58 percent in 1993. For local television news, viewership 
also was down—from 76 percent of the public in 1993 to 57 percent in 2002 (The state of 
the news media, 2004). Newspapers face an even more dismal situation. By 2002, only 
54 percent of Americans said they read a newspaper sometime during the week (The state 
of the news media, 2004).  
Despite this bleak picture, many political scientists insist that the public must 
have a way to remain informed so that it can make knowledgeable decisions, monitor 
legislators, and retain a belief in the workability of the system. Rosenthal (1999) argued 
that since making laws is one of the principal jobs of legislatures, the public must be able 
to examine how well its legislators are performing that task. To make that judgment, the 
public must have the information it needs. Jeffres, Atkin, and Neuendorf (2002) reported 
that their study of political involvement at the community level showed media can, and 
do, play a positive role in community politics. “Those most likely to rely on 
neighborhood newspapers as sources,” they said, “are less disillusioned with 
government” (p. 387). Frantzich and Sullivan (1996) found that C-SPAN viewers take 
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more interest in government and that that interest takes the form of voting in elections, 
writing letters to members of Congress, contributing money to political campaigns, and 
discussing issues with other people. In a survey that modeled the study Frantzich and 
Sullivan (1996) cited and that will be discussed in more detail later, Rowley and Kurpius 
(2006) found that viewers of statewide public affairs television also took more interest in 
government, albeit at the state level. They were more likely to contact public officials, 
write letters to the editor, discuss politics or issues with each other, and contribute to 
political campaigns. 
Yet the question remains: How much information do citizens truly need to 
function effectively in a democracy? How informed is the “fully informed” citizen? Delli 
Carpini and Keeter (1996) argue that citizens do not have to be informed about every 
aspect of every policy, but they believe they should be at least “passingly” informed 
about what government is doing and why. 
Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) point out that today “…government is more 
difficult, popular support is more contingent and effective communication is more vital” 
(p. 2) because the “traditional ties” that previously helped organize an individual’s 
political understanding have diminished in influence (e.g., political parties, family, 
religion, neighbors, and social class groupings), allowed for greater mobility, and placed 
increased emphasis on communication across traditional boundaries. They noted that this 
is coupled with a change in media reporting from an outside observer’s perspective to 
that of an insider participant in the political process. “Taken together, these developments 
have resulted in the increased dependency of both politicians and voters on the media and 
the messages they provide” (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995, p. 3). 
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On the other side of the argument are those scholars who maintain that essentially 
citizens are as informed as they need to be. Rather than being fully informed, these 
scholars say, it is enough for citizens to pay attention to those issues in which they have 
the most interest. Schudson (1998), for instance, argues the need for a reassessment of 
what constitutes a fully informed citizen, pointing out that it is unrealistic and impractical 
to expect people to keep up with and understand all of the specific details involved in 
public affairs issues. What he proposes instead is the “monitorial citizen” model. “The 
monitorial citizen,” he says, “engages in environmental surveillance more than 
information-gathering. … The monitorial citizen is not an absentee citizen but watchful, 
even while he or she is doing something else” (Schudson, 1998, p. 311).”  
Other scholars have offered variations of this model. More than 20 years ago, 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) developed a model they termed fire alarm oversight. 
Although they were concerned specifically with congressional oversight, their model 
could apply equally well to members of the public. Under this model, citizens make 
elected officials aware of problems as they arise, with the expectation that leaders then 
will take action. In other words, members of the public pay some attention to issues, but 
do not get fully involved until they believe there is a problem. Along the lines of 
McCubbins and Schwartz’s work, Zaller (2003) developed his burglar alarm model of 
citizen engagement. “The key idea is that news should provide information in the manner 
of attention-catching ‘burglar alarms’ about acute problems, rather than ‘police patrols’ 
over vast areas that pose no immediate problems” (Zaller, 2003, p. 110). 
Graber (2004), in her review of research that argues either for or against the 
necessity of an informed citizenry, found that there is a disconnect between the ideal and 
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the reality. Ideally, she said, the mass media provide interesting, well-written, 
comprehensive, and contextual stories that offer the public all the pertinent details they 
need to fully understand various issues. The problem, she says, is that “there is a huge 
gap between democratic theorists’ expectation and the reality of how much political 
knowledge the media will transmit and what citizens can and will learn” (2004, p 550). 
Further, Graber argues, the majority of the public pays only “selective attention” to 
issues, and while the supply of public affairs content is likely not a problem for the 
average citizen, it is a problem for the “attentive public,” which, she notes, “routinely 
relays political information to less-interested fellow citizens” (2004, p. 563).  
Still the disagreement continues about how informed citizens need to be. 
Converse (1962), for instance, found in his study that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
it was the least informed voters who caused the balance of power shifts in election results 
and that these shifts were most likely to occur when an election—or some facet of it—
generated a significant amount of attention, such as a presidential race. He also argued 
that a voter’s ability to take in information is limited by two factors: “(1) by the volume 
of output of the formal and informal systems of political communication in the society, 
and (2) by the voter’s motivation to attend to political communications …” (Converse, 
1962, p. 386). 
Price and Zaller (1993) expanded on Converse’s work in their study of audience 
recall of 16 news stories. The premise of their research was that the political effects of 
news coverage are best understood by understanding who gets the news as opposed to 
who is merely exposed to the news because “only people who actually acquire 
information from the news can use it in forming and changing their political evaluations” 
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(Price & Zaller, 1993, p. 134.) Ultimately they concluded that “better-informed people 
are both more likely to use the news media and more likely, by virtue of their stored 
informational resources, to gain from that use” (p. 158). Like Price and Zaller, Gilens 
(2001) found that exposure to information has the greatest effect on those who already 
have some general political knowledge—usually elites.  
Gilens examined the question of what impact ignorance of specific policy 
components has on the political policy preferences of fully informed citizens. He argued 
that it is not enough simply to make information available to the public. Rather it is the 
kind of information that is available that matters—i.e., policy-specific information—and 
he drew three broad conclusions from his research. First, surveys that focus on 
respondents’ general political knowledge may be useful, but they offer an incomplete 
picture of the effects of political ignorance. Second, he said, “policy-specific ignorance 
may well have a greater influence on political preferences than the lack of general 
knowledge as measured by political information scales” (Gilens, 2001, p. 380). Finally, 
he said, “policy-specific information has a stronger influence on respondents who display 
higher levels of general political knowledge” (p. 380). 
No Interest? 
A common perception among television professionals is that viewers are not 
interested in politics, but a Pew Research Center poll refutes that belief (Audience 
interest by question, 2002). The survey compared answers to a standard question about a 
person’s general interest in political coverage. Only 29 percent of the survey’s 
respondents reported they would be “very interested” about “issues and activities in state 
government and politics.” However, the same survey found when people were asked 
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about their interest in specific functions of government, the support for coverage jumped 
to more than 53 percent. For example, 64 percent of survey respondents said they were 
“very interested” in coverage about what government can do to reduce health care costs 
(Audience interest by question, 2002). This suggests that citizens may very well be 
interested in media coverage of at least some specific areas of government performance. 
Poindexter and McCombs (2001) found, too, that there was a clear relationship 
between those respondents who believed it was their civic duty to keep informed and 
their use of newspapers, network television news, and local television news to do so. 
Their conclusion was that the media’s efforts to attract and retain viewers and readers 
would be better spent in promoting and strengthening “the fundamental democratic 
principle—a good citizen has a duty to keep informed. This is the news industry’s best 
hope for reversing the decline in news media use” (p. 124). 
Politicians and the Media 
While much of the civic engagement literature focuses on how the public 
responds to media content, a number of researchers have studied this area from the 
standpoint of the relationship between politicians and the media—specifically, Congress 
and the press. These researchers can be divided into three groups. One segment maintains 
that the media are nothing more than recorders of current events, dependent on official 
sources to point them in the direction of carefully scripted happenings. That is, sources 
create news and reporters shape the information into a story.  
Boorstin (1992), for instance, writes of the rise of the pseudo-event and the 
media’s dependence on such contrived events to provide them with a steady, reliable 
stream of news to publish or broadcast. Among the specific types of pseudo-events 
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researchers have examined are the news interview (Clayman & Heritage, 2002), 
presidential news conferences (Manheim, 1979), and presidential public appearances 
(Canes-Wrone, 2001; Hager & Sullivan, 1994, Kernell, 1997). Clayman and Heritage 
(2002) write about the news interview, describing it as a game with well-established 
rules. Each side knows what the rules are, and each side comes into the interview with 
specific expectations about what sort of news will be produced. Over time, they write, the 
news interview has become more adversarial as interviewers have learned how to press 
for the answers they are looking for and interviewees have learned how to deflect 
questions they do not really want to answer. Even so, Clayman and Heritage (2002) say, 
an element of uncertainty remains; news interviews can boost both politicians’ and 
reporters’ reputations dramatically or they can damage them irrevocably. 
Canes-Wrone (2001), Hager and Sullivan (1994), Kernell (1997), and Manheim 
(1979) examined the public capacities of presidents, and argued that whatever the public 
event is, it is almost certain to make news. This is because the president has access to 
reporters in ways that other federal officials do not. Manheim (1979) specifically 
examined the presidential news conference. Although the White House press office goes 
to great lengths to control news conferences, Manheim (1979) said, in the end it is not a 
forum controlled by either the president or the press. Over time, reporters’ questions have 
become designed to limit the president’s options in answering. The result is that the 
presidential news conference more often resembles a negotiation rather than a top-down 
model of information transmission.  
Hager and Sullivan (1994) explain why presidents are moving away from news 
conferences and toward more staged events. They underscore the notion that each 
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president comes into office within a particular context—for instance, George Bush in 
2000 after the controversial Supreme Court decision giving him the presidency. It is this 
context that often shapes what presidents do, rather than what they each bring to the job. 
Considering that, it is not surprising that there is more of a move toward staged events. 
Canes-Wrone (2001) and Kernell (1997) studied the increasing tendency of presidents to 
circumvent the press conference and congressional bargaining by going public. Such a 
strategy can be effective in drawing attention to issues important to the president, they 
say, given that the presidency is the most prominent institution in the news and that there 
is an entire White House press corps just waiting for something to write about. The 
danger, they say, is that it leaves little room for public discussion of an issue and little 
room for negotiating with Congress. Going public, therefore, works best when presidents 
use it sparingly. 
In the case of the states, the governors share similar public capacities as the 
president. Media attention traditionally focuses on the 50 governors, generally at the 
expense of their legislatures. Statewide public affairs television provides a way for 
legislators to reshape the balance of power by giving them a way to reach ordinary 
citizens and by giving citizens a way to see the governmental process at work with little 
of the filtering done by the traditional media and by the governors’ press offices. In other 
words, citizens get a more complete picture. 
Another group of researchers has examined in depth the idea that the news is 
“indexed” to the concerns and discussions going on in government. Bennett (1990) was 
one of the first to describe the relationship between media and government this way, 
although other scholars (Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1980; Gitlin, 1980; Lawrence, 2000; 
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Molotch & Lester, 1975; Tuchman, 1977, 1972) have examined the same thing under 
different names. Bennett (1990) examined the New York Times’ coverage of U.S. funding 
for the Nicaraguan contras in developing his concept of an index of news. What he found 
was that the Times did, in fact, allow officials to set the range of acceptable coverage on 
the issue. In this case, it was Congress. By acceding to the official “index,” Bennett says, 
the Times effectively shut out any alternative or oppositional views of the funding issue. 
At the heart of Bennett’s indexing theory is David Manning White’s (1950) 
gatekeeper theory. Basically, White argued that only a fraction of the information 
available to newspapers is actually put into print and then only after it has been filtered 
through the subjective thought processes of an editor or editors. These editors decide 
what to put in the newspaper based on what feels right to them, on what they perceive 
their audience wants. Whether they actually have an accurate idea of what their audience 
wants is immaterial. The result is that the public gets a created version of the news that 
does not necessarily reflect its interests or provide it with the information it needs to 
understand important policy issues. Statewide public affairs television alters the 
gatekeeper role, mostly because it usurps the commercial media’s place. It offers 
information without the mass media filter, thereby allowing audiences to see their 
government at work in a more direct way. Statewide public affairs television also falls in 
line with Bennett’s indexing model. The information being sent out through the network 
feed is not controlled by the traditional media. Reporters and editors, of course, have the 
option not to use the content or to question the information that is provided, but with the 
ever-increasing pressures presented by understaffing, shrinking news holes, and 
inexperience, it is reasonable to question whether they will.  
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Finally, there are a number of scholars who argue that the best way to look at the 
relationship between the media and the politicians is to consider the media as the fourth 
branch of government, although one not sanctioned by the Constitution (Cater, 1959; 
Cook, 1998). In a famous passage from the opening of his book, Cater described the role 
of the Washington reporter as that of recorder and participant. “He is the indispensable 
broker and middleman among the subgovernments of Washington. He can choose from 
among the myriad events that seethe beneath the surface of government which to 
describe, which to ignore” (1959, p. 7). Cater was writing at a time when the executive 
branch had become the primary generator of legislative programs. Congress, on the other 
hand, found itself increasingly in an oversight and review capacity. In both cases, 
publicity took on even more importance as each side tried to make its arguments to each 
other and to the public.  
Cook (1998) explored Cater’s contention that the media function as a fully 
institutionalized fourth branch of government. Although journalists vehemently disagree 
with this characterization, Cook (1998) showed how the norms and routines of journalism 
fit with the government’s need to disseminate information. Further, the government and 
the press are intertwined because of all the subsidies the media receive, whether they 
involve preferential postal privileges in the case of print or free spectrum space in the 
case of broadcast. Far from being a one-sided, top-down relationship, Cook argues, the 
connection between the press and the government is a negotiated one, with both sides 
holding equal bargaining positions. 
Blumler and Gurevitch (1981) also examined the construction of political 
communication from the perspective of the politicians and the press and concluded that 
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the two are “locked into a complex set of transactions” (p. 485). What has happened, 
Blumler and Gurevitch say, is that the relationship between the press and the politicians 
has grown increasingly intertwined over the past few decades. It is the quintessential 
love-hate relationship. They argue, fight, use each other, and in the end share the same 
disdain for members of the public. As a result, much of the news content that is produced 
is aimed at each other, and not the public. 
Blumler and Gurevitch describe the relationship as one that derives  
from interactions between (1) two sets of mutually dependent and mutually 
adaptive actors, pursuing divergent (though overlapping) purposes, whose 
relationships with each other are typically (2) role-regulated, giving rise to (3) an 
emergent shared culture, specifying how they should behave toward each other, 
the ground rules of which are (4) open to contention and conflicting 
interpretation, entailing a potential for disruption, which is often (5) controlled by 
informal and/or formal mechanisms of conflict management (p. 476-477). 
 
In the current political communication system, journalists and politicians talk at, 
around, and to each other, but not necessarily to the public. Such a relationship, although 
mutually beneficial, has consequences for the content that results. Blumler and Gurevitch 
(1981) suggest four possible consequences: (1) Established power holders hold a 
privileged position in such a system, and it is easier for them to get the media’s attention; 
(2) Despite the politicians’ relatively easy access, journalists still control how the 
message is presented; (3) The audience takes a back seat; and (4) It is hard for anything 
that deviates from the norm or that smacks of innovation to get attention, in part because 
so many people have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.  
Several other scholars have tackled the question of the media’s role when it 
comes to governance, but from the standpoint of who sets the agenda in Washington 
(Edwards & Wood, 1999; Epstein & Segal, 2000; Jacobs, et al., 1997; Kollman, 1998; 
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Manheim, 1994; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986). Essentially what they conclude is that the 
president has some ability to get issues into the public eye, Congress has less capacity to 
do so, and the media have the most power of all. If an issue achieves high salience in the 
media, then Washington officials are almost certainly going to have to address it. 
Role of Public Affairs Television 
This is where C-SPAN comes in. Over the course of its nearly 30-year existence, 
the network has become an integral part of Washington, D.C., politics. The network’s 
success in achieving this status is due in large measure to its ability to “maintain its 
position as an ‘honest broker,’ providing access to the public and the policymakers in a 
fair and honest way” (Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996, p. 327). Politicians ignore C-SPAN 
and the impact of its broadcasts of Congress at their peril because of its power to help 
them exchange and manage information, as well as give them one more way in which to 
reach constituents. Further, C-SPAN provides an easily accessible, permanent record of 
what representatives and senators say, or of what they do not say. As such, it can be a 
formidable election tool for both incumbents and challengers. In short, C-SPAN has 
become an institution in much the same way that Cook (1998) argued that the traditional 
national media have become an institution in Washington. Cook maintains that the 
national media and the federal government collaborate almost constantly in the 
dissemination of news, albeit without any sinister intent. In fact, Cook (1998) says, the 
government more often than not deliberately pursues media help in getting out its 
information rather than the other way around. This relationship between the media and 
government is so strong, he continues, that for all intents and purposes, the media should 
be considered as formal and structured a branch of governance as the three specifically 
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outlined in the U.S. Constitution and as intertwined with them as they are with each 
other. Despite this linking, however, the relationship is not as one-sided as it may seem 
because while the government may try to use the media to get its message out, it has little 
ability to control the final form the message actually takes. As an example, Cook (1998) 
cites the presidential press conference. All the elements of control are there for the White 
House public relations office—it sets the time, place, duration, topic, and parameters for 
questions, among other things. Yet what stories actually are written or broadcast, or, 
indeed, if any are written or broadcast at all, is out of the White House’s hands. In that 
sense, the relationship between the media and government is a negotiated one and one in 
which the media exercise influence as well. The question is whether the same can be said 
of statewide public affairs television. 
Statewide public affairs television imitates some of the elements of the C-SPAN 
model. While the stated mission of statewide public affairs television is “to proactively 
support the establishment and expansion of noncommercial networks devoted to 
providing citizens with access to unbiased information about state government 
deliberations and public policy events” (National Association of Public Affairs Networks, 
2006), research has shown that the general audience for these networks is small. 
Frantzich and Sullivan (1996) point to a 1995 Multimedia Audience Report that found 
that 8.6 percent of the population had viewed C-SPAN “within the last seven days.” On 
the other hand, Rowley and Kurpius (2006) found that 15.2 percent of those responding 
to a survey about statewide public affairs television said they had watched their network 
once in the last week. Although statewide public affairs television appears to have a 
larger audience that C-SPAN in terms of percentages, the numbers are somewhat 
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misleading because of the small sample in the survey. Statewide public affairs television 
still does not reach a majority of the available audience. Nor is it reasonable in this day 
and age of information overload and declining television viewership to expect that 
potential viewers will sit through coverage of entire legislative sessions. Most people 
simply do not have the time or the interest to make such an effort. Given that, the public 
affairs programming surrounding the gavel-to-gavel coverage takes on an added 
importance in giving citizens the opportunity to become informed about what 
government is doing. Such public affairs programming typically takes the form of 
legislative highlights shows, expert panels, journalist round tables, and audience call-in 
programs. While statewide public affairs television has great potential for such 
programming, in reality, the quality and amount of it varies markedly from state to state. 
Statewide public affairs television provides the opportunity for a different 
relationship—one between the politicians and the public. The networks effectively 
eliminate the commercial media component of the information flow, giving the public a 
more direct path to news about state government. Like C-SPAN’s content, the product 
these state networks offer is not unfiltered, although it is minimally edited. Decisions 
have to be made about what to cover. But once the decision is made, the coverage is 
complete from beginning to end, giving the public more of a chance to evaluate issues or 
debates for itself, without having reporters do it for them. Statewide public affairs 
television also offers citizens a way to expand both their knowledge of state government 




The Audience for Public Affairs Television 
Frantzich and Sullivan (1996) provide a fairly complete, though now a bit dated, 
demographic overview of the C-SPAN audience. They describe C-SPAN viewers as 
considerably more educated, older, and more male, with higher incomes and a greater 
interest in public affairs coverage than the general population. Their research found that 
30 percent of the C-SPAN audience held college degrees and that 52 percent of all 
college graduates have watched C-SPAN.  
Frantzich and Sullivan (1996) also found that only 14 percent of 18- to 24-year-
olds watched C-SPAN, while 16 percent of people ages 65 and older watched the 
network. More than 79 percent of viewers were non-minorities. The most interesting area 
in the study was political activity. C-SPAN viewers are more knowledgeable about 
current events and 98 percent of them vote (Viewer statistics, 2006). Frantzich and 
Sullivan (1996) say that C-SPAN viewers are twice as likely as non-viewers to discuss 
politics, contribute to campaigns, and write to members of Congress. The bottom line is 
C-SPAN attracts a politically interested and active set of viewers. Thus it is of no surprise 
that C-SPAN viewers are interested in issues coverage. 
In a survey conducted as part of a media credibility study, Rowley and Kurpius 
(2006) found that statewide public affairs television viewers share many of the 
characteristics of the C-SPAN audience, but they also demonstrate some differences. 
Statewide public affairs television viewers are primarily college-educated, middle-aged 
Caucasians who discuss politics, write letters to the editor, and contribute to political 
campaigns. Where they differ markedly from C-SPAN viewers is in gender and income. 
Survey responses indicated that the majority of statewide public affairs television viewers 
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are female and make less than $30,000 a year, which was an unexpected finding given 
the C-SPAN data and the anecdotal data from the people who run the statewide networks. 
In numerous interviews conducted as part of research prior to the survey (Kurpius & 
Rowley, 2004, 2003; Rowley & Kurpius, 2005), the administrators of these networks 
stated their firm belief that the audience for their content consisted primarily of 
legislators, legislative staff members, lobbyists, statehouse reporters, and a handful of 
political junkies—the elite.  
While the survey findings indicated that the audience is more diverse than that, 
the results also reiterated that most of the people who watch these networks are elites 
who use the content to monitor policy development issues, in the mode of the monitorial 
citizen described by Schudson (1998), Zaller (2003), Graber (2004), and others. One of 
the strongest findings was that the primary reason people watch statewide public affairs 
television is to hear about the day’s events. The easiest way for viewers to do this is 
through the legislative highlights programs many of these networks air. Such highlights 
shows by their nature focus on key pieces of information rather than specific details. 
They allow viewers to practice “environmental surveillance,” as Schudson terms it or 
react to the “burglar alarms” signaling important issues, in Zaller’s words. By watching 
this type of programming, viewers can stay informed about the issues they deem 
important, which is precisely how Graber (2004) describes today’s engaged citizens. 
They pay attention and take action as they feel the need. Indeed, the data showed that the 
viewers of these networks will engage in such activities as trying to persuade someone to 
adopt a particular political position, or contact a public official, or contribute to a 
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campaign. The willingness to participate and provide input, in turn, allows viewers to 
have an impact on how policies are shaped. 
Policy-Making 
As described previously, policy-making long has been recognized as one of the 
primary functions of government at any level. Yet the question of how policy is made is 
one that has stymied researchers for decades. As a result, a large body of work exists on 
the subject, but not a lot of agreement. Part of the problem stems from the complexity of 
the components that go into public policy (Dye, 1975; Ingram & Schneider, 1995). 
Ingram and Schneider, for instance, describe public policy as “a complex combination of 
elements, including goals and objectives, agents and implementation structures, targets, 
tools, rules, and rationales” (1995, p. 444). 
In trying to explain how policy is made, Schneider and Ingram (1993) decided to 
focus on how policy-makers conceive of, and act toward, various target populations in 
reaching their decisions. They developed a four-part typology of target populations on 
which to base their evaluations of policy-makers. Thus, they look at how decision-makers 
react to the advantaged, the contenders, the dependents, and the deviants in crafting 
policy. In their typology, Schneider and Ingram describe the advantaged as consisting of 
such segments of the population as the elderly, business people, veterans, and scientists. 
Contenders include the rich, large unions, minority groups, the cultural elite, and the 
Moral Majority. Dependents include children, mothers, and the disabled, and the deviant 
category consists of criminals, drug addicts, Communists, flag burners, and gangs. 
Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that these target populations vary according to power 
and influence, and therefore in their ability to affect policy decisions. At the same time, 
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they say, specific policy decisions can send a clear signal to a target population about 
what exactly its status is in the larger scheme of things. Public officials know this, too. 
In almost any policy area there are multiple logics that involve different target 
populations and/or different roles for target groups. Thus, even when public 
officials are pursuing widely held public interest goals, they are commonly able to 
provide benefits to powerful, positively constructed groups and burdens to less 
powerful, negatively constructed ones. (Schneider & Ingram, 1993, p. 337) 
 
That is, the benefits of policy decisions tend to go to the most influential target 
populations, while the negative effects fall disproportionately on the least powerful. 
The effect of public opinion on policy development is another area of contention 
among researchers. Edwards and Sharkansky (1978) believe there are two perspectives 
from which decision-makers can gauge what policy decisions to make. One is public 
opinion, the other rational analysis. On the surface, following public opinion seems to be 
an easy way to determine policy, Edwards and Sharkansky say. “To utilize this gauge, 
they (decision-makers) need only consult and evaluate public opinion and make their 
decisions in line with the public’s wishes. Reliance on public opinion as the basis for 
decisionmaking conforms with a prominent view of the way decisions ought to be made 
in a democracy” (1978, p. 5-6). The problem is that often most of the public has no 
particular policy preference. Further, officials frequently are limited by law in what 
decisions they can make, no matter what public opinion says. In addition, Edwards and 
Sharkansky (1978) say, since government officials spend a great deal of time trying to 
persuade the public to support various policy decisions, it is often hard to tell who is 
influencing whom. 
Edwards and Sharkansky also explore the idea of making policy decisions 
through a rational analysis framework. For that to work, they say, decision-makers must 
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follow five steps—identify the problem, determine precisely what the goals are and what 
priority they should have, gather all the information available on all the possible options, 
determine and assess the consequences of each option, and choose the option that best 
meets the goal. The problem is that the framework is unrealistic. Not only is 
policymaking an “ambiguous, complex, and conflictual process which cannot be broken 
down into neat categories” (Edwards & Sharkansky, 1978, p. 7), but also no government 
official has either the time or the resources to follow such a process. 
The idea of public opinion as a determinant of policy decisions can be broken 
down further into the conflict between elite and participatory models (Steelman, 2001), or 
between elite and mass opinion (Dye, 1975). In these frameworks, the participatory, or 
mass opinion, model promotes the inclusion of the general population in any decision-
making process. The elite model, on the other hand, suggests that policymaking “is best 
left to the domain of experts and thus is protected from the capricious influence of a 
potentially uneducated and impassioned public” (Steelman, 2001, p. 73). Steelman finds 
that neither model can account for all of the elements that must go into a policy decision. 
Rather, he says, some combination of the two seems to work best, with the understanding 
that there will be some change in the balance depending on the situation. “The goal 
should be to structure a decision such that the knowledge from the technical experts can 
inform the citizen participants, while the knowledge from the citizen participants informs 
the technical elite” (Steelman, 2001, p. 86). 
Other frameworks through which to study public policy have been posited as well 
by researchers. Schlager and Blomquist (1996), for example, examine three—institutional 
rational choice, structural choice, and the advocacy coalition framework. Institutional 
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rational choice theorists, they say, see “public policies as institutional arrangements—
rules permitting, requiring, or forbidding actions on the part of citizens and public 
officials” (p. 653). Structural choice proponents, on the other hand, believe public 
policies are formed as a result of “the interaction of interest groups, politicians, and 
bureaucrats within the context of democratic politics” (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 
655). The third of the frameworks—the advocacy coalition—argues that policy change is 
“a function of (1) the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions within a policy 
subsystem; (2) changes external to the subsystem (e.g., in socioeconomic conditions); (3) 
the effects of relatively stable system parameters (e.g., constitutional rules, basic social 
structure)” (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, p. 656). Here again, none of the frameworks is 
able to provide a full explanation for how policies are determined. 
Statewide public affairs television does not provide a full explanation for policy 
decisions either, nor is that its role, but it does allow citizens to hear policy debates and 
discussions, and to draw their own conclusions. In that regard, the networks follow in the 
footsteps of the Wisconsin Collaborative Project, one of the first efforts to revitalize 
broadcast television through the production of quality public affairs programming. The 
Wisconsin Collaborative Project focused on building relationships among local public 
television stations and producing content that encouraged the public’s participation in the 
democratic process. Often, a renewed interest in democracy is one of the first arguments 
made in favor of establishing a statewide public affairs television system, too.  
Norms and Routines 
Mass communication researchers have argued for decades that the production of 
news is very much a function of set routines dependent on official channels of 
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information (Bennett, 2003; Ericson, Baranek, & Chan, 1999; Fishman, 1980; Gans, 
1980; Golding & Elliott, 1999; Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Kaniss, 1991; McChesney, 
2000; Schlesinger, 1999; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978; among many 
others.) That is, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) write, media organizations are set up to 
provide their audiences with the most acceptable product in the most efficient manner, 
given the time and space constraints under which they work. To do that, the media have 
developed a specific set of routines that allows them to send reporters out to those 
sources where information is plentiful and easily accessible. These routines include a 
reliance on official sources for information, a focus on the most dramatic element of a 
story, regardless of whether it provides an accurate portrayal of the story as a whole, and 
a belief that there are only two sides to every story—for and against (Bennett, 1990; 
Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1980; Gitlin, 1980; Kaniss, 1991; Lawrence, 2000; Molotch & 
Lester, 1975; Tuchman, 1977, 1972, among others).  
The advantages in focusing on official sources are numerous. It saves time 
because officials tend to work in a handful of central locations, which means it is faster to 
find them. The offices where these officials work generally are repositories of 
information, so reporters can both talk to officials and find the documents they need or 
want without having to drive all over town. As Fishman (1980) explains it, the world is 
bureaucratically organized for journalists. 
Fishman (1980), Gans (1980), Gitlin (1980), Lawrence (2000), Molotch & Lester 
(1975), and Tuchman (1977, 1972), in particular, looked at journalists’ reliance on 
official sources for information. This reliance, they say, is driven in large part by media 
organization demands to gather as much information as possible as efficiently and 
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cheaply as possible. The tendency, then, is to gravitate toward centers of information, 
which almost inevitably are government centers—City Hall, the state Capitol, the 
courthouse, etc.—because sources and documents are concentrated in these places. The 
reporter can gather more information more quickly than he could if he had to go to many 
different places. The problem with this style of reporting is that it favors those in 
positions of power who have access to lots of information. Left out are those individuals 
and groups that do not have the ability to hand the media nicely packaged information. In 
addition, because journalists’ reliance on official sources becomes almost second nature, 
it becomes difficult for non-official sources to even get reporters’ attention. When it 
comes to choosing an official version of events or an alternative version, the media 
generally give the benefit of the doubt to officials. Still, this newsgathering routine is not 
inevitable or unchangeable. The media are capable of seeking out alternative sources of 
information as Kurpius (2003) showed in his study of local television stations and civic 
journalism, but outside funding and a visionary newsroom manager are critical to such 
efforts. When these civic journalism initiatives were successful, journalism norms and 
routines were altered temporarily as coverage focused on issues, or themes, rather than 
episodes, and greater attention was given to finding a diversity of sources, including 
sources from segments of the community that usually would be marginalized— 
particularly in McManus’ (1994) market-driven model and in Herman and Chomsky’s 
propaganda model. These best practices efforts, as Kurpius (2003) described them, 
tended to be limited to how long the foundation money held out or the primary driving 
force behind the project, i.e., the visionary, remained at the station. 
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Gitlin (1980), Lawrence (2000), and Molotch & Lester (1975) earlier had found 
out how difficult it is to alter journalism’s norms and routines with their studies of 
coverage of the Students for a Democratic Society protests, police use-of-force incidents, 
and the Santa Barbara oil spill, respectively. Even when the media do pay attention, the 
results can be a double-edged sword, as Gitlin found. The alternative group gets the 
publicity it wants for its cause, but ultimately the norms and routines of journalism as 
embodied by members of the mainstream media lead to the neutralization of the group. 
There are several reasons for this, Gitlin (1980) writes, but the biggest reason is that 
members of the traditional media tend to come from the elite class. They are mostly 
white, upper-middle to upper income, and well-educated, and they tend to share the same 
core values and belief in the American system as those in government. That makes these 
journalists more predisposed to go along with the government’s view of things and to 
frame their stories that way. Practically speaking, that means that alternative groups tend 
to be pictured on the fringes, as outsiders who pose a threat to society. The focus of 
coverage becomes the process of the protest, rather than the issues that are driving the 
protest. After the newness of the protest wears off, group members are left with the 
options of either moderating their views to fit more in line with the mainstream, or 
escalating their protest activities to get more media attention, which in turn pushes them 
even further to the fringes. 
Molotch and Lester (1975) found that accidental events, such as the Santa Barbara 
oil spill, offer non-official groups the opportunity to capture media attention, but 
eventually the normal order of things is restored. In the end, the official and the business 
versions of the oil spill prevailed in the media. Part of that had to do with the fact that the 
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major media are concentrated on the East Coast, which is also the business and 
governmental center of the country. In addition, the media are predisposed by virtue of 
their place among the elite and by the nature of the norms and routines under which they 
operate to take the official viewpoint. 
On the other hand, Lawrence (2000) argues, every now and again, an accidental 
happening is so momentous and so controversial that public outcry forces the media to 
adopt an adversarial role in dealing with official sources. Such was the case with the 
Rodney King incident. Normally, Lawrence (2000) says, police use-of-force incidents 
attract little media attention. On those rare occasions when they do, the media tend to 
give more credence to the official version of the incident. However, the Rodney King 
beating and videotape were so outside the norm and the public outcry was so immediate 
and sustained, that the media really had no choice but to follow the public’s lead. When 
that happens, Lawrence (2000) says, then there is a rare opportunity for meaningful 
change. 
Tuchman (1978) likens the reporting process to the casting of a net, but adds that 
the net only will gather information in those areas where it is cast and that the holes in the 
net vary in size, thereby limiting what gets caught. In particular, she argues, reporters, 
editors, and news directors have a tendency not to stray from well-established patterns 
and sources when it comes to gathering news. The news that is produced, therefore, does 
not really reflect society as much as it reflects the view of those in charge. It requires a 
conscious effort to look beyond the readily available to find information outside the norm 
(Fishman, 1980; Kaniss, 1991; Tuchman, 1978).  
 46
Fishman (1980) goes further, maintaining that “news is the result of the methods 
newsworkers employ” (p. 14). He argues that through their work routines, reporters do 
more than selectively report the news; they, in effect, create the news. The concern, of 
course, is that it is generally a creation of news as projected by the existing power 
authority. What the public sees is a view of the world as the government bureaucracy 
wishes it to be seen. Kaniss (1991), too, points out that journalists work under a set of 
“Standard Operating Procedures” that allow them “to internalize certain professional 
values that guide them in their search for news and in the way they package what they 
find. These standard operating procedures both assure that the journalist will be able to 
fill the newshole each day and that he or she will fill it efficiently” (p. 73). She 
concludes: 
The reliance on eager official sources for information, the lack of quantitative 
expertise, the need for sexy angles to stories, and the fragmented beat structure of 
metropolitan newspapers all combine to prevent journalists from presenting the 
public with a balanced presentation of the pros and cons of new policy initiatives. 
(Kaniss, 1991, p. 100) 
 
For television reporters, Kaniss (1991) says, the situation is even more 
pronounced.  
… the need for effective video and sound bites and for drama and emotion leads 
to a distortion of some news and, in general, to the de-emphasis of governmental 
news in favor of crime, fires, accidents, and disasters. When local television does 
cover government, it is often the sexier government stories or the more 
humanistic angles of government plans that are reported, frequently at the expense 
of more important information. (Kaniss, 1991, p. 132) 
 
Not surprisingly, these well-entrenched work routines have led to criticism that 
the media frame the news primarily in terms of how the elite or the powerful or those 
with disproportionate access to the press see it, thereby leaving out the views of those not 
in the mainstream. Tuchman (1978) puts it more succinctly: “Clearly, whom one asks for 
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information influences what information one receives. … That people with power serve 
as sources bears consequences for the information newsworkers uncover…” (p. 81). 
As described earlier, the norms and routines of journalism are designed to let 
reporters gather the most amount of information in the least amount of time and at the 
least cost possible. This element of norms and routines answers the demands of the 
market-driven model of journalism that prevails in this country (Bagdikian, 1997; 
Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994). When the bottom line is the overriding concern of 
media operations, then the most expedient way to deal with that is to develop a set of 
routines that minimizes the costs of doing business. 
Further, the norms and routines of journalism are self-perpetuating. Each 
generation of journalists is socialized into believing that these norms and routines are the 
best and only way to do things. The socialization process is not overt, as many scholars 
have found (Breed, 1999; Donsbach, 1999; Hardt & Brennen, 1995; McDevitt, 
Gassaway, & Perez, 2002; Sigelman, 1999). Instead, an unspoken code exists in most 
newsrooms about what is acceptable news coverage and what is not. It does not take too 
many instances of having a story sent back or killed outright for novice reporters to figure 
out what they need to do to get their copy on the air or on the front page.  
One of the biggest problems with the norms and routines of journalism, scholars 
say, is the type of content that eventually makes it to the public. Gans (1980) describes it 
as content built on scheduled events, officially sponsored events, and government-
centered events. Bennett (2003) argues that the norms and routines of journalism lead to 
content that is overly personalized, overly dramatic, fragmented, and unduly focused on 
the tension between authority and disorder. The public gets little in the way of insightful, 
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substantive issues coverage. Since the public takes its cues from the media about what it 
needs to pay attention to (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; Iyengar, 1990; McCombs & Shaw, 
1999), the opportunities for meaningful debate are almost nonexistent. The default then is 
to whatever the official view of things is. Even when journalists undertake investigative 
reporting efforts, Protess et al., say (1991), the public seldom takes notice. Rather, 
investigative reports only generate a response if the officials involved feel strongly 
enough to do something. 
Journalists also use their norms and routines to absolve themselves of any 
responsibility for the content they produce (Schudson, 1978; Soloski, 1999; Tuchman, 
1972). By using opposing sources, direct quotes, corroborating evidence, and the inverted 
pyramid style (Tuchman, 1972), journalists convince themselves that they have 
discharged their obligation to present a balanced story to readers or viewers. The fact that 
most stories do not lend themselves to such simplistic treatment never seems to be 
considered. 
Statewide public affairs television has its own set of norms and routines, which 
help shape its coverage. Legislative floor sessions are always covered, regardless of 
whether something more interesting is happening, such as a committee hearing on a 
controversial issue. The camera angles in both the legislative chambers and the 
committee meeting rooms are fixed, usually on whoever is speaking and on whoever is 
presiding over the session. Beyond identifying the speakers, many of the systems do not 
provide any sort of on-screen text that might give viewers some context to help decipher 
what they are watching. Critics of statewide public affairs television suggest that without 
context, the information these networks provide is not that useful to the average citizen. 
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Those who operate the networks counter that it is not their job to make interpretations for 
viewers nor is it their job to encourage them to participate in the deliberative process. It is 
simply to make the information available. 
Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis is marked by numerous theories, disagreements about 
content versus structure, and a history that encompasses both American and British 
research traditions. Even something as elemental as what constitutes a social network has 
been the subject of much debate. Banck (1973) summed up the lack of order, concluding 
that each researcher defines a network according to his or her needs. With no overarching 
theory to guide it, the path of social network analysis has been full of detours and side 
trips as one theory after another gained favor and then faded. Among them have been the 
balance theory (Heider, 1946), the exchange theory (Kapferer, 1969), the political 
economy framework (Benson, 1975), the focus theory (Feld, 1981), and the contact 
hypothesis (Nelson, 1989). In addition, different levels of analysis exist for social 
networks. For instance, Banck (1973) said, networks can be studied from the perspective 
of the influence of their structure on individual actions or from the perspective of an 
individual’s manipulation of the network for his own ends.  
Boissevain (1973), writing at the same time, provided this definition of a social 
network: “The basic postulate of the network approach is that people are viewed as 
interacting with others, some of whom in their turn interact with each other and yet 
others, and that the whole network of relations so formed is in a state of flux” (p. viii). 
Initially, social network analysis developed out of the social anthropology field 
and researchers’ dissatisfaction with the ability of the structural-functional framework to 
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explain the relationships that exist in complex, rapidly changing societies (Boissevain, 
1973; Noble, 1973). Anthropologists were accustomed to studying slowly evolving rural 
and tribal societies. But in the 20th century, the center of society shifted to urban areas, 
and a much faster pace of life developed. “Structural-functional analysis by definition 
views societies as essentially static, moral corporations whose members’ behaviour is 
explicable in terms of, if not determined by, jural rules” (Boissevain, 1973, p. vii). By the 
middle of the 20th century, such an approach to studying communities was unworkable. 
Social network analysis arose out of a desire among many researchers to create a 
theoretical framework that would “be more adequate in tackling problems of urban 
societies and tribal societies” (Noble, 1973, p. 9).  
Sociometric Analysis Tradition 
Scott (2000) defines three traditions that form the foundation for social network 
analysis. In the 1930s, sociometric analysts focused on the relationships found in small 
groups and developed the technical graphing methodology that often is used to depict the 
links among members of social networks. Among the early sociometric analysts were 
Kurt Lewin, Jacob Moreno, and Fritz Heider. Lewin believed that the field of social 
forces in which the group is located determines group behavior. Moreno developed the 
sociogram as a way to depict the formal properties of social configurations, and Heider 
examined how “a person’s various attitudes towards others are brought into a state of 
‘balance’ ” (Scott, 2000, p. 11).  
Some years later, Stanley Milgram developed his small world theory, and he and 
fellow researcher Jeffrey Travers devised an experiment to test its limits. Briefly, the 
theory poses the question, “what is the probability that any two people, selected 
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arbitrarily from a large population, such as that of the United States, will know each 
other?” (Travers & Milgram, 1969, p. 425). In the experiment, Travers and Milgram 
chose an arbitrary target person and a group of starting people. The goal was to generate 
an acquaintance chain from each starting person to the ultimate target person.  
In this case, the target person was a Boston stockbroker and the starting people 
comprised three groups—100 Nebraska blue-chip stockholders, 96 random Nebraska 
residents, and 100 random Boston residents. All were to mail a folder to the target person 
via a series of acquaintances. Ultimately, 64 of the 217 folders sent out, or 29 percent, 
made it to the target person. When broken down by group, 24 percent of the Nebraska 
random group, 31 percent of the Nebraska stockholders, and 35 percent of the Boston 
random group completed their acquaintance chains.  
The results were not statistically significant, but Travers and Milgram found 
“there is a weak tendency for higher completion rates to occur in groups where the mean 
length of the completed chains is shorter” (1969, p. 438). The mean length of the 
completed acquaintance chains was 5.7 for the Nebraska random group, 5.4 for the 
Nebraska stockholders, and 4.4 for the Boston random group. In addition, Travers and 
Milgram found that as the chains converged on the target, some intermediaries began to 
show up in more than one chain. “The 64 letters which reached the target were sent by a 
total of 26 people” (1969, p. 439). Further, among the senders, 86 percent sent their 
folder to friends and acquaintances, while 14 percent sent it to relatives. Although it used 
different terminology, the Travers and Milgram study can be viewed as a precursor to 
Granovetter’s work on strong and weak ties. 
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Early Harvard Tradition 
Another social network analysis tradition developed at Harvard University in the 
1930s and 1940s as researchers there studied “patterns of interpersonal relations and the 
formation of ‘cliques’ ” (Scott, 2000, p. 7). The Harvard researchers of that era pushed 
the social network field forward with the work of W. Lloyd Warner and Elton Mayo 
(Scott, 2000). Mayo’s research focused on business but with a sociological twist. He was 
concerned with individual motivation and its connection with Pareto’s “non-rational” 
components of action. Rather than the theoretical and applied concerns that Mayo was 
interested in, Warner preferred to study actual group behavior settings to test theories and 
to bring a level of empiricism to the research. He, Mayo, and other Harvard researchers 
collaborated on the Hawthorne and Yankee City studies.  
The Hawthorne studies revolved around employees at the Hawthorne Works of 
the Western Electric Company in Chicago. Researchers found that worker productivity 
rose regardless of any physical changes in the working conditions and that the increase 
was more a result of the workers being happy that they were the center of attention than 
of alterations in their environment. The Yankee City study focused on a small New 
England town, Newburyport, where Warner examined the social configurations that 
existed in the town and found both sub-groups and cliques. He defined sub-groups as 
family, church, classes, and associations. Cliques, on the other hand, were informal 
associations among people who felt a degree of intimacy with each other and in which 
norms of group behavior existed. Shortly after Warner finished the Yankee City study, 
several of his colleagues conducted the Old City study of a city in the Deep South with 
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the goal of explaining the internal structure of cliques. What they concluded was that 
cliques have three layers—the core, the primary circle, and the secondary circle. 
Homans then combined the two lines of research and developed a theoretical 
framework to describe group behavior.  
He divided the structure of any group into an ‘internal system’, which expresses 
the sentiments that arise through the interactions of its members and an ‘external 
system’ through which group activities are related to the problem of 
environmental adaptation. The environment itself consists of the physical, 
technical and social contexts of group behaviour (Scott, 2000, p. 25). 
 
The Manchester Anthropologists 
Finally, Scott (2000) says, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Manchester University 
anthropologists “built on both (the sociometric and Harvard University) strands to 
investigate the structure of ‘community’ relations in tribal and village societies” (p. 7). 
The best-known Manchester anthropologists of the period were John Barnes, Elizabeth 
Bott, and J. Clyde Mitchell. They emphasized looking at “structures as networks of 
relations” and “combined the formal techniques of network analysis with substantive 
sociological concepts” (Scott, 2000, p. 27).  
Barnes, for instance, studied the relationships among people living in the small 
Norwegian island community of Bremnes. He described social network theory as being 
useful in describing and analysing political processes, social classes, the 
relationship of a market to its hinterland, the provision of services and the 
circulation of goods and information in unstructured social environments, the 
maintenance of values and norms by gossip, structural differences between tribal, 
rural and urban societies, and so on (1969, p. 52-53).  
 
In his study of Bremnes, Barnes identified three types of social relationships: 
The first were the sets of relationships the islanders were involved in in their 
working life—the industrial system. The second embraced the relationships 
people became involved in by reason of their occupying a place in a territorial 
system of social relationships. But in addition to these there was a set of personal 
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relationships which interfused and cross-cut the set of relationships in the 
industrial and territorial systems. These were the relationships based on 
friendship, kinship and neighbourliness … (Mitchell, 1973, p. 15). 
 
Since 1954, when Barnes published his work on the people of Bremnes, Mitchell 
(1973) said, social network theory has evolved to encompass networks of agencies, 
organizations, and the units within them, but its origins remain in the analysis of the 
family unit. This was seen clearly in Bott’s 1955 study of 20 London families. Initially, 
she planned to use social class and the neighborhood to explain the variations she found 
in the division of household chores, but problems with her data led her to look for a 
different framework (Mitchell, 1973). She ended up turning to social networks, which she 
defined as consisting of friends, neighbors, and kinsfolk, to analyze the relationships 
within her subject families, and “she contrasted the relationships her couples had with 
these with the relationships derived from involvement in what she called ‘organized 
groups’, particularly those relating to work or local government, medical services and 
schools” (Mitchell, 1973, p. 16).  
Mitchell also came out of the Manchester tradition. He argued that there are two 
aspects to the study of social network theory. One is the structure of the network, that is, 
the patterns of the links (the morphological features) among the members. The other is 
the flow of communication into and out of the network (the interaction features). 
Although researchers have tended to focus on one aspect or the other in their studies, 
Mitchell (1969) suggested that the two are intertwined, each affecting and being affected 
by the other.  
Among other notable Manchester researchers were Epstein and Kapferer. Epstein 
(1969) developed the idea of qualitative differences in one’s social network. There is the 
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effective network, which consists of close-knit, socially equal ties. This part of the 
network tends to be compact. Then there is the extended network. These ties are more 
numerous but less closely knit and involve the members of one’s network who likely do 
not know each other well. 
Kapferer (1969) used a dispute among workers at an African mining company to 
study the tradeoffs that are inherent in the relationships that make up social networks. He 
found that the individual workers chose sides or picked issues that “allowed them to 
discharge their obligations to others without incurring too great a loss in their social 
investment built up over a period of time” (p. 243). A network approach to such a dispute 
“accounts for the selection of issues and norms, and variations in the manipulation of 
these norms to serve particular interests in a specific context” (Kapferer, 1969, p. 244). 
Contemporary Social Network Analysis 
Eventually, Scott (2000) says, the three strands of research converged at Harvard 
University in the 1960s and 1970s, and contemporary network analysis developed. Early 
social network analysis tended to have an anthropological or sociological focus, but by 
the 1970s, more and more researchers began to see its applicability to fields as diverse as 
psychology, political science, and communication. At Harvard, in particular, Granovetter 
helped propel this shift with his model of information diffusion. This model posited that 
acquiring information “depends upon, first, the motivation of those with information to 
pass it on, and second, the strategic location of a person’s contacts in the overall flow of 
information” (Scott, 2000, p. 35). 
But Granovetter (1973) went further in his research, focusing particularly on the 
strength of a person’s contacts, or ties, and the effect that has on the flow of information. 
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He argued that small-scale interpersonal networks—weak ties—turn limited interactions 
into larger patterns that in turn feed back into small groups. What he tried to show was 
“how the use of network analysis can relate this aspect (interpersonal ties) to such varied 
macro phenomena as diffusion, social mobility, political organization, and social 
cohesion, in general” (1973, p. 1361). He likened the ties among people in a network to 
bridges and argued that the more bridges that exist among members of network, the 
easier it is for information from a variety of sources to flow through. He concluded that 
those people in a network with many weak ties are in a better position to receive and 
disseminate information than those with strong ties.  
Burstein (1976), Burt (1976), and Crenson (1978) followed up on Granovetter’s 
work, conducting studies that focused on the transmission of information among 
members of networks. Burstein looked at data from the 1969 Israeli national elections in 
an effort to determine the relationship between party membership and voting. He 
hypothesized that “measures of political environment are often more highly correlated 
with party choice than are background attributes” and “the impact of the environment is 
to a significant extent independent of the impact of the attributes” (1976, p. 835). What 
he found was that network variables—that is, social ties—“have a significant impact on 
party choice independent of background attributes, and are important as mediators 
between background attributes and party choice as well” (1976, p. 845). 
Burt (1976) set out to develop a way to conceptualize the various relations 
between actors in a network. He started from the standpoint that there are two ways to 
look at the intensity of the relationship between two actors in a network: “from the 
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perspective of the two actors as a dyad which is only secondarily associated with the 
overall network” or  
from the perspective of the two actors as elements of the overall network. The 
former can be discussed in terms of an asymmetric individual distance from one 
actor to another. The latter can be discussed in terms of a symmetric social 
distance between the two actors in terms of their respective positions in the 
network. (1976, p. 94). 
 
In essence, he found that the intensity of the relationship between two actors in a 
network is affected by their relationships with each of the other actors in the network.  
For example, if one actor is a member of a clique which excludes the other actor, 
then they will have a greater social distance between them than they would if both 
actors were members of the same clique—even if the individual distances 
between them were the same under both circumstances. Further, the distance 
between the two actors would be larger still if each actor were a member of a 
clique which excluded the other actor (Burt, 1976, p. 95). 
 
Crenson (1978) examined six neighborhoods in Baltimore—two close-knit, two 
loose-knit, and two cosmopolitan—and their neighborhood associations to determine 
what sort of relationship networks among the residents existed, how those relationships 
functioned, and what effects they had on the residents. In particular, he wanted to know 
whether it was true that only close-knit neighborhoods could muster the means and the 
people to engage in local political life. What he found, however, was that knowledge of 
the existence of, and involvement in, the community associations was highest and most 
intense in the loose-knit neighborhoods. Those neighborhoods he termed cosmopolitan 
ranked second, and close-knit neighborhoods were last. The findings suggest “that loose-
knit networks may function more effectively than close-knit networks as mechanisms for 
spreading information about neighborhood associations” (Crenson, 1978, p. 581).  
Crenson reasoned that this is because members of loose-knit neighborhoods are 
more likely to have a variety of information sources and thus have access to more kinds 
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of information. “… the fact that loose-knit respondents became so well-informed about 
community associations is due, not to the size, but to the structure of their neighborhood 
social networks” (1978, p. 583).  
The flow of information proved to be the key in some later studies using social 
network analysis. Blau and Alba (1982), for example, looked at the networks among 
workers at a public children’s psychiatric facility. They wanted to know the effects of the 
networks on individual workers’ power within the organization. What they found was 
that “there were few, if any, cliques, and individuals tended to associate with others 
outside of their unit as often as they did with immediate colleagues” (1982, p. 366). They 
speculated that one reason for this was the intentional blurring of network lines. The 
facility’s staff and health care personnel held numerous meetings over the course of a 
week—both formal and informal—as they sought to keep each other informed about 
patients. In addition, there was a great deal of crossover from one work group to another, 
which meant that a nurse might preside over a committee meeting, while a doctor helped 
coach a ball game. Further, the more an individual worked with the children, the more 
personal power he or she acquired, and the more influence he or she was able to wield. 
Blau and Alba concluded that “group characteristics influence individuals’ positions in 
the configuration of power, effects that have consequences that permeate the 
organizational matrix” (1982, p. 376). 
A few years later, Burkhardt and Brass (1990) came to the same conclusion in 
their study of the effect adoption of new technology had on the network structure and 
power positions within a federal agency. What they found was that adoption of the new 
technology altered both. “Early adopters (of the technology) were able to reduce 
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uncertainty for others, and this uncertainty reduction ability enabled them to gain power 
and centrality” (1990, p. 119). Burkhardt and Brass (1990) concluded this would tend to 
give early adopters an advantage within the organization in the same way that innovative 
companies are able to rise to the top within an industry. Although Burkhardt and Brass 
were looking at the impact of new technology on a social network structure, their study 
also touches on one aspect of the diffusion of innovation—that of early adoption. The 
diffusion of innovation process encompasses four other stages of adoption and provides 
another perspective from which to examine the growth of statewide public affairs 
television. 
Diffusion of Innovation 
Diffusion of innovation is a longstanding theory used by scholars from many 
research fields, including rural sociology, sociology, anthropology, education, marketing, 
public health, and, more recently, mass communication (Katz, Levin, & Hamilton, 1963). 
Although most scholars cite the 1943 Iowa hybrid seed corn study conducted by Bryce 
Ryan and Neal C. Gross as the genesis for the theory, Rogers and Singhal (1996) give the 
credit to French sociologist Gabriel Tarde, who defined such concepts as “opinion 
leadership, the S-curve of diffusion, and the role of socioeconomic status in interpersonal 
diffusion” in his 1903 book The Laws of Imitation (p. 410-411). Anthropologists almost 
immediately seized upon Tarde’s work, using his concepts to investigate the role 
technological innovations play in spurring cultural change. One of the most notable of 
these studies was a 1923 study by Clark Wissler, who examined the diffusion of the horse 
among the Plains Indians in the United States (Rogers & Singhal, 1996). 
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Use of diffusion theory in academic research continued to grow, and in the 1950s, 
communications scholars adapted it to study the diffusion of news events (Rogers & 
Singhal, 1996). Paul J. Deutschmann and Wayne A. Danielson, in particular, popularized 
the theory with their 1960 study on the diffusion of news events, in which they concluded 
that information about news events spread much more rapidly throughout a society than 
adoption of the agricultural innovations Rogers was studying (Rogers & Singhal, 1996). 
As a result of the volume of work involving diffusion theory, many definitions 
have been developed. One of the most widely accepted comes from Rogers, who says, 
Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain 
channels over time among the members of a social system. An innovation is an 
idea, practice, or object perceived as new by an individual or other unit of 
adoption. The diffusion process involves both mass media and interpersonal 
communication channels. (Rogers & Singhal, 1996, p. 409) 
 
What makes diffusion of innovation unique, Rogers and Singhal (1996) say, is 
that it involves not only an awareness of the innovation, but also a decision to adopt and 
use it. These innovations, they add, are primarily technological in nature, and the two 
scholars argue that more qualitative research needs to be conducted into diffusion of 
innovation—particularly into the consequences of technological innovations. 
Katz, Levin, and Hamilton (1963) describe diffusion “as the (1) acceptance, (2) 
over time, (3) of some specific item—an idea or practice, (4) by individuals, groups, or 
other adopting units, linked (5) to specific channels of communication, (6) to a social 
structure, and (7) to a given system of values, or culture” (p. 240). The mass media, they 
point out, are usually successful in fostering the initial awareness of an innovation, but 
the acceptance of that innovation is affected more by interpersonal contact. That seemed 
to be borne out in earlier research (Kurpius & Rowley, 2004b), where interpersonal 
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contact among the leaders of the various statewide public affairs television systems 
seemed to be more of a factor in the diffusion of the technology needed to run them. 
Rogers’ model of diffusion of innovation features five stages—innovators, early 
adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards. Where the decision to establish a 
statewide public affairs television system falls on the scale may depend on the degree of 
interaction officials have with their counterparts in other states. DeFleur (1966) argues 
“actors in a social system who have already adopted a particular item ‘expose’ or 
otherwise influence those who have not” (p. 316). And Eyestone (1977) found that one of 
the components of diffusion is interaction. The more favorable the interaction, the more 
likely a policy or innovation will be diffused. A state “may emulate the policy of another 
state not because of expert pressure, but because the other state provides a timely model 
which may be seen as the solution to a vexing local political problem” (Eyestone, 1977, 
p. 441). Mintrom (1997) also makes the case for the importance of interaction, pointing 
out that networking allows the “policy entrepreneurs” to learn more about innovations 
elsewhere, to learn about the experiences of early adopters, and to learn how best to sell 
their innovations to their stakeholders.  
In fact, the officials who run these statewide public affairs television systems 
spend a great deal of time talking with other, from informal phone calls and e-mail 
messages to a formal meeting each year where they gather to discuss problems, issues, 
technology, etc. Their adoption of technology, in turn, has had a significant impact on 
their ability to provide information to the public. The adoption rates are mixed, however, 
with some operations using different technology in the same statehouse, and the 
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technology ranges from low-end basic equipment to more sophisticated, high-end 
cameras and control consoles. 
Most of the scholarship on diffusion theory has focused on its application to 
technological innovations. Walker (1969), however, used diffusion theory to study the 
propensity of states to adopt new programs and policies. Specifically, he looked at why 
some states adopt new programs more readily than others and then, once an innovation 
was adopted, how it spread among the states. To answer his questions, Walker (1969) 
analyzed 88 different programs adopted by the states before 1965, the dates they were 
adopted, and whether they were adopted at all. His data cover only the 48 contiguous 
states; Alaska and Hawaii were left out because there was not enough information 
available at the time to provide meaningful results. Through his analysis, Walker 
developed an innovation score for each state and concluded that new or experimental 
programs tend to be more easily accepted “in the industrialized, urban, cosmopolitan 
centers of the country (1969, p. 887). That is, those states scoring the highest on his scale 
not only were the ones most likely to embrace new policies, but they also tended to be the 
larger, wealthier, more populated states. 
Walker also examined what criteria decision-makers use in determining whether 
to even consider a proposal for a new program or policy and found that regionalism plays 
a significant role in state policy-making. State decision-makers often look  
to each other for guides to action in many areas of policy … In fact, I am arguing 
that this process of competition and emulation, or cuetaking, is an important 
phenomenon which determines in large part the pace and direction of social and 
political change in the American states. (Walker, 1969, p. 890)  
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In essence, regional proximity has a large effect on whether a state decides to adopt a 
policy. If one or more of its neighbors have adopted the policy in question, than a state is 
more likely to consider doing the same. 
Gray (1973) also studied policy innovation among the states. She examined the 
rates at which laws were adopted in three policy areas—welfare, education, and civil 
rights—and concluded that “… ‘innovativeness’ is not a pervasive factor (in policy 
decisions); rather, it is issue- and time-specific at best” (1973, p. 1185). Gray differed 
from Walker in her conclusion, arguing that developing an average innovativeness score 
for each state was not an accurate way to gauge how innovative that state is. Instead, she 
said, the degree to which a state can be considered innovative depends on the specific 
issue or policy under consideration and the political and environmental circumstances at 
the time. 
Eyestone (1977), however, believed both Walker’s and Gray’s analyses of policy 
diffusion have some shortcomings. Gray, he said, opted to fit the diffusion process to an 
interactive equation and in the process assumed that the states are interchangeable. Only 
six of the 12 areas she examined showed an interactive effect. The results for the rest 
indicated independent adoption decisions by the states. On the other hand, the problem 
with Walker’s analysis, Eyestone said, was that it suggested an emulative pattern of 
adoption with a regional component. That is, the states tend to follow the regional leaders 
in deciding whether to adopt a policy. Eyestone concluded that was too simplistic an 
explanation for how policies are spread among the states. Instead, he said, the diffusion 
of policies among the states is a complex phenomenon, and different models—such as 
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interactive effects, independent adoption, and federal mandate—can provide only partial 
explanations for how it occurs. 
Foster (1978) later re-examined the data from Walker’s study and found his 
regionalism explanation for policy diffusion to be a valid one but also one that does not 
provide a complete explanation for how policies spread. More recently, Jensen (2004) 
looked at the diffusion of policy, and found that it is, indeed, a complex process. In his 
study of the spatial diffusion of public policies, Jensen combined organizational theory 
with public policy research in an effort to develop a richer, deeper analysis. He came up 
with two possible models to explain how policy is diffused—the internal determinants 
model and the regional diffusion model. The internal determinants model posits that 
“policy adoption occurs as a result of political, social, or economic variables specific to 
the governmental division (i.e., state),” while the regional diffusion model suggests that 
“policy diffusion occurs regionally and that proximity determines adoptions” (2004, p. 
109). 
Clearly the common thread running through all of these theories is regional 
proximity. States look to see what their neighbors are doing. The effect of regionalism on 
how states make decisions also fits with the political culture research, which finds 
clusters of states sharing similar approaches to government and governmental decisions. 
In looking at those states that have statewide public affairs television, it is clear that 
regionalism does come into play. For example, the Pacific Coast states—Washington, 
Oregon, and California—all have systems. So do Minnesota, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, and Wisconsin has a system in the development phase. In 
the Northeast, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts all have systems. 
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These systems are characterized by three primary elements. First, they foster the 
production of content with minimal editing and resources and provide that content to the 
public. Such technology innovations as robotic cameras, automatic systems, non-linear 
editing capability, and digital cameras have made it possible for many of these systems to 
set up with limited resources, considering the amount of content they work to cover. The 
technology also allows them to tighten or broaden the scope of their operations as 
circumstances permit (Kurpius & Rowley, 2004b). Second, the content these systems 
produce is a source of information for reporters working for more traditional media, such 
as newspapers and commercial television (Rowley & Kurpius, 2005). In addition to 
providing basic gavel-to-gavel coverage, many of these systems can cover events outside 
of the capital, shift coverage easily from one chamber to another or from one committee 
room to another, develop their own public affairs programming, and offer non-
government related content if they wish. Finally, with just a few exceptions, these 
systems tend not to hire trained journalists, but instead rely on employees with technical 
backgrounds (Kurpius & Rowley, 2004b).  
 Rogers and Singhal (1996) talked about the need to study the consequences of the 
diffusion of technological innovations. One of the consequences of this diffusion of 
technology is that it helps the diffusion of information and ultimately leads to the creation 
of additional space on television (including cable, satellite, and broadcast) for state public 
affairs content. For instance, at one statewide public affairs television system that relied 
on the two legislative bodies to provide coverage, there was no provision for archiving. 
One of the engineers at the statehouse took it upon himself to handle the task. There in 
the control room behind the racks are rows of DVCam tapes—digital recordings of the 
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proceedings that make up the most comprehensive archive that system has to date. This 
potentially important video archive holds value as the network covers state issues over 
time. The engineer simply thought someone might want them someday and that it was a 
shame to miss the opportunity.  
In the end, information is the key. For decades, the commercial media provided 
the primary means for watching what state government was doing. That role has 
diminished considerably, however, in the wake of a changing industry, leaving the 
question of where the public can go to get the information it wants or needs. Statewide 
public affairs television systems offer an alternative, but only if state governments make 
the conscious policy decision to establish them. 
The availability of new technology has allowed statewide public affairs television 
to create content that distinguishes it from traditional media. That content tends to be 
more substantive, more complete, and more widely disseminated than that of traditional 
media. The wider dissemination comes courtesy of the cable systems in each state, which 
set aside channel space for statewide public affairs television because they need the 
content to fill airtime and because it demonstrates their commitment to public service. 
This, in turn, helps the cable systems maintain their monopolies in the communities they 
serve. The more substantive and complete coverage the networks air is a result of the 
unfiltered nature of the content and the ability of the statewide public affairs television 
systems to stay with legislative hearings and floor sessions from start to finish. 
 Institutionalism 
The work in institutional theory essentially comes down to trying to answer two 
questions: How does one define an institution, and how does one explain how an 
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institution functions? For more than a century scholars have debated these questions in 
the context of institutionalism and the closest they have come to an answer is … it 
depends. Specifically, it depends on what area one is talking about (economics, 
sociology, or political science), what academic tradition one is talking about (European or 
American), and what time frame one is talking about (early institutionalism versus new 
institutionalism).  
The definitions of institutionalism have proved to be as varied as the scholars who 
have studied it. Hughes (1936), for instance, explained it this way: “The only idea 
common to all usages of the term institution is that of some sort of establishment or 
relative permanence of a distinctly social sort” (p. 180). Selznick (1957) had this 
definition:  
Institutionalization is a process. It is something that happens to an organization 
over time, reflecting the organization’s own distinctive history, the people who 
have been in it, the groups it embodies and the vested interests they have created, 
and the way it has adapted to its environment … In what is perhaps its most 
significant meaning, ‘to institutionalize’ is to infuse with value beyond the 
technical requirements of the task at hand. (p. 16-17)  
 
Davis and North (1970) had this explanation:  
At one time or another it (the word institution) has been used to refer to 
organizations (a bank, for example, is a financial institution), to the fundamental 
legal rules that govern the economic relations between people (the institution of 
private property), to a person or a position (the president or presidency), and even 
at times to something as slight as a particular document (the Mayflower 
Compact). (p. 132) 
  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that “institutionalization involves the processes by 
which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rulelike status in 
social thought and action” (p. 341). And North, writing later, further refined his 
definition. Institutions “are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive 
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team sport. That is, they consist of formal written rules as well as typically unwritten 
codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules” (1990, p. 4). 
Institutionalism and Economics 
 
Scott (2001) provides one of the clearest overviews of the development of 
institutional theory, tracing its evolution over time and through various permutations. 
Starting with economics, Scott (2001) describes how the theory first came to prominence 
in Germany in the 19th century. The arguments forming the basis for the theory grew out 
of a debate over scientific method in the social sciences and whether one should start 
with human behavior in explaining how economic systems work or develop economic 
principles that could be both timeless and abstract. Neither side yielded, and it was left to 
later generations to reach a compromise. In the United States, Jacoby (1990) says, 
Institutionalism swept American economics in two waves: the first appeared in 
the eighteen seventies and eighties, and included the work of Ely, Seligman, and 
Patten; the second—and more influential—crested during the two decades after 
1900, and included the work of Veblen, Mitchell, and Commons. (p. 318) 
 
Scott explains that although Veblen, Mitchell, and Commons all viewed 
institutionalism and economics differently, all were critical of conventional economic 
models because they involved unrealistic assumptions about human behavior and paid 
little attention to the importance of historical change in studying how people behave. 
Veblen believed that people’s economic behavior was determined in large part by habit 
and convention. He defined institutions “as ‘settled habits of thought common to the 
generality of man’ ” (Scott, 2001, p. 3). Commons, for his part, dismissed the notion of 
individual choice behavior and focused instead on the idea of transactions as the driving 
force behind behavior. He argued that institutions were nothing more than an imperfect 
solution to a set of problems. Mitchell maintained that institutionalism offered a superior 
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way to understand economics, as opposed to the competing neoclassical view. 
Conventional economics, he said, “was a hindrance to understanding the nature of the 
business cycle, and he devoted much of his energies to studying economic change. Like 
all institutionalists, he was reluctant to embrace an assumption of economic equilibrium” 
(Scott, 2001, p. 4). Despite their prominence and their arguments, Veblen, Commons, 
Mitchell, and their theoretical supporters failed to prevail. Instead, proponents of 
neoclassical economics prevailed and continue to dominate today. 
The new institutional economics takes a somewhat different approach, viewing 
transactions as the primary unit of analysis. The pioneer here is Ronald Coase and his 
1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm.” Coase was the first one to explore the idea of 
transaction costs in the formation of institutions. He was trying to answer the question of 
why some economic exchanges are subject to imposed rules or enforcement mechanisms 
rather than the free market. What he determined is that “there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism” (p. 389). That cost is the cost “of negotiating and concluding a separate 
contract for each exchange transaction which takes place in a market” (Coase, 1937, p. 
389). That is, institutions—firms—arise because of transaction costs. Scott (2001) points 
out that Coase’s insight attracted little attention until Williamson resurrected it with his 
work on institutional economics in the 1970s.  
Williamson extends Coase’s arguments by pushing them beyond the market 
versus firm comparison to consider a wide variety of ‘governance systems’ 
ranging from markets to hybrid organizational forms, such as franchising or 
alliance arrangements; to hierarchical structures, such as unified firms and 
multidivisional corporations. (Scott, 2001, p. 30) 
 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) explained transaction costs this way:  
The parties to an exchange wish to economize on transaction costs in a world in 
which information is costly, some people behave opportunistically, and rationality 
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is bounded. The challenge, then, is to understand how such attributes of 
transactions as asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency give rise to specific 
kinds of economic institutions. According to organizational economists, 
institutions reduce uncertainty by providing dependable and efficient frameworks 
for economic exchange. (p. 4) 
 
Among the new institutional economists, North is perhaps the most recognized. 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) describe North as  
… one of the few economists to attend to the importance of ideology and the state 
in maintaining institutions. As exchanges among individuals grow more 
specialized and complex, contracts require third-party enforcement, a demand that 
is met by political institutions, which play a positive role in specifying and 
enforcing property rights. But states vary greatly in the ways they define property 
rights, and citizens may view political institutions as more or less legitimate, 
depending on their ideologies. When ideological consensus is high, opportunistic 
behavior is curbed. When it is low, contracting costs are higher and more energy 
is expended on efforts at institutional change. Thus ideological consensus 
represents an efficient substitute for formal rules. (p. 5) 
 
North (1990), himself, refers to institutions as entities that “exist to reduce the 
uncertainties in human interaction” (p. 25). As such, they involve exchange 
relationships—monetary and otherwise. That is, each party has something the other wants 
and they negotiate to reach a means—a framework—by which they can trade. Over time, 
these “rules” become accepted across societies and eventually reach institutional status. 
He points out that there is nothing inherently fair or equal about these exchange 
relationships, but that generally each side believes it is getting something of value.  
Institutionalism and Political Science 
 
The institutional approach to the study of political science dominated the field in 
both Europe and the United States in the second half of the 19th century and the early 
decades of the 20th century. The leading American proponents of the institutional 
approach in political science were J.W. Burgess, Woodrow Wilson, and W.W. 
Willoughby. Their work was based on constitutional law and moral philosophy and 
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focused primarily on the legal frameworks and administrative arrangements of specific 
political systems or governance mechanisms.  
Bill and Hardgrave (1981) described the institutional school of the early 20th 
century as fixated on formal structures and legal systems, more interested in detailed 
descriptions of specific political systems and the explanation of normative principles than 
in the development of testable propositions. Such a focus on the micro-aspects gave way 
in the 1930s to the behavioralist approach. The behavioralist proponents sought to shift 
the focus away from the study of the institutional structures inherent in political systems 
and toward the way people behaved in political systems, such as voting behavior, party 
formation, and public opinion. Like the early institutionalists in economics, however, the 
behavioralists pushed too far in the opposite direction from the “configurational” 
theorists, with the result that a new institutionalism arose in political science.  
The current institutionalists  
do not call for a return to “configurational history” but do seek to reestablish the 
importance of normative frameworks and rule systems in guiding, constraining, 
and empowering behavior. Moreover, it has come to be recognized that formal 
structures can exert important influences in social life apart from their effects on 
the behavior of those subject to them. (Scott, 2001, p. 8) 
 
Institutionalism and Sociology 
 
The history of institutionalism in sociology is almost as long as that of 
institutionalism in economics. In this case, Scott (2001) says, the most influential thinker 
throughout the 20th century is considered to be Herbert Spencer, whose work spanned 
1876-1896. Spencer’s conception of “society as an organic system evolving through 
time” (Scott, 2001, p. 9) guided most of the major scholars in the field, including Sumner, 
who found that an institution “consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a 
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structure” (Scott, 2001, p. 9). In essence, Scott says, Sumner’s concept “defines the 
purposes or functions of the institution; the structure embodies the idea of the institution 
and furnishes the instrumentalities through which the idea is put into action” (2001, p. 9). 
After Sumner, Scott says, 
Kingsley Davis (1949) defined institutions as ‘”set of interwoven folkways, 
mores, and laws built around one or more functions,” adding that in his opinion, 
“the concept of institutions seems better than any other to convey the notion of 
segments or parts of the normative order.” (2001, p. 9)  
 
While the work of Spencer, Sumner, and Davis was built around the various social 
groups to which people belong—family, work, church, economic status, etc.—Cooley 
focused on “the interdependence of individuals and institutions, of self and social 
structure” (Scott, 2001, p. 10), and Hughes argued that institutions could be found in the 
“standardized behavior of individuals” (Scott, 2001, p. 10). 
In Europe, the institutional tradition in sociology is generally traced to Marx. 
 
Marx, working in the early decades of the industrial revolution, saw the key 
structures as the economic: Productive activity had been transformed into 
involuntary labor. Under a capitalist system, work was no longer an expression of 
creative productivity; it was alienated labor. The nature and meaning of work and 
work relations were seen to be transformed by structures of oppression and 
exploitation. These structures—involving the accompanying beliefs, norms, and 
power relations—are the product of human ideas and activities, but they appear to 
be external and objective to their participants. (Scott, 2001, p. 12) 
 
After Marx, Durkheim and Weber are usually cited as among the major European 
scholars in institutionalism and sociology. Durkheim focused on the role symbolic 
systems, shared cognitive frames, and schemas play in the creation and maintenance of 
social institutions, while Weber sought to understand “the ways in which cultural rules, 
ranging in nature from customary mores to legally defined constitutions or rule systems, 
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define social structures and govern social behavior, including economic structures and 
behavior” (Scott, 2001, p. 13). 
Scholars working with the new institutionalism in sociology have tended to focus 
their attention on organizations and the people within those organizations. Such a 
perspective, Powell and DiMaggio (1991) say,  
emphasizes the ways in which action is structured and order made possible by 
shared systems of rules that both constrain the inclination and capacity of actors 
to optimize as well as privilege some groups whose interests are secured by 
prevailed rewards and sanctions. (p. 11) 
 
The new institutional sociology draws from a number of fields, including social 
psychology, anthropology, phenomenology and cultural studies, and ethnomethodology. 
Geertz (1973), for instance, developed a concept focusing on the symbolic features of 
culture, while Durkheim and Parsons moved institutional thinking in the direction of 
shared knowledge and belief systems. Meyer and Rowan (1977) moved the work further, 
arguing that institutions form as the rules that govern a specific work activity become 
established and expand as these rules become incorporated into the structural framework. 
Meyer and Rowan were interested in the macro effects of institutionalism. Zucker, on the 
other hand, examined the micro effects, emphasizing how cognitive beliefs anchor 
behavior. “… social knowledge, once institutionalized, exists as a fact, as part of 
objective reality, and can be transmitted directly on that basis” (1977, p. 726). 
Today’s Institutionalism 
 
The early work of the institutionalists, while considered crucial to the 




Scott described those limitations this way: 
Little attention was accorded to organizations. Some theorists focused their 
analyses on wider institutional structures—on constitutions and political systems, 
on language and legal systems, on kinship and religious structures—whereas 
others emphasized the emergence of common meanings and normative 
frameworks out of localized social interaction. Few, however, treated 
organizations themselves as institutional forms or directed attention to the ways in 
which wider institutions shaped collections of organizations. (2001, p. 18) 
 
Later institutionalists—the new institutionalists—made organizations the primary focus 
of their research. Specifically, they were concerned with how organizations develop into 
institutions and how those institutions in turn maintain their legitimacy. Powell and 
DiMaggio attributed the development to March, Simon, and others who 
… developed an array of insights that students of organization now regard as 
foundational elements: the importance of uncertainty and its reduction through 
organizational routines; the notion that the organization of attention is a central 
process out of which decisions arise; the concern with the implications of decision 
making when choices are made under conditions of ambiguity about preferences, 
technology, and interpretation; and the many insights that follow from the view of 
decision making as a political process involving multiple actors with inconsistent 
preferences. (1991, p. 18-19) 
 
In this view, institutionalization of various organizations spreads by a “contagion 
of legitimacy,” to use Zucker’s (1988) phrase. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue that 
organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field 
that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful. The ubiquity of certain 
kinds of structural arrangements can more likely be credited to the universality of 
mimetic processes than to any concrete evidence that the adopted models enhance 
efficiency. (p. 70) 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) further explored what it is that makes organizations 
so similar and why it matters whether that is understood or not.  
Fields only exist to the extent that they are institutionally defined. The process of 
institutional definition, or “structuration,” consists of four parts: an increase in the 
extent of interaction among organizations in the field; the emergence of sharply 
defined interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; an 
increase in the information load with which organizations in a field must contend; 
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and the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of 
organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise (DiMaggio, 1982). 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148) 
 
In the process, DiMaggio and Powell created a framework for isomorphism that 
this study will use to examine whether statewide public affairs television has achieved 
institutional status. In their model of institutional isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell 
offer three ways in which change can occur: "…1) coercive isomorphism that stems from 
political influence and the problem of legitimacy; 2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from 
standard responses to uncertainty; and 3) normative isomorphism, associated with 
professionalization" (1983, p. 150). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe coercive isomorphism as resulting "from 
both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon 
which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which 
organizations function" (p. 150). More relevant to statewide public affairs television is 
their summary of Meyer and Rowan:  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) have argued persuasively that as rationalized states and 
other large rational organizations expand their dominance over more arenas of 
social life, organizational structures increasingly come to reflect rules 
institutionalized and legitimated by and within the state (also see Meyer and 
Hannan, 1979). As a result, organizations are increasingly homogeneous within 
given domains and increasingly organized around rituals of conformity to wider 
institutions. (p. 150) 
 
With mimetic isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell say,  
Uncertainty is also a powerful force that encourages imitation. When 
organizational technologies are poorly understood (March and Olsen, 1976), 
when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic 
uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations. … The 
modeled organization may be unaware of the modeling or may have no desire to 
be copied; it merely serves as a convenient source of practices that the borrowing 
organization may use. Models may be diffused unintentionally, indirectly through 
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employee transfer or turnover, or explicitly by organizations such as consulting 
firms or industry trade associations. (1983, p. 151) 
 
Normative isomorphism stems from professionalization, DiMaggio and Powell 
say.  
Following Larson (1977) and Collins (1979), we interpret professionalization as 
the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and 
methods of their work, to control “the production of producers” (Larson, 1977:49-
52), and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational 
autonomy. (1983, p. 152) 
 
Specifically, they say, uniformity in the formal education or training for a field 


















The mass communication, political science, and sociological theories at the heart 
of this study fit well with DiMaggio and Powell’s model for institutional isomorphism. 
Policy-making can be placed under the coercive process part of the model, social network 
analysis and diffusion of innovation under the mimetic process, and civic engagement 
and norms and routines under the normative process. In this way, institutionalism 
provides the framework for using these theories to determine whether statewide public 
affairs television can be deemed to have become an institution.  
From a civic engagement perspective, statewide public affairs television provides 
the information and opportunity for non-elites to participate in policy discussions and to 
have an impact on what decisions are made. But there are questions about how well these 
networks achieve that goal because of problems with accessibility, public awareness of 
the systems, and programming limitations created by varying operational structures. The 
answers, in turn, affect the public’s ability to gather the information necessary to get 
involved in the process in a substantive way. 
The policy-making component offers another way to examine the role statewide 
public affairs television plays in the state governing process. Previous research suggests 
that the primary audience for these networks is an elite one whose members are directly 
involved in public policy debates and decisions. What is important to know is how they 
use statewide public affairs television in the policy-making process. 
Traditionally in mass communication, norms and routines refer to the specific 
manner in which journalists do their jobs. Earlier research (Rowley & Kurpius, 2005) 
showed that these networks have had a subtle, but noticeable, impact on the norms and 
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routines of statehouse reporter. The question is whether the same can be said of 
legislative staff members and lobbyists. Diffusion of innovation and social network 
analysis offer two more perspectives from which to study statewide public affairs 
television. Similarities in operational structures and programming also would suggest that 
these networks have become institutionalized. 
Out of these theoretical components one primary research question and seven 
secondary research questions were developed. 
Primary research question: Has statewide public affairs television achieved 
institutional status and become an integral part of the state governing process? 
Research question 1: How do elite audiences use the content produced by 
statewide public affairs television? 
Research question 2: What role do elite audiences play in the content decisions of 
statewide public affairs television?  
Research question 3: Has statewide public affairs television had an impact on how 
the state conducts business?  
Research question 4: How do non-elite audiences use the content produced by 
statewide public affairs television? 
Research question 5: How have programming and technological innovations 
helped in the development of statewide public affairs television as an institution? 
Research question 6: What obstacles hinder the development of statewide public 
affairs television into an institution? 
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Research question 7: Does statewide public affairs television provide a viable 
alternative to commercial broadcasting in fulfilling the public information and education 








































This project combines qualitative and quantitative methodologies in seeking to 
answer whether statewide public affairs television has achieved institutional status. The 
qualitative component features a multi-faceted approach, using comparative case study, 
in-depth—or long—interviews, and ethnographic observation. The quantitative element 
consists of a random national telephone survey. The use of multiple methodologies, or 
triangulation, in mass communication research is an approach that is more the exception 
than the rule (Cooper, Potter, & Dupagne, 1994; Kamhawi & Weaver, 2003; Trumbo, 
2004).  Cooper, Potter, and Dupagne (1994), for instance, analyzed the methodologies 
found in articles in eight journals between 1965 and 1989. The journals they analyzed 
were Communication Monographs, Communication Research, Critical Studies in Mass 
Communication, Human Communication Research, Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media, Journal of Communication, Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly, and Quarterly Journal of Speech. They found that 57.8 percent of the articles 
reported quantitative methods, 35.1 percent reported qualitative, and 7.2 percent mixed 
methods (qualitative and quantitative). (Their results were estimates based on sampling of 
the total articles over that period.)  
Ten years later, Trumbo (2004) replicated the study and found that between 1990 
and 2000, 57 percent of the articles reported quantitative methods, 41 percent reported 
qualitative, and 2 percent reported mixed (qualitative and quantitative). Kamhawi and 
Weaver (2003) examined a somewhat different set of journals (Communication 
Monographs, Communication Quarterly, Communication Research, Critical Studies in 
Mass Communication, Human Communication Research, Journal of Broadcasting & 
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Electronic Media, Journal of Communication, Journalism & (Mass) Communication 
Monographs, Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, and Public Opinion 
Quarterly) between 1980 and 1999, but they found essentially the same results—71.9 
percent of the articles used a quantitative methodology, 25.6 percent used a qualitative 
methodology, and 2.5 percent used a combination. 
Mixed methods research is not a new concept (Brewer & Hunter, 2006; Campbell 
& Fiske, 1959; Erzberger & Prein, 1997; Weaver, 1988, 1993). The approach first came 
to prominence in a landmark 1959 article written by Campbell & Fiske, but scholars 
since then have been slow to adopt it in any great numbers (Cooper, Potter, & Dupagne, 
1994; Kamhawi & Weaver 2003; Trumbo, 2004). Despite this, the mixed methods 
approach offers some advantages. Chief among them, Weaver (1993) says, is that a 
mixed methodological approach can “provide more complete and more valid answers to 
many of the questions about communication than do the commonly used single methods 
such as content analysis, experiments and surveys” (p. 203).  Erzberger & Prein (1997) 
argue that one of the primary reasons to consider mixed methodologies is the fact that 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches offer advantages as well as disadvantages. 
Whereas quantitative research often neglects the fact that social structures can 
only survive if they are actively reproduced and interpreted by social actors, 
qualitative researchers tend to ignore that there is an objective social reality 
beyond individual interpretations or they tend not to distinguish between 
narratives and reality (Erzberger & Prein, 1997, p. 142).  
 
By combining the approaches, the weaknesses could be, if not overcome, at least 
mitigated.  
What a mixed methods approach means in practice is that  
… the research design is split in two distinct and mutually exclusive parts: 
different data sets are collected, one of them consisting of numerical data, for 
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example collected with survey questionnaires … The other data set could consist 
of unstructured textual material, for example transcripts of open-ended questions 
in questionnaires or interviews, or verbal records from participant observation. 
(Erzberger & Prein, 1997, p. 143)  
 
In fact, that is the case with this study. Qualitative data were collected via in-
depth interviews and ethnographic observation. The quantitative data came from a 
telephone survey. 
The Qualitative Component 
Qualitative researchers employ a variety of methodologies in gathering data—
methodologies that allow them to collect and analyze their information in such a way as 
to capture subtler meanings and nuances than is often possible with more quantitatively 
oriented processes. Among the most widely used methodologies in qualitative research 
are case studies, long interviews, and ethnographic observation. Although each stands 
alone as a methodology, in reality most qualitative research projects use some 
combination of these techniques because each offers a different perspective on the data 
being gathered.  
Hamel, Dufour, and Fortin (1993) describe the case study approach as one that 
takes an in-depth look at the cases under consideration using various means—interviews, 
participant observation, and field studies, for example. The case study’s strong suit, they 
argue, is that “it has proven to be a powerful descriptive study” (p. 33). Case studies, too, 
offer the chance to examine a larger community while focusing on a few representative 
examples. Stake (2000) observes that the case study method is a way in which  
a researcher may jointly study a number of cases in order to investigate a 
phenomenon, population, or general condition … They may be similar or 
dissimilar, redundancy and variety each important. They are chosen because it is 
believed that understanding them will lead to better understanding, perhaps better 
theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases. (p. 437) 
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Ragin (1987) and Burawoy et al. (1991) also argue in favor of case studies, 
pointing out that they are relevant for interpreting historical or culturally significant 
phenomena or advancing theory. Ragin (1987), in particular, makes the case for the 
comparative case study method, adding that those researchers “who use case-oriented 
strategies often want to understand or interpret specific cases because of their intrinsic 
value” (p. 35).   
The long interview is a focused, intense methodology based on an open-ended 
questionnaire that provides structure to the research and ensures that the same topics are 
covered with each respondent. It is especially useful in situations where there is not time 
for an extended participant observation study or where privacy concerns prevent the 
researcher from getting close enough to the subjects of the study. McCracken (1988) says 
that the long interview “seeks to diminish the indeterminacy and redundancy that attends 
more unstructured research processes” (p. 7). The methodology further allows researchers 
to concentrate on developing broad categories that try to explain cultural patterns and 
shared meanings. “The method can take us into the mental world of the individual,” 
McCracken says, “to glimpse the categories and logic by which he or she sees the world. 
It can also take us into the lifeworld of the individual, to see the content and pattern of 
daily experience.” Bellah et al. (1996) found interviews to be a crucial element in their 
work as well, arguing that “active interviews create the possibility of public conversation 
and argument. When data from such interviews are well presented, they stimulate the 
reader to enter the conversation, to argue with what is being said” (p. 305). Fontana and 
Frey (2000) point to the flexibility of the interview method, observing that interviews can 
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be structured, semi-structured, or unstructured, depending on the nature of the data 
sought. 
Lastly, there is ethnography. Ethnographers focus on observation, on examining 
the world around them while at the same time maintaining a distance between themselves 
and those they are studying. Tedlock (2000) says that ethnographers are expected “to 
cultivate rapport, not friendship; compassion, not sympathy; respect, not belief; 
understanding, not identification; admiration, not love.” But the advantage of this 
approach, Burawoy et al. (1991) say, is that it allows researchers not just to observe how 
people act, but to find out “how they understand and experience those acts. It enables 
(researchers) to juxtapose what people say they are up to against what they actually do” 
(p. 2). 
Like the long interview, ethnography works to provide the audience with wider 
cultural understandings. Its greatest strengths, Chambers (2000) says, lie in its ability to 
draw out the “native point of view” and to uncover the more unspoken elements of 
culture. Anderson (1992) used a combination of ethnography and interviews in 
StreetWise, his study of two communities in transition—one undergoing gentrification, 
the other becoming poorer and more isolated—and the shifting boundary between the 
two. Through the data gathered from his observations, as well as from numerous 
interviews, Anderson succeeds in giving readers a clear picture of what it is like to live in 
The Village and of the changing list of issues and tensions that shape everyday life.  
Each of these qualitative methodologies enables the researcher to look from the 
inside out at how people and organizations perform. They also allow the researcher to 
focus on the people who make up organizations and how they do their jobs, how they see 
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their jobs, and how they see what they do fitting into society at large. A qualitative 
approach, McCracken (1988) says, “does not survey the terrain, it mines it. It is, in other 
words, much more intensive than extensive in its objectives” (p. 17). The data that result 
frequently are richer and provide a more contextual picture than that gleaned from a 
quantitative approach alone. 
Qualitative Data Collection 
The qualitative data for this study were collected in multiple phases as part of an 
ongoing research project. Some of the data were gathered as part of this specific study, 
and some of the data come from earlier work done by the doctoral student in conjunction 
with the professor who developed the original research project. Initially, 20 operating and 
one developing statewide public affairs television system were compared on the basis of 
structure, distribution, funding, and programming. A truth table—as described by Ragin 
(1994) in his work on comparative case studies—was constructed to examine these 
variables and look for patterns. The networks then were grouped into like categories, and 
a purposive sample was selected that reflected a representative of each type. From there, 
visits were made to each organization in the sample to observe its operations and conduct 
qualitative, in-depth interviews.   
The states selected for the initial visits were California, Florida, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington. The sites were chosen based on initial data 
gathered from the Internet Web sites of these systems and brief, preliminary phone 
interviews. The factors considered in making the selections were source of funding, 
whether a government, public television, cable, or foundation entity established the 
system, the state’s political culture as defined by Elazar (1972), and geographic location. 
 86
The researchers believed this would provide the greatest source of variation and the 
opportunity to observe varied models.  Not all 20 states with systems were considered, 
however. Alaska and Hawaii, which both have statewide public affairs television 
networks, were excluded because of the distance and the expense that would have been 
involved in the travel. In addition, Wisconsin was selected for a visit because it was in the 
process of developing a statewide public affairs television network, and it was anticipated 
that valuable insights into the creation of these systems would be gained. 
Table 1. Criteria for Sample Selection 
Source of funding State government, cable industry, 
private group of foundation, sponsored programs 
Entity establishing system State government, cable industry, 
public television system, foundation 
Political culture Individualistic, moralistic, traditionalistic 
Geographic location Northeast, Midwest, Northwest, South 
 
Initially, the lead researcher—who is a former television journalist—visited two 
of the sites—California and Washington—to determine how long it would take to reach 
redundancy in the interviewing process and what range of interviews would be needed to 
obtain the appropriate data. The first two trips were scheduled for a week each with the 
ability to expand that time if necessary. Based on these trips it was determined that a 
week was sufficient to gather the necessary interviews as long as a trained doctoral 
student could help conduct the interviews. The data gathered from these initial trips also 
led the researchers to conclude that the best information would be gathered through 
interviews with the employees of the statewide public affairs television systems, 
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legislative staff members, statehouse journalists, and, where possible, lobbyists because 
these were the groups most likely to be aware of and to use the networks’ content.   
At this point the doctoral student—who is a former print journalist—joined the 
data gathering process. Most of the initial interviews were formal sessions conducted at 
the interviewee’s office. The doctoral student, who did not go on the first two trips, then 
conducted several more interviews over the phone following the same interview protocol. 
After completing all of the interviews for the two sites, it was determined that there was 
no difference in the quality of the data gathered from either the in-person interviews or 
the phone interviews. The professor and the doctoral student jointly carried out 
subsequent data gathering in Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania. The 
professor focused on the statewide public affairs television managers and workers, and 
legislative staff, while the doctoral student focused on interviews with statehouse 
reporters. Both also interviewed lobbyists. 
In each site visit, the researchers continued to interview until they reached the 
point of redundancy in the data, which happened fairly quickly. At each site the 
researchers conducted an average of 12 interviews. Except for a few rare cases, 
interviews were held in the interviewee’s office following the standard interview protocol 
developed for this project (see Appendices D, E, and F). Journalists typically were 
interviewed at their desks at the statehouse. The researchers allowed the interviewees to 
move the discussion away from the protocol but in the end the interviewers always made 
sure the entire protocol was covered. This allowed for new potential elements of interest 
to develop. Interviews lasted about one hour, with a few running more than two hours. 
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The interview protocol started with basic structural questions and moved to questions 
focused on the structure and value of statewide public affairs television. 





Journalists Lobbyists Total 
California 2 4 5 3 14 
Connecticut 5 3 4  12 
Florida 8 1 4 2 15 
Kentucky 5  2  7 
Michigan 4 5 5  14 
Minnesota 7 3 8 2 20 
Ohio 3 1 3  7 
Pennsylvania 7 2 9 3 21 
Rhode Island 1 1 2  4 
Washington 4 1 7 2 14 
Wisconsin 5  2  7 
      
Total 51 21 51 12 135 
 
For this study, the author selected four additional states to visit: Connecticut, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Rhode Island. These states were chosen because their statewide 
public affairs television systems shared similar characteristics with those in the states 
previously examined and because they also provided some geographic and cultural 
contrasts. In selecting these states, the goal was to reinforce previous research as well as 
use the data collected as a means to study the institutionalism question, which is at the 
heart of this project. Data collection was done through in-depth interviews and 
ethnographic observation. An interview protocol was developed incorporating the 
questions from the previous research and expanding it to focus on the institutionalism 
question. Again, the protocol was designed to guide the interviews and make sure all 
areas were covered. At the same time, there was considerable leeway for the discussions 
 89
to move away into different areas. Most interviews lasted approximately one hour, 
although a few went as long as two hours.  
A total of 135 people were interviewed across 11 states, and the data from all of 
the interviews were analyzed using the qualitative analysis software NVivo. The software 
allowed the data to be coded and examined for patterns that could be used to answer the 
institutionalism question. 
The Quantitative Component 
Survey data make up the quantitative element of this study. Proponents of survey 
research argue that it enhances understanding of public opinion. It is not a perfect tool, 
they say, but over time it has proven to be the most effective and reliable way developed 
to measure what the public is thinking (Brady, 2000). Through the quantitative science 
aspects of the survey process, researchers are able to ask questions of a relatively small 
number of people and extrapolate those results to whatever general population the sample 
represents with a fairly high degree of certainty (Frankel & Frankel, 1987). The survey is 
a more credible and objective way of finding out what researchers wish to know than 
using such things as family and friends, workplaces, recollections, or anecdotes (Brady, 
2000). When well-executed, a survey affords researchers the opportunity to obtain 
objective and unbiased information about the public’s feelings toward a particular person 
or issue.  
Arguably, in fact, survey research’s most important use has been, and continues to 
be, as a measure of politically related issues. With it, political scientists have gained 
tremendous insight into what issues the public thinks are important, what tools the public 
uses to make decisions about what’s important, and how to predict public reaction to 
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specific issues or people (Kim, Weaver, & Willnat, 2000; Kinder & Winter, 2001; 
Scheufele, Shanahan, & Kim, 2002). If for no other reason than that, survey research 
would be a tremendous social science tool.  
But it is also incredibly flexible—working just as well for the academic as for the 
public relations or marketing practitioner. Researchers in all social science fields have 
made use of survey research. A survey can be used to measure virtually anything—from 
how Washington State voters feel about affirmative action, for instance (Moy, Domke, & 
Stamm, 2001) to how TV reporters view their stations’ coverage of City Hall (Coulson, 
Riffe, Lacy, & St. Cyr, 2001) to whether there is cross-country support for a European 
Union-wide government (Rohrschneider, 2002).  
The actual surveys themselves are flexible in format and can take a variety of 
forms. They can be conducted by telephone (Curtin, Presser, & Singer, 2000; Keeter, 
Miller, Kohut, Groves, & Presser, 2000; Singer, Van Hoewyk, & Maher, 2000, 
Tourangeau, Steiger, & Wilson, 2002), in face-to-face interviews (Javeline, 1999; Zipp & 
Toth, 2002), by mail, and by Internet (Kim, Weaver, & Willnat, 2000). The field of 
survey research, too, has shown a tremendous capacity to evolve and adapt as society 
changes, as knowledge in the field increases (Box-Steffensmeier, Jacobson, & Grant, 
2000; Krosnick, 1999; Merkle, 1996), and as technology changes (Couper, Traugott, & 
Lamais, 2001). 
Survey research undeniably presents some problems, with the quality of some of 
the research being done at the top of the list (Weissberg, 2002). Dryzek (1988) argues 
that opinion surveys can provide only a flawed, imperfect account of how and why 
people vote the way they do. Further, the widespread use of such surveys has the side 
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effect of reinforcing the existing social political order and blocking any substantive 
alternatives to it.  
Empirical scrutiny of political man was once fairly casual. Only in the last few 
decades has science been brought to bear. … By far the most popular approach 
has involved the application of survey research methods, especially in conjunction 
with the fields of public opinion and voting studies. (Dryzek, 1988, p. 705) 
 
What all this research has shown, Dryzek concludes, is:  
Most people are uninterested in and uninformed about politics. When pressed, 
they express attitudes highly intolerant of unpopular minorities. There is little 
consistency across any political opinions they do express. Their minimal political 
behavior is often under the sway of social and psychological forces the individual 
does not fully understand (in the standard socio-psychological model of voting 
behavior, vote choice is determined by attitudes, which in turn are affected by 
social forces). (1988, p. 705-706). 
 
He goes on: 
 
Every time a survey is designed, or its questionnaire administered, or its results 
analyzed, or its conclusions reported in textbooks, or discussed by students in a 
class, or noted by fellow-practitioners, political leaders, or the attentive public, 
then a conception of politics as properly instrumental, individualistic, limited, 
reactive, and power-oriented is reinforced and furthered, at the expense of a 
politics of unimpeded discussion and interaction. The mismeasure of political 
man lies squarely in the path of attempts to promote alternative visions of political 
life; and if Aristotle is right that man is indeed zoon politikon, obstructs man’s 
achievement of his true nature. (Dryzek, 1988, p. 722) 
 
But no one has yet devised a process to replace survey research. Until then, 
researchers simply will have to keep working to maintain its viability and credibility. 
Quantitative Data Collection 
The data for this study were collected as part of a larger survey on media 
credibility. Fifteen questions were developed specifically to ask respondents whether 
their state had a statewide public affairs television network, whether they watched the 
network, and what use they made of the information (see Appendix G). The 15 questions 
were folded into the overall survey, which was conducted via a national random sample 
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of 605 adults over the age of 18. Respondents to this telephone survey were contacted 
between September 22, 2005, and November 4, 2005. Trained interviewers from the 
Louisiana State University Public Policy Research Lab conducted the surveys using 
telephone numbers selected through a random digit dialing process. All numbers in the 
pool of eligible numbers were tried a minimum of 10 times with no answer before being 
removed from the pool. Interviewers made three attempts to contact potential respondents 
at 72-hour intervals to convert interview refusals. The final response rate for the survey 
was 33 percent, with a 55 percent cooperation rate.  
 The survey questions first sought to establish whether the respondent’s state had a 
statewide public affairs television network, with 1 indicating yes, and 2 indicating no. If 
the answer was yes, the respondent then was asked how often he or she watched the 
network. Answers were coded on a five-point scale, where 1 was more than once a week, 
2 was about once a week, 3 was once or twice a month, 4 was rarely, and 5 was never 
(M=3.68, SD=1.41). Respondents also were asked what their primary reason for 
watching was. Answers were coded as 1 – track specific bills or issues, 2 – see what a 
specific legislator was doing, 3 – hear what experts said about an issue, 4 – hear what 
journalists covering the issues had to say, and 5 – hear about the day’s events (M=3.53, 
SD=1.57). The survey also asked a series of questions designed to gauge respondents’ 
participation in such political activities as writing a letter to the editor or calling into a 
public affairs talk show, contacting a public official about an issue, persuading someone 
they knew to support or oppose a political issue, and contributing to a political campaign 
or organizations. The responses to each of these questions were coded as a dichotomous 
variable, with 1 being yes and 2 being no. 
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In addition, the survey asked respondents to rate the accuracy of news coverage, 
the fairness of news coverage, and whether news coverage helped solve problems in 
specific issue areas. To gauge accuracy, respondents were asked how confident they were 
in the accuracy of news coverage for politics and public affairs using a 10-point scale 
where 1 indicated little or no confidence and 10 indicated a great deal of confidence. To 
measure fairness, respondents were asked to rate news coverage about politics and public 
affairs on a 10-point scale as generally fair to all sides (coded as 10) or generally strongly 
favoring one side over another (coded as 1). Finally, respondents were asked whether 
they thought news coverage of politics and public affairs issues helped to solve problems, 
or made them more difficult to solve. Answers were ranked on a 10-point scale with 10 
indicating the coverage helped resolves problems and 1 indicating that coverage made 
problems more difficult to resolve. 
The overall survey also asked about various demographic categories, and the data 
were included in the analysis here. Education was measured on a standard seven-point 
scale where 1 was less than ninth grade, 2 was ninth through 11th grade, 3 was a high 
school diploma, 4 was some college or vocational school, 5 was a four-year college 
degree, 6 was some graduate work, and 7 was an advanced degree (M=4.5, SD=1.4). 
Race and gender were coded as dichotomous variables with 1 indicating non-whites and 
females respectively. Age was coded as a continuous variable reflecting the respondent's 
age in years (M=48, SD=16.6).  
 Political ideology was measured as an index of a person’s self-identified position 
on foreign policy, social issues, and economic issues. Within each area, respondents were 
asked to place themselves on a 5-point scale with 1 indicating very liberal and 5 
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indicating very conservative. The result was a 12-point scale ranging from 0 indicating 
very liberal to 12 indicating very conservative (M=9.3, SD=3.14). Finally, partisan 
affiliation was measured on a 5-point scale with 1 indicating strong Democrats, 2 weak 






















Initial coding of the interview data yielded 32 categories, which were collapsed 
into 15 (see Appendix H). An examination of the original set of categories showed 
considerable overlap among them, so some consolidation was necessary to ensure that 
every item coded was placed in a discrete category and that a clear distinction could be 
made in the information provided by each category. Then a textual analysis of the data 
was done and the findings used to address the research questions posed by this study. The 
data gleaned from the telephone survey were descriptive in nature and a series of cross-
tabs were run to try to determine what they showed about the non-elite audience for 
statewide public affairs television. 
Research Question 1 
How do elite audiences use the content produced by statewide public affairs 
television? 
Journalism Routines 
For the majority of reporters interviewed, statewide public affairs television has 
become another tool in covering state government.2 Primarily they use the network feeds 
for monitoring purposes, and often that monitoring takes place while they are writing 
another story or waiting for phone calls to be returned. Depending on the state, they can 
monitor House and Senate floor debates, as well as legislative committee hearings, press 
conferences, and state Supreme Court arguments. In short, many of them said, access to 
statewide public affairs television allows them to multi-task.  
                                                 
2 Information under Journalism Routines reprinted with permission of Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly  
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The reporters also use the feed as a way to cover events that they cannot 
physically be present for or to cover something that breaks unexpectedly in a committee 
hearing or legislative floor debate. One reporter observed that “government is a slow-
moving, ponderous kind of thing and there’s a lot of stuff we don’t really care about. So 
you can be working on other things here … kind of monitoring out of the side of one ear 
on the TV and when good stuff happens, we can either watch it down here or run 
upstairs.” 
For television reporters, the feeds are an important source of sound bites and are 
frequently clearer than what they might obtain on their own from a hearing room or a 
legislative chamber. Further, in those states where statewide public affairs television 
provides access to archives, the reporters use them both to catch up on something they 
might have missed and for background purposes for a story. Television reporters also use 
archives for file footage for their stories. Reporters cited another use for the feed, too. In 
some instances, they said, the feed helps them identify legislators who are speaking 
during a floor debate or a committee hearing—something that is not always possible 
when they listen to proceedings via the old-fashioned squawk boxes or the Internet. 
The access has caused some subtle changes in reporters’ routines. Many said they 
attend fewer floor sessions and committee hearings, opting instead to monitor the 
proceedings from their offices. Part of that has to do with logistics—press corps offices in 
California, Florida, Kentucky, Ohio, and Washington, for instance, are outside their 
respective state Capitol buildings—and some of it has to do with the changing philosophy 
of the media. Specifically, stories place more emphasis on long-term trends and the 
impact of bills on people than on the actual legislative process. Reporters still need to 
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keep track of the progress of various bills, however, and statewide public affairs 
television is one more way to do that. 
The format and programming of the networks also plays a large role in how much 
and how often their content is used by statehouse reporters. In California, for instance, 
where the California Channel’s programming day ends at 3:30 p.m., reporters expressed 
frustration that frequently the feed would end in the middle of a session or hearing they 
were following. In Minnesota, the House and Senate television services programming 
day generally ends at 5 p.m., and reporters there had the same complaint. Further, while 
the Minnesota reporters had access to multiple feeds within the state Capitol, outside the 
Capitol they were limited to the channel provided for the general public. In Michigan, 
MGTV is on the air from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m., and the House of Representatives generally 
doesn’t begin its floor sessions until 1 p.m. That means little of the actual session can be 
broadcast. In addition, reporters complained about MGTV’s habit of running previously 
taped meetings and hearings that are days or weeks or months old by the time they air, 
pointing out that those programs do them no good given the timeliness the news business 
demands.  
On the other hand, TVW in Washington, PCN in Pennsylvania, the Florida 
Channel, and CT-N in Connecticut offer 24-hour-a-day programming. Therefore, if 
hearings or floor debates run late, reporters have the option of leaving for the night and 
keeping tabs on things from home. Many of them said they take advantage of that.  
Access to archives is another important feature of some networks. Where the 
archives are easily accessible—TVW in Washington or the Ohio Channel, for instance—
reporters make frequent use of them. “I was working on a story related to British 
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Columbia and their budget,” said one reporter. “The premier of British Columbia spoke 
at some event six months ago, and TVW happened to cover it. It was great because I 
could go back and listen to the whole speech.” In Ohio, the Ohio Channel has archived 
House and Senate sessions in such a way that they are searchable by bill number, 
legislator, or topic. In addition, the search engine allows users to skip over the irrelevant 
parts of the meeting or debate to get to the precise information they need. Users also can 
find every instance in which a legislator spoke about a particular topic or every time a 
specific issue has come up for debate. 
What emerged most clearly from the data is that statehouse reporters consider 
statewide public affairs television to be just another tool for doing their jobs. At first 
blush, the networks seem not to have changed journalists’ reporting routines so much as 
they have become an integral part of those routines. Certainly the routines as articulated 
by Tuchman, Gans, Fishman, and others have not been altered. Reporters still spend the 
bulk of their time tracking down their news from official sources. What happens in the 
Capitol is news—albeit an official version of the news. The development of statewide 
public affairs television has not altered that. In fact, it could be argued it has reinforced 
that.  
A closer look, however, reveals some subtle changes in routines. Some of the 
reporters interviewed, for instance, said they take notes and quotes directly from the 
television feed, and many acknowledged that they do not spend as much time going to 
chamber floors for debates or going to committee hearings. The disadvantage of watching 
the proceedings on television as opposed to being present for them is that the cameras fail 
to capture the nuances of what is happening in the chamber or the committee room. 
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Because the cameras are permitted only limited shots, they miss side conversations 
between legislators or between legislators and lobbyists or they fail to capture who is in 
the room and who is not. All of these things provide additional context for the discussions 
and debates taking place. Although the reporters concede that watching the proceedings 
on television is not entirely the same as being there, they also point out the benefits. They 
are able to keep track of more than one story at a time, they can write one story while 
listening to a debate on another, which is an advantage when working on deadline, and 
they can follow the progress of a bill over time without wasting time sitting in hearings 
that will not yield a story. That, in turn, fits with the changing philosophy many 
newspapers have adopted when it comes to legislative coverage. They are less interested 
in the technical processes of making legislation and more interested in the impact 
legislation actually will have on people. 
For virtually all of the reporters interviewed, access to public affairs television has 
become a way to stretch diminishing or stagnant resources by allowing them to multi-
task. This is especially the case in those Capitol bureaus where a single reporter is 
responsible for covering state government for his paper. 
Another of the concerns raised about use of statewide public affairs television is 
who controls the signal—in other words, who is the gatekeeper? It is true that the 
commercial media do not control the signals emanating from these television services nor 
do they make the decisions about what floor debates or committee hearings are covered. 
In fact, who controls the signal varies among the networks. In some cases, network 
employees control the equipment and the feed; in other cases, state employees control 
them, and the network simply takes the feed just as the commercial media do. The 
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concern is that if state employees are controlling the signal, then there likely is some self-
censorship of the network’s content because protecting the legislators and protecting their 
own jobs would factor into coverage decisions. However, most of the reporters said they 
found that the coverage choices made by the television services staff generally reflected 
what were considered the most important topics. Occasionally, they said, they disagreed 
with the decision to cover a specific hearing, but they found that to be more of a minor 
annoyance rather than a serious problem. 
Further, while reporters have no control over the camera angles used for the feeds, 
it is also the case that they cannot choose their sight lines when they are on the chamber 
floor, in a gallery, or in a committee hearing room because the media are confined to one 
spot—they cannot wander. In that sense, little has changed. The question remains, 
however, of how well reporters are able to pick up on the nuances of debate—the back 
room deals—when they are watching something on the television. Some say there is a 
difference; others maintain that if a reporter is truly tuned in to what is going on, it is not 
a problem. 
Lobbyist Routines 
Lobbyists also have found statewide public affairs television to be an effective 
way to monitor the progress of bills or the back-and-forth of legislative debate. 
“Lobbyists are fans of our coverage,” said the head of House Television Services in 
Minnesota. “They can be in their offices and watch our live Internet streaming. We will 
get calls from lobbyists when we go off the air because it is an issue of importance for 
them.” The clerk of the House of Representatives in Ohio said she had noticed that there 
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were fewer lobbyists sitting in the public gallery in the chamber. “They’ll go back to their 
offices and watch it. It’s made it easier for them.” 
Having access to the network feed allows lobbyists to follow hearings and events 
outside of the capital city as well. “I know I can watch a committee hearing in Spokane 
that I can’t get to,” said one Washington lobbyist, “and I can watch it the next day. When 
you have a bill in two committees and a meeting at the same time, you watch TVW.” 
Another lobbyist talked about how he was able to get a bill heard in committee that was 
not originally on the calendar: “On one of the more boring sessions, I decided to spend 
the morning in my office doing paper work and watching the Senate on TV. They 
announced that they were going to let committee chairs pull any bill from Rules and put it 
on the calendar, and I immediately thought of this little water bill that was pretty 
innocuous but important to some. I rushed up there and tried to get the committee chair to 
add it to his list and he wouldn’t do it because it wasn’t that important. I asked another 
member to ask for the bill and he said OK, and he put it on and it passed, and it was 
because I was watching TVW.” 
Lobbyists also have found other ways to use statewide public affairs television. 
For instance, some ask for copies of tapes of hearings to show to clients as proof that they 
are doing their jobs or to use in pitches for other work. In other cases, lobbyists have 
asked for copies to critique their own performances.  
The data showed clearly that statewide public affairs television has had an impact 
on journalists, lobbyists, and their routines. The content provides journalists and lobbyists 
alike with a tool that allows them to make more efficient use of their time. The ability to 
monitor proceedings via television or the Internet means that neither journalists nor 
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lobbyists have to spend as much time sitting through legislative floor sessions or 
committee hearings that might or might not be productive. Instead, they can keep track of 
debates and bills and issues and do other work at the same time. For instance, journalists 
can follow a meeting while writing another story, making phone calls, and waiting for 
phone calls to be returned. Lobbyists can monitor multiple bills if they are being heard in 
different committees at the same time or follow bills being debated in out-of-town 
hearings without having to make the trip. On the other hand, both the journalists and 
lobbyists interviewed agreed that as helpful as the network content is, it is no substitute 
for actually being present for hearings and debates. The cameras fail to capture all the 
sideline machinations among legislators, and such nuances often are more important to 
understanding what is happening than simply following the details of the process. 
Further, the availability of the feed has the potential to become a crutch, particularly for 
journalists who are under constant pressure to do more with less. The worst case scenario, 
said one journalist, would be a situation in which a reporter who has never been to the 
capitol follows the proceedings through the statewide public affairs television feed, 
makes a few phone calls to get some quotes, and then writes the story. Such a story might 
be worse than no story at all if the reporter is writing it without any understanding of the 
legislative process or the people involved. The question would be how valuable or 
informative the story would be to members of the public.  
Research Question 2  
What role do elite audiences play in the content decisions of statewide public 
affairs television?  
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The stated mission of the networks in this study is to open up government to the 
public, but anecdotal evidence suggests that most of the people who watch statewide 
public affairs television are those whose jobs revolve around the state capitol—
legislators, legislative staff members, lobbyists, and statehouse reporters. In addition, all 
of these networks are dependent on the state legislature for access in order to produce a 
signal; many also rely on the state for funding. What this question sought to determine 
was how these realities affect the programming of the networks. 
 Political Pressures 
Whether a statewide public affairs television network feels political pressure 
seems to depend on which network one is describing and on whom one asks. The 
networks can be divided into three categories in terms of operational structure. In one 
group are those networks dependent on a legislative television feed for their signal—the 
California Channel, MGTV, and PCN. In another group are networks run by the state—
Minnesota House Television and Senate Media Services, the Ohio Channel, and Capitol 
Television in Rhode Island. In the last group are those networks that run the equipment 
and provide their own feed—CT-N, the Florida Channel, KET, and TVW. None of the 
groups is immune to political pressure; the pressure simply takes different forms. Those 
dependent on the legislative feed, for example, could be faced with the loss of their signal 
if the legislature decided it was unhappy with the coverage, while the employees of those 
networks run directly by the state clearly are dependent on the state for their jobs. For 
other networks, the potential pressure is financial if their primary source of money is the 
legislature. 
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And even if the pressures are minimal, the perception of such censorship 
sometimes can be just as strong, as the data showed. For instance, many of the statehouse 
reporters interviewed believed that these networks operate as arms of the legislature 
rather than as independent entities and that the content presented represents the wishes of 
elected officials. One reporter remarked, “The legislature controls everything that goes on 
on the floor. They all know exactly what the rules of engagement are at PCN. Obviously 
they don’t have full access.” Another said, “It’s (the network) taxpayer-funded, but it’s 
kind of an arm of the General Assembly, so is the House Speaker calling the shots, is the 
Senate president? I don’t know honestly.”  
Even some of the lobbyists seemed to wonder how independent the networks are. 
A California lobbyist noted that the California Channel never shows the meetings of the 
Rules Committee, which is the most powerful committee in the legislature because it 
decides where bills are assigned or if they even will receive a hearing. In addition, the 
Rules Committee oversees what is broadcast by the Assembly TV and Senate TV 
services, and they, in turn, provide the signal for the California Channel. Interviewees 
acknowledged that the Rules Committee had acceded on occasion to legislators’ requests 
that a hearing not be aired. When that happens, meetings either are moved to an unwired 
room or are scheduled after 3:30 p.m., after the California Channel goes off the air. At 
that point, the best the California Channel can do is tape the hearing and show it on a 
delayed basis. The practical effect is that decisions can be made out of view of the public. 
In Minnesota, staff members who run the House Television and Senate Media 
Services insisted they had complete editorial freedom, although they also conceded it was 
possible for legislators to work around them by scheduling meetings for unwired rooms. 
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Officials with the Ohio Channel, on the other hand, operate under the premise that they 
are there to keep legislators happy and it is up to legislators to ensure the integrity of the 
content. In that vein, the Ohio Channel does not cover legislative committee hearings and 
is reluctant to press legislators to open them up. The head of the Ohio Channel said that 
“what we do is we say that it’s basically self-policing. My role is not to say no to 
anybody. I tell them, ‘I’ve got 132 plus bosses and I’m not saying no to anybody because 
you all sign my budget.’ ” 
For those networks that provide their own feed, the pressure usually comes in the 
form of the budget. All of the networks mentioned receive a significant portion of their 
funding from the state and can be subject to threats of cuts if legislators are displeased by 
the content. What seems to happen most often with those networks is that they become 
particularly attentive to the question of balance in the coverage. So if a Democratic 
legislator is quoted in some piece, a Republican legislator must be found to give a 
counter-view. While these networks have editorial and production independence, the 
budget threat can lead to a cautious approach to programming, at least until the network 
establishes a track record and legislators become comfortable with it. At TVW, network 
staff members keep detailed records about who appears on the programming to head off 
complaints that they are favoring one party over the other. One staff member explained< 
“We once had a legislator who made a comment that he didn’t like how much we were 
covering the governor. So I immediately picked up my database and told him what 
percentage of our total programming that past year had been of the governor and said, ‘If 
you think there is a problem, you tell me because we’re certainly making an effort,’ to 
which he responded that he loved us and put us back in the budget.” 
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The problem with having to worry constantly about funding stability or record 
keeping or content decisions made by others is that all of these things distract the 
networks from their primary goal, which is to provide the programming the public needs 
to stay informed about the policy-making process and to help it participate if it wishes. A 
focus on pleasing legislators at the expense of creating useful, quality programming 
sharply limits the ability of the networks to offer content that furthers the debate. Rather 
than living up to their potential for engaging the public, they settle for a more 
stenographic role. What the data showed was that only a handful of these networks—
TVW, CT-N, and the Florida Channel—have developed to a point where executives 
believe they have built up sufficient credibility and trust to be able to think more 
creatively about programming and to delve into self-produced content that requires some 
editing decisions about what or who will be shown. Other networks, such as the cable-
funded PCN, California Channel, and MGTV, also have moved beyond gavel-to-gavel 
coverage, but the programming they produce is relatively safe from a political pressure 
perspective. That programming takes the form of high school sports coverage, interview 
programs with state leaders, cultural events, and book programs, and minimal editing is 
involved.  
Earning legislative respect and trust is one of the biggest hurdles these statewide 
public affairs television systems face. Without it, they are more prone to the political 
pressures that affect content as they work to keep individual legislators happy. Self-
censorship becomes a concern, as does reluctance to explore new types of programming 
that might draw in more viewers. Constantly having to worry about money and a 
preoccupation with the appearance of balance also get in the way of programming 
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innovations. In that regard, statewide public affairs television can find itself in the same 
position as traditional media where the bottom line and the focus on the “two sides” of 
the story often lead to content that gives the public little opportunity for meaningful 
discussion of issues or any context for the information it uses to make decisions. 
Research Question 3 
Has statewide public affairs television had an impact on how the state conducts 
business?  
Legislative Process 
Whether a network is part time or full time, reaches just within the capitol or 
across the state, or focuses only on the legislative process rather than producing its own 
programming, the data show a clear impact on the state government institutions it covers. 
Most noticeable among the effects is the increase in efficiency for legislators and 
legislative staff members. Put simply, statewide public affairs television allows these 
groups to keep track of the latest developments in policy debates, follow the progress of 
specific bills, and, in general, use their time more productively by multi-tasking. 
Legislative staff members, in particular, can spend more time working at their desks 
while monitoring proceedings via the Internet or a television set rather than sitting in 
committee hearings or floor sessions. In addition, the ability to stay informed allows staff 
members to work more effectively with members of the public. For instance, in 
Michigan, a vote in the House of Representatives on a bill to make major changes in 
teacher benefits stalled as proponents tried to gather enough support. Legislative staff 
members who had been watching the proceedings were flooded with phone calls from 
anxious teachers wanting to know what was happening. Because staff members had been 
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following the session from their offices they could tell callers that the voting was still 
going on and how many votes were needed to pass the measure. 
Even staff members who have to be on the floor find a way to use the feed. One 
said, “If I can’t figure out what is going on (on the floor), I go out and watch a monitor 
because all the clutter and noise are gone.” Another staff member said that she will watch 
the feed toward the end of the session “to kind of critique how we did. Not every day, but 
if we’ve had a particularly tough day, I’ll watch it to see how we did.” 
Other staff members said they found the network coverage to be especially 
helpful in this day and age of legislative term limits. As one said, “I do not necessarily 
watch it for where policy stands, since I don’t have any direct interest in that. I am more 
interested in learning the personalities of the members. Because of the term limits, I need 
to get to know people faster. I can get to know their personalities faster through 
television.” This same staff person went to explain that he watches when the House 
Speaker is on “because I want to know what the Speaker is planning. There might be 
something he will not think to share with me. If I know the Speaker is on, I watch to get 
insights into the process and plan. That allows me to stay up on the flow of the process.” 
For legislators, themselves, the network coverage lets them keep track of what 
various committees are doing, as well as what the other chamber is talking about. “What 
we’ve started to find is that in some ways we are contributing to the efficiency of how the 
institution operates, the ability for legislators to time shift for example. If they can’t be at 
a hearing at a certain time and we’re covering it, they can go to our Web site and they can 
watch in real time and whenever they want because we store everything in on-demand 
files,” said one network director. 
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Statewide public affairs television also has had another impact on legislators in 
that members of the minority party find they have more of a public presence than they 
might otherwise. In Connecticut, “the Republicans (who initially opposed the creation of 
CT-N) have come full circle because they realize that now when they stand up on the 
House floor and offer amendments or debate their side of an issue … whereas before it 
was never reported, now it goes to a statewide audience,” said one network employee. 
With the statewide networks providing essentially uninterrupted coverage of 
legislative debates, speeches, and other proceedings, legislators also have a means of 
reaching their constituents that is not possible with traditional media coverage. The 
unfiltered, minimally edited nature of the network coverage allows legislators to get their 
entire message out rather than just a sound bite. The remote broadcasting capabilities of 
some of the networks also give legislators another tool with which to reach their 
constituents. They can organize a town hall meeting and arrange coverage of the event so 
that those unable to attend can see it. Capitol Television employees have been surprised 
at the popularity of a new portable camera the network bought. “We’ve only had it for 
less than a year and we’re doing a lot more and what happens is that you send it out with 
one member of the House or Senate and you do something like that and they come back 
and tell their colleagues and then they come to us and eventually we need another 
camera, we get so many requests.” 
The wider impact of statewide public affairs television becomes even more 
apparent as more legislators seek coverage for their committees or ask that previously 
unwired hearing rooms be wired. In Michigan, legislators “wanted to have one room 
where they could have a meeting and not feel like, well, maybe those cameras are on. So 
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we had one committee meeting room that did not have cameras, and we’re putting 
cameras in that room starting in January,” said one staff member. In the Rhode Island 
statehouse where only two committee rooms are wired because of size constraints, 
legislators sometimes will ask to have their hearings moved into one of them so they can 
be televised, and in Washington, legislators complain if TVW decides not to cover their 
specific hearing.  
Another measure of the impact of statewide public affairs television is the 
willingness of legislators to press for carriage of the signal. The most dramatic evidence 
of that came from Connecticut where legislators proposed a measure requiring all cable 
companies to carry CT-N on their lower channels. “… it was probably the first time in 
history where you had a press conference with the Speaker of the House, the minority 
leader of the House, the president of the Senate, and the minority leader of the Senate … 
all four caucuses in a press conference asking for the same thing,” said the director of 
CT-N. Ultimately the cable companies agreed, and CT-N now has statewide carriage on 
channels more accessible to the public than the digital tier. 
Not all of the impact has been positive, however. Most noticeable has been the 
effect the cameras have on the behavior of legislators. In every instance, the most 
frequently cited objection to installing cameras in the chambers and committee rooms 
was that their presence would lead to grandstanding by legislators and detract from the 
serious business of state government. Another fear was that the video from the coverage 
could be taken out of context and used by legislators’ political opponents.  
On the subject of grandstanding, or playing to the cameras, the data were mixed. 
Some interviewees were absolutely convinced that lawmakers played to the cameras. “… 
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when TVW publishes a schedule that says we’re going to cover these committees … that 
doesn’t go unnoticed. I see more dark suits and red ties on those days. They get dressed 
up. … we’re nicer, better, more statesman-like,” said one observer. Others said there was 
no difference in legislators’ behavior that they could determine, arguing that since the 
cameras were not within the legislators’ sight in most cases, they tended to forget they 
were on camera. At the same time, most of the networks must abide by guidelines that 
restrict camera angles to shots of the person speaking, rather than views of the whole 
body. Term limits also have played a role in how legislators behave, some of the 
interviewees said. In those states where term limits have taken effect, the legislative 
bodies tend to be made up of members for whom the cameras always have been present 
and they do not feel the need to modify their behavior. Still others pointed out that while 
some legislators did grandstand a bit, they would do that with or without the presence of 
cameras. “They’re used to the televising. If they want to posture, they know how to do it. 
In the beginning, there was fear of posturing and perhaps it does happen. Everybody’s 
expecting to be televised, so they behave accordingly.” 
Where there was more agreement was in the observation that legislative processes 
have been altered by the presence of the cameras. For instance, legislative debates and 
committee hearings have lengthened noticeably with the installation of the cameras. As 
one interviewee observed, “I think sometimes some of our events can become a bit more 
dramatic and lengthy because CT-N is covering the event. There have been times when 
we have, not necessarily debated, but certainly discussed an issue in committee far longer 
than we would have in the past because people want the opportunity to be viewed by the 
folks at home.” Another change has been the willingness of legislators to speak when the 
 112
issue involved is a controversial one. “… when it’s a controversial bill, usually there’s 
almost no remarking other than the proponents of the bill and certain key members,” one 
staff member said. “When it’s something that pretty much everybody can get behind, 
that’s when you have legislator after legislator after legislator getting up to remark on 
something that’s pretty much a home run, but they want the face time, if you will, to go 
along with it.”  
The concern is that the presence of the cameras exacerbates some aspects of 
legislator behavior that are not necessarily conducive to sound policy-making or keeping 
citizens informed. The unwillingness to speak when an issue is controversial, for 
instance, could keep constituents from fully understanding a legislator's thinking or from 
being presented with an alternative view that might provide them with more information 
on which to base their own decisions. The urge to play to the cameras while speaking has 
the potential to put the focus more on theatrics and less on the policy issue under debate, 
again with the result that citizens are less informed. 
What the data show are changes in the norms and routines of legislators and 
legislative staff members. As with statewide public affairs television’s impact on 
journalists and lobbyists and their routines, the changes are subtle. But they are 
noticeable. The availability of statewide public affairs television allows both legislators 
and legislative staff members to be more efficient in that they can make better use of their 
time by multi-tasking instead of sitting in meetings. In addition, the opportunity to see 
both chambers and multiple committees at work means staff members can follow the 
progress of various policy issues and bills more easily. For legislators, the availability of 
statewide public affairs television provides them with more ways to maintain contact with 
 113
their constituents and a platform from which to compete with the governor for the 
public’s attention. In addition, minority party legislators find they have more exposure 
through the networks than they did previously, which allows them a means to get their 
message out when it might be overshadowed by the majority party.  
Research Question 4 
How do non-elite audiences use the content produced by statewide public affairs 
television? 
Democratic Process 
The data in this category were expected to show how statewide public affairs 
television uses its content to encourage citizens to take part in the democratic process. 
Improvement in civic engagement, after all, is usually the first reason given for the 
creation of a network. Instead, most of the networks made it clear they did not consider it 
part of their mission to actively encourage viewers to participate. Rather, the data showed 
that they felt simply presenting the chance to become better informed was sufficient. That 
is, it was enough to make the information available and after that, it was up to citizens to 
make their own decisions about becoming more involved.  
As one interviewee said, “If they choose to involve themselves, that opportunity’s 
there. To let people know that the process is not a behind-closed-doors process; it’s open 
to the public.” Another said, “We hope from time to time something will pique their 
interest or they’ll tune in and they’ll understand the process and how decisions are 
made.” This point of view fits more with Graber, Schudson, and Zaller than with Blumler 
and Gurevitch, Yankelovich, and Delli Carpini and Keeter. Graber, Schudson, and Zaller 
argue that members of the public are as informed as they need and want to be. That is not 
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to say that information should not be made available at every opportunity. Rather, the 
concept maintains that people will dip in and out of the information according to their 
needs. The executives who run statewide public affairs television understand this even as 
they see the potential for something more. “ … some day we’re going to look back at the 
beginnings of these state networks and see that that was the beginning of a shift in how 
people get their information about state government and a shift in, hopefully, citizen 
participation and engagement, which could be reflected in voter turnout and things like 
that,” said one. The market-driven model of the traditional media offers little hope that 
local newspapers and television stations will ever produce much in the way of quality 
public affairs content. Between the economic demands and the entrenched norms and 
routines of journalism, changing the existing model of coverage simply becomes too 
difficult. What statewide public affairs television offers is the potential for a new model 
of coverage, one that provides multiple entry points for citizens. Such a change is by no 
means certain, and the managers of these networks acknowledge that they face many 
obstacles, but the potential remains nevertheless.  
One of the criticisms leveled against traditional media is that the public has few 
ways to makes its feelings or concerns known, nor do reporters and editors make much of 
an effort to seek that kind of input. The statewide public affairs television networks 
examined in this study have a similar problem with feedback from the public. 
Feedback from the Public 
All of the networks reported receiving feedback from members of the public, 
although only CT-N in Connecticut has tried to quantify it with a viewer satisfaction 
survey it did in 2005. In general, the networks do not go out of their way to solicit 
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comment, but they all provide some mechanism for viewers to reach them if they wish. 
“We hope we have motivated people to care enough to take action to find out what the 
follow-up is, either by writing a letter to the committee or legislator or getting on the 
Web site to do research,” said one network employee. “We try to provide the resource 
and allow them to do their own work.” 
In some cases, the network provides a comment form on its Web site for people. 
In others, phone numbers and e-mail addresses are run at the end of programs, alerting 
viewers to how they can obtain more information, ask a question, or make a comment. A 
few of the networks produce call-in shows that encourage members of the public to 
contact them. 
The data show that viewers call for all sorts of reasons. Some want to comment on 
a program, some want more information, others want to know if they still can provide 
input into whatever the public discussion is, and still others want copies of programs that 
aired. One network director said, “We do get a lot of calls especially when something’s a 
hot issue. ‘When are you going to rebroadcast that’ and that type of thing. ‘Can we see it 
again, how long is it going to be on, can I come down and talk about it?’ ” 
Despite the lack of firm viewership numbers or other data on whether these 
networks are reaching people, the anecdotal evidence suggests there is an audience. One 
CT-N employee said: “We get all kinds of people (calling in). Even though we disclaim 
the comment line up one side and down the other that we want comments about the 
programming, not necessarily the issues, we get people who will leave four and five 
minutes that can be rails against whatever they just saw on CT-N that they’re taking issue 
with from a policy perspective. They don’t know where to go to get this off their chest. 
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Unfortunately we don’t have a mechanism where we can pass that stuff on to anybody, 
but it’s an indication that there is a sense among the general viewing public that they 
want to be heard and they don’t know how to be heard.” He added that at the moment 
CT-N has no way to pass these types of calls along to an appropriate person, so the 
network is primarily a sounding board for unhappy citizens rather than a conduit to the 
appropriate state official.  
Members of the media who have appeared on some of the programs produced by 
the networks or who have been captured on tape while at a press conference also said 
they had received comments from people who had seen them on television. One 
Pennsylvania reporter said, “… if they’re (PCN) covering the same press conference as 
me and I’m asking a question, my mother-in-law in Hazelton will say, ‘Hey I saw you on 
TV. Why weren’t you wearing a tie?’ So it’s amazing the span of people that watch it.” 
Another reporter talked about the sudden celebrity that television appearances can bring. 
“I’m a print reporter and you’re used to being anonymous … just some schlub who can 
slip in and out of places with no problem at all. When I first moved up here, I did my first 
show about three or four months after I got here. … I was in the grocery store one time 
and some lady came up to me and said, ‘I saw you on PCN.’ It’s weird. A lot more 
people watch it than you think.” 
Legislative staff members also talked about hearing from the public, particularly 
when the coverage involves controversial issues. One pointed out that she knows the 
network is having an impact “when you get the phone call from somebody. ‘I was 
watching the hearing the other day and’ … either asking a question about what went on 
during the hearing that they didn’t quite get or ‘is it too late for me to submit testimony? 
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I’d really like to contact the committee, I have something to say on this subject, and can I 
send something in?’ There are far more questions about participation in the process after 
they’ve watched an event.” 
Legislators also hear from constituents who have seen them on the network or 
who are following a specific issue and want to comment. “People come up to them in 
their districts, talking to them about minutia in the legislation that no one would have 
access to a copy of … the filed copy … of the bill with its changes and calendar notes,” 
said one legislative staff member. “No one would have that access, but now it’s talked 
about and someone watched it and heard it and questioned the senator when they saw him 
again.” Of course, there is a down side to the access, as another legislative staff member 
ruefully observed. If the debate is happening in real time, then viewers can contact them 
in real time, and “they’ll hear 20 minutes of a debate and the rhetoric’s getting heated and 
they’ll get the wrong idea of what happened.” 
The ability for members of the public to provide input is a crucial part of civic 
engagement and the networks that are part of this study clearly welcomed the feedback. 
Where the gap exists is between a member of the public making a comment and taking 
things a step further to actually become involved in the process. This seems to be where 
the networks draw the line. They are more than willing to accept the feedback and to 
provide some opportunities for people to gather the information they need to take action, 
but most of the onus is on the viewers. 
The data in this section speak to the civic engagement dilemma outlined 
previously—namely, how informed and active does the public need to be for the 
democratic process to function effectively. What emerged was a belief more in line with 
 118
Schudson, Price and Zaller, and Graber and their model of a monitorial citizen. That is, 
network managers seem comfortable with the idea that members of the public tune in 
when they feel a need to do so or inadvertently, such as when they come across an issue 
that interests them. They admit that the legislative process does not always produce the 
most exciting programming, nor is every issue debated of interest to every member of the 
public. In that sense, the monitorial model is an appropriate one. Where network 
managers differ somewhat from the scholars is in their optimism that these systems have 
the potential to develop into a model that will encourage and make easier the public’s 
participation in the democratic process. 
Research Question 5 
How have programming and technological innovations helped in the development 
of statewide public affairs television as an institution? 
The sharing of information about equipment, programming, and funding concerns 
is common among these networks. What this question sought to examine was the extent 
to which this diffusion of innovation took place. 
Networking Among Systems 
The data showed that the managers of these networks talk with each other 
frequently and have done so for some time. They compare notes, discuss common 
problems and questions, and look for ideas for everything from programming to signal 
carriage to funding. What seems to have emerged is an informal system by which 
managers and staff members at more established networks pass along their knowledge to 
those wishing to start up networks. Several of the interviewees, for instance, indicated 
that as they set up their networks or sought to expand them, one of the first people they 
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called was Denny Heck, then president of TVW in Washington. Paul Giguere, the head 
of CT-N in Connecticut, was one of those. “I went out to TVW and I visited Denny for a 
while … right after that I started looking into (setting up CT-N) and Denny sent me all of 
their original planning documents and organizational structure, equipment lists. I put 
together a plan to create a full-time network.” Likewise, Giguere has become a resource 
for others. He said a group in Massachusetts that wants to expand the network in that 
state had asked him for advice, and he, in turn, sent it all of his original planning 
documents, budgets, equipment lists, and programming decisions. 
With the creation of an interest group, the National Association of Public Affairs 
Networks, a few years ago, statewide public affairs television managers seem to be trying 
to move beyond the informal networking stage. They now have a Web site and a list of 
contacts for every system in the country. In addition, several of them meet each year, 
sometimes at the National Cable Television Association’s conference and sometimes at 
the National Conference of State Legislatures’ meeting. They hold a mini-conference of 
their own to share information and to meet with members of the NCSL and the NCTA, 
upon whose good graces they depend for legislative access, channel allocation, and signal 
distribution. 
The basic definition of social network theory is the study of interactions among 
people and how those interactions cascade so that a network of relationships ultimately is 
formed. In the case of statewide public affairs television, the development of a social 
network among the systems has been crucial in their expansion to more states. The 
network started to form almost from the first days of statewide public affairs television as 
the managers and founders of the earliest systems shared operational, programming, and 
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financing information with those who came afterward, enabling them to tailor things to fit 
the situation in their particular state. The frequent contact among the managers continues 
today. What has happened is that as more systems have come online, those interested in 
setting up new networks can use already established systems as concrete examples for 
their legislators. The established networks show how the systems can work, what is 
entailed in creating them, and how lawmakers can benefit from the presence of cameras 
in their chambers and committee rooms. Further, the social network that exists among the 
managers allows them to keep track of what each is doing, provide support where they 
can, and consider new ways of expanding programming and increasing their value to the 
state governments they cover and the members of the public they are trying to reach. 
Cameras 
The backbone of statewide public affairs television is the camera. Before a 
network can be established several questions related to the cameras have to be addressed: 
How many will the network use? Where will they be placed in the chambers? Will they 
be placed in committee rooms? What type of shots will the cameras be allowed to take? 
Who will control the cameras? How these questions are answered determines in large 
measure the shape of the network and how effective it can be in disseminating 
information about how state government works. 
The data revealed certain similarities and patterns regarding placement and use of 
cameras. All of the systems under study here had cameras in their state’s House and 
Senate chambers to provide gavel-to-gavel coverage of legislative sessions. Gavel-to-
gavel coverage is the foundation for statewide public affairs television, and every 
system—no matter what its specific characteristics are—offers it. The number of cameras 
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in the chambers ranges from a low of three in Rhode Island and Ohio to a high of eight in 
Florida. Camera position obviously varies somewhat with the difference in the number of 
cameras, but typically they will be mounted in spots behind the House Speaker or Senate 
President, then along the sides, and finally in the back of the chamber. In some states, 
another camera is positioned up in the public gallery area in the back of the chamber. 
With the exceptions of Kentucky and the House chamber in Rhode Island, all of the other 
states in this study use robotic cameras that are mounted up high on the walls of the 
chambers out of the sight line of the legislators. In Rhode Island, the House cameras are 
set on tripods on raised platforms at the edges of the chamber, while in Kentucky, the 
cameras are on dollies that are wheeled into each chamber. In both cases, camera 
operators must be present when the cameras are used. These were the most extreme 
departures from the norm among the states studied.  
The shots the cameras are allowed to take run from one end of the spectrum to the 
other. In some states the cameras essentially have fixed shots—usually on whoever is 
speaking at the rostrum and on the House Speaker or Senate President. In other states 
where legislators stand at their desks and speak, the cameras are allowed to move from 
legislator to legislator as they are recognized by the presiding official, but the shot must 
be fairly tightly focused on the person speaking. Panning the chamber with the cameras 
generally is not allowed so that the chances of catching a legislator napping or arguing 
with another lawmaker are minimized. In a few states, system executives insist there are 
no restrictions on the camera shots they take, other than “common sense” and “good 
taste.” 
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The freedom of the networks to use whatever camera shots they deem necessary 
is an important consideration in discussing the civic engagement element of statewide 
public affairs television. The stated mission of these systems is to open up the process of 
state government to the public. When their camera shots are limited, their ability to 
provide an accurate, minimally filtered depiction of government at work is also limited, 
and viewers miss more of the context surrounding the debate/discussion of issues than 
they would if the cameras were allowed free rein. 
Programming 
The data showed that the programming for these networks follows a pattern. All 
start with gavel-to-gavel coverage of their respective legislatures. As legislators grow 
more comfortable with the cameras and begin to see a value in having their sessions 
televised, they become more amenable to having legislative committee hearings covered. 
From there it is a short leap to coverage of state agency boards. In some cases, the 
networks also cover the governor’s office and the state supreme court. As the networks 
expand their programming day, they have to find or produce additional content to fill the 
time. That content can take many forms, including coverage of public policy forums, 
town hall meetings, speeches by newsmakers, and election campaigns. Self-produced 
programming usually goes hand-in-hand with the expanded coverage and is as varied as 
the networks themselves. Some networks produce book programs, business tours, and 
cultural programs, while others air their own legislative highlights shows, expert panels, 
journalist round tables, and documentaries. In California, “we average 150 hours per year 
of our own programming, where we go out mostly in the state Capitol area to cover 
events around the Capitol and state government-oriented stuff.” 
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PCN is unique among the statewide public affairs television networks in that it 
airs high school sports. The programming is unorthodox, but it has served to draw 
viewers to the network. PCN’s high school sports coverage came out of state Senate 
hearings into the state high school athletic association’s decision to move the football 
championship games from one side of Pennsylvania to the other. One of the senators who 
took part in the hearings wondered why PCN was not showing the events. System 
officials met with the athletic association after the hearings were over and negotiated an 
arrangement to carry the so-called minor sports—hockey, swimming and diving, track, 
and so forth. Besides responding to an interest expressed by a legislator, PCN officials 
also saw the programming as a way to attract viewers who might not otherwise turn to 
their channels and to coax them into looking at some of the other government-related 
content. 
A few of the networks make arrangements to rebroadcast programming from 
other entities. Thus, the Ohio Channel has an agreement with the PBS stations in the state 
to air any of the programs from their archives, its executive director said. “We started 
putting all of our programs together, and we cover the House and the Senate, the 
Supreme Court, the governor’s events, and we realized, wow, on a good week, we 
probably had maybe 12 hours of programming, and if we’re talking about a 24/7 feed, 
that’s a lot of repetition. We started saying, well, why are we confining this to just three 
branches? What if we dipped into the Public Broadcasting library and started taking all of 
the Ohio-based programming? … We found eight hours of programming from around the 
state of weekly public affairs things.” 
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CT-N, which is based in Hartford, Connecticut, rebroadcasts the Sunday morning 
news programs of the local commercial stations. The network’s director explained why: 
“Channel 3 does Face the State, Channel 30, the NBC affiliate, does Connecticut 
Newsmakers, and the Fox affiliate does Beyond the Headlines, but again, they air at 
ungodly hours because in terms of selling commercial time, it’s not going to happen, so 
they’re going to stick it somewhere. So I think it raises their visibility that they are doing 
some things, and it’s been a really good thing for us as well.” The Florida Channel also 
picks up some additional content by rebroadcasting some of the programming from Space 
Coast TV, which is a government access channel based near Cape Canaveral.  
Most of these networks have plans for more ways to expand their programming, 
too. For instance, TVW in Washington will begin Spanish language programming, while 
CT-N plans to start closed-captioning some of its legislative content. Other networks are 
trying to persuade their Supreme Courts to allow cameras in during oral arguments, and 
in Michigan, which already broadcasts Supreme Court arguments, the state Court of 
Appeals is looking for funding to wire its courtroom for television coverage. As 
legislators and other elite audiences become more comfortable with these networks, a 
snowball effect seems to occur, and other agencies and groups start to look at how they 
can have their meetings and hearings televised, too. At the same time, most network 
managers are looking for ways to vary and expand their programming so that their 
audience appeal increases. 
Expansion of Networks 
All of the statewide public affairs television systems in this study have moved 
beyond just providing gavel-to-gavel coverage of their legislatures. Five of the systems in 
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this study—CT-N, the Florida Channel, the Ohio Channel, PCN, and TVW—program 24 
hours a day. To fill the airtime, CT-N, for instance, also covers legislative committee 
hearings, the executive branch, state agencies, the Connecticut Supreme Court, public 
policy discussions, and the University of Connecticut’s monthly health forum. In 
addition, the network covers events and meetings outside the capital with a remote crew. 
CT-N also carries the weekly news interview programs produced by its commercial 
counterparts in Hartford. The network runs the three programs back to back in a bloc on 
Sunday nights, making them easy for viewers to find. 
In Ohio, the Ohio Channel serves as an in-house production operation for state 
government, in addition to providing gavel-to-gavel legislative coverage. Thus, 
legislators are invited and encouraged to put together their own 30-minute shows on a 
topic of their choice, and the Ohio Channel provides the production expertise. The 
network also contracts out its production services to state agencies and commissions. In 
addition, the network rebroadcasts programs produced by the various PBS stations 
around the state, giving them wider exposure than they might otherwise get. 
In Washington, TVW covers the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, 
produces its own interview and legislative highlights programs, and covers events around 
the state. TVW’s latest project is the development of Spanish-language programming. 
The Florida Channel also produces a legislative highlights show as well as cultural 
programs about different areas of the state, and has become the pool network for the 
Florida Department of Emergency Management. That means the Florida Channel will be 
the only network allowed into the state’s emergency operations center and will be 
responsible for providing feeds for other broadcast media. In addition, CT-N and the 
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Florida Channel also have moved into coverage of electoral politics, although in a more 
limited fashion than the commercial media.   
The other networks in the study—the California Channel, KET, MGTV, 
Minnesota House Television Services and Senate Media Services, and Capitol Television 
in Rhode Island—also look for opportunities to extend their programming beyond the 
gavel-to-gavel coverage. Capitol Television, for example, has begun covering community 
meetings, often at legislators’ request, while MGTV covers the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s oral arguments, and KET in Kentucky produces a highly respected legislative 
wrapup show. The program runs nightly when the legislature is in session and weekly 
when it is not.  
In addition, most of the networks try to provide educational materials that both 
members of the public and teachers can use. In Connecticut, CT-N has put together a 
video detailing how to testify at a public hearing. The video covers everything from 
where the Legislative Office Building is to how and where to park to how to sign up to 
how best to prepare testimony. MGTV in Michigan has put together a curriculum 
package for teachers on the Civil War battle flags that hang in the Capitol building. The 
network also provides links to generic House and Senate legislative sessions that teachers 
can bring up to show students how the bodies work. The California Channel partners with 
the California Center for Legislative Studies to put together programs for high school 
students. 
What is interesting in examining how the networks have expanded their 
programming beyond the simple gavel-to-gavel coverage of the legislature is that a few 
of them—CT-N, TVW, and the Florida Channel—seem to be moving toward a model 
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more typical of the traditional broadcast media, but without the demands imposed by an 
advertising-supported model. That is, they are producing content that sometimes has little 
to do with the legislative process but which serves as another avenue to attract viewers. 
The development and growth of statewide public affairs television has been 
driven by both technological and programming innovations. From a technology 
perspective, the early founders of these networks used technological advances to create a 
model that could be used by others. These innovations allow the networks systems to 
produce content with minimal editing and resources and to provide that content to the 
public. Such advances as robotic cameras, automated playback systems, non-linear 
editing capability, and digital cameras have made it possible for many of these systems to 
set up with limited resources, and to tighten or broaden the scope of their operations as 
circumstances permit. At the same time, the managers of these systems have looked for 
ways to expand their programming so that more and more members of the public might 
find something of interest. Gavel-to-gavel coverage of legislative sessions is rarely 
exciting, and the managers recognize that they must find other types of programming to 
attract audience interest. The hope is that once a viewer discovers the network, he or she 
eventually will tune in some of the legislative content.  
The ability to develop innovative programming generally depends on the 
relationship between legislators and the network and how stable the network’s funding 
mechanism is. Those networks that have built reputations of fairness and even-
handedness in their coverage tend to be the most innovative in their programming, as are 
those that have dependable funding streams. In addition, the social network the managers 
of these systems have developed allows them to exchange ideas about programming and 
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technology, which, in turn, helps spur their development. What the data showed was that 
statewide public affairs television has benefited tremendously from this diffusion of 
knowledge and expertise—of innovation—among the networks.  
Research Question 6 
What obstacles hinder the development of statewide public affairs television into 
an institution? 
Distribution of Networks 
Accessibility to statewide public affairs television is one of the most persistent 
challenges these networks face. Within the capitol buildings themselves the availability 
of the feed varies. Generally, the pressrooms in the buildings are equipped with television 
sets that carry the signal, as are legislative offices. Legislative staff members usually can 
access the feed via their computers. A few of the buildings also have monitors installed in 
public areas where anyone can watch, while in Rhode Island and Connecticut, televisions 
are moved into vacant committee rooms or out into hallways to accommodate overflow 
crowds.  
Only two of the systems seem to have resolved the distribution issue outside of 
the capitol buildings. Both Connecticut and Rhode Island have statewide distribution. In 
Connecticut’s case, the statewide reach is due to its intervention in a lawsuit over the 
federal requirement that cable companies set aside space for PEG channels—channels 
dedicated to public access, educational programming, and government programming.  
CT-N’s position was that in the past, the cable industry had defined the government 
component of the PEG channels as local government. CT-N contended that there was 
nothing in the law that specified local government and that a channel dedicated to state 
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government would be equally applicable. Rather than fight the battle, cable leaders in 
Connecticut capitulated and agreed to carry CT-N on a lower channel, making it 
accessible around the state. 
In Rhode Island, the cable franchise is under the state’s control, and channels 
were set aside for public access in the initial agreements more than 20 years ago. Capitol 
Television shares one of the channels with local college educational programming. But 
again, the reach is statewide. While the statewide distribution these two networks have is 
notable, it also should be pointed out that both states are small in terms of geography, and 
distribution is not the problem it is in larger states like California and Florida.  
With the exception of Pennsylvania, where PCN reaches into more than 80 
percent of the state, the other states in this study struggle to obtain cable carriage. The 
California Channel, the Florida Channel, and House Television and Senate Media 
Services in Minnesota, in particular, have had difficulty convincing cable companies to 
give up valuable channel space to programming that brings in no money. In Kentucky, 
the situation is worse because the cable signal is only available in Frankfort, the capital. 
In Ohio, Ohio Channel officials have created a hybrid distribution network that combines 
cable and the statewide PBS network. As a result, the channel reaches about two-thirds of 
Ohio’s households.  
Another facet of the distribution issue is the Internet presence of the systems in 
this study. All of these networks, with the exception of Capitol Television in Rhode 
Island, have a Web site where more state government content is available than is possible 
through their broadcast signal. The Web cast capability allows some of these systems to 
solve their dilemmas over which committee to cover when more than one is meeting at a 
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time or which chamber session to put out over the air when both are meeting. The Web 
sites allow for multiple signals, assuming the committee rooms in question are wired, 
giving audience members a choice of what to watch. While this flexibility increases the 
opportunities for citizens to gain information about what their state government is doing, 
that is only the case for those who have access to a computer and Internet service. In the 
same way, the cable-only access of the networks automatically means some potential 
audience members will be excluded because they cannot afford cable service. 
One of the inherent flaws in statewide public affairs television is its reliance on 
the cable industry for distribution. Since not everyone has access to, can afford, or wants 
to pay for cable television service, not everyone has access to the content produced by 
these networks. People who choose not to pay for cable service have made the decision 
that they can do without the expanded programming cable offers, including that produced 
by statewide public affairs television. That is different from those who have no access to 
or cannot afford cable service. For the members of the public who fall into either of these 
groups, the decision has been taken away from them. The same is even more true for 
Internet access. So even if a system has a Web presence, the reality is that even fewer 
members of the public will have access to it than have access to the cable channel. This 
inequity in accessibility, in turn, affects how engaged citizens can be and reinforces a 
two-tiered society of information haves and have-nots.  
Criticisms of Networks 
The criticisms of statewide public affairs television flowed primarily from 
questions and concerns having to do with the specific makeup of each system. So, several 
of the interviewees complained about the short broadcast days of the California Channel, 
 131
MGTV, and Minnesota House Television and Senate Media Services. In the California 
Channel’s case, the network’s on-air legislative coverage ends at 3:30 p.m. each day. In 
Michigan, MGTV only broadcasts from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. each day, while Minnesota 
House Television and Senate Media Services are on the air from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. The 
practical result is that the primary audience for both of these networks is elites, not 
ordinary citizens, because most members of the public work during the day or are busy 
taking care of children and households. That limits the non-elite audience for these 
networks to viewers who work the night shift, or are retired or unemployed, who are not 
typical of the general public. In addition, the limited programming schedule means the 
networks sometimes go off the air in the middle of important legislative debates, making 
them less useful for statehouse reporters and legislative staff members. 
Other criticisms focused on the lack of availability of the network outside the 
capitol building, the fact that in some states not all legislative committee rooms have 
cameras, and even in states where every room is wired, the network does not cover every 
committee hearing. The data also revealed a belief among some interviewees that those 
networks dependent on the cable industry for funding and distribution—the California 
Channel, MGTV, and PCN—had to concern themselves more with keeping the industry 
happy than with producing useful, quality content. Limited camera views of the chambers 
and the lack of any informational graphics on the broadcast signal also drew criticism. 
The restricted camera views mean that it is impossible for viewers—elite or non-elite—to 
see what else is happening in the chambers or committee hearing rooms. Therefore, they 
cannot see which legislators are whispering to each other, which ones are distracted or 
bored, or which ones are present or absent. They cannot see which lobbyists are talking 
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with which legislators and which lawmakers are being taken to task by the legislative 
leadership. All of these things provide context for the legislative process and the 
decisions made but they are things viewers miss because the cameras almost never show 
them. 
In a similar vein, simply putting pictures up on a television monitor or a computer 
screen does not tell viewers much about what is actually happening. Some on-screen 
informational graphics to help audience members orient themselves would give them 
some context for what they are seeing and would allow them to make better use of the 
information. 
Finally, in Connecticut, statehouse reporters complained about CT-N’s 
permanently assigned Capitol crew. The three-person team stays over at the Capitol to 
make sure a camera is available to record impromptu press conferences or other 
unscheduled happenings. The reporters’ complaint was that it was one thing for CT-N to 
act as a news-recording entity and another for it to engage in news gathering. Their view 
was that the latter was inappropriate given that CT-N contracts with the General 
Assembly to provide the legislative coverage. “If they’re setting themselves up as a news 
organization, I wonder … they’re a creature of the General Assembly. How well is a 
creature of the General Assembly going to cover the General Assembly?” asked one 
reporter. This criticism, in particular, highlights the problem these networks have in 
establishing credibility. On the one hand, many of the statehouse reporters tended to be 
skeptical of how independent these networks truly are. On the other, they used the 
content anyway to help them do their jobs. In a way, the credibility issue may not be that 
problematic for reporters because they have access to many other sources of information 
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and can weigh one against the other. It is a relevant question for members of the public, 
however, since they have fewer ways to get information about the governmental process. 
This criticism also ties into the previously cited Political Pressures category. If a network 
is susceptible to pressure from legislators, then it is reasonable to question its effect on 
programming and on the system’s overall credibility. 
The more important concern is how these weaknesses affect the access citizens 
have to information about state government and how they affect the quality of the content 
statewide public affairs television provides. If the networks are not broadcasting when 
people are most likely to be watching or if the signal is not widely available, then 
ordinary citizens lose one more way to get the information they need to begin to think 
about participating in the process. In the same way, if there are suspicions about the 
quality or credibility of the content statewide public affairs television provides, then 
citizens will be less likely to pay attention to it, which also will affect their ability to stay 
informed. 
Public Awareness of Networks 
Statewide public affairs television has two distinct audiences—an elite one made 
up of legislators, legislative staff members, lobbyists, and statehouse reporters—and a 
non-elite one that consists of members of the public. The non-elite audience can be 
broken down further into a small group of very interested, knowledgeable members of the 
public and the much larger group of viewers who dip into the content periodically 
depending on the issue and their level of interest in it. One legislative staff member said 
he did not think that most people would watch the programming from start to finish. “I 
think most people ... channel-surf a lot and if they’ll get on it and happen to see someone 
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making a point, someone they recognize … they may watch it for a little while.” While 
network managers have a good sense of who their elite audience is, they acknowledge 
that they know little about their non-elite viewers. What information they do have is 
anecdotal and based on the feedback they get from members of the public. Thus they 
know when certain types of programming strike a chord with viewers because of the 
phone calls, e-mails, and requests for copies they receive. Some of the networks also 
produce call-in shows, which is another way to gauge whether anyone is watching.  
What these networks do not do is conduct formal viewer surveys or subscribe to 
any ratings service like Nielsen. One reason for that is the cost involved. Such a survey 
would require tremendous oversampling just to obtain enough responses to get a valid 
indication of viewership. The survey that forms the quantitative component of this study, 
for instance, was possible because it was part of a larger overall media credibility survey, 
and even with that advantage, the sample size was small, meaning that it is difficult to 
draw broad conclusions from the data. 
Only CT-N has tried to conduct any sort of survey to determine who is watching 
its network, and that was done in-house. The marketing director built his own research 
program and used network resources to conduct the survey. “Candidly, it’s come in a 
little slower than I would have liked … and the response rate on some of these surveys 
has not always been to my liking, but it’s finally getting to the point where I’ve spent 
enough money on free thank-you gifts for people who fill out the survey that I’m starting 
to get some significant information.” Essentially CT-N’s survey showed that its audience 
mirrored that of C-SPAN. 
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Nor are network managers entirely certain they want to know how large their 
audiences are. Part of that is because they see their mission as simply to make the 
information available, not to actively seek viewers. And part of that has to do with not 
wanting their funding sources—the legislature or the cable industry—to know just how 
small their audience is. In line with that is the limited effort most of these networks make 
in terms of marketing and promotion. In addition to the costs involved, statewide public 
affairs television executives face some challenges in trying to promote their networks. 
Gavel-to-gavel coverage and legislative committee hearings, for instance, may have a 
definite start time, but they rarely have a specific end time. In other words, legislative 
coverage does not fall into neat hour or half-hour blocks. If a legislator makes a 10-
minute speech on the chamber floor, statewide public affairs television shows the whole 
10 minutes. It does not cut the speech short to fit into an artificially constructed time slot, 
as commercial broadcast television must do. Such unpredictability makes it difficult to 
get the programming listed in any type of television guide. Even worse for these 
networks is that because they cannot say for certain when the gavel-to-gavel or legislative 
committee coverage will end, they cannot promote their own public affairs programming 
because they cannot guarantee when it will run. All of this makes it hard for viewers who 
have been conditioned by commercial broadcast media to look for specific start and end 
times to tune in.  
Another major obstacle to marketing efforts is the inconsistency in channel 
allocation. Typically, the channels allocated to statewide public affairs television vary by 
the cable system that carries it. That is, the programming may be on Channel 2 in one 
city, Channel 17 in another, and Channel 21 in a third. That means promotional 
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campaigns have to be tailored to specific cities, which is an expensive proposition and 
something the networks do not have the resources to do. Obtaining a standardized 
channel is next to impossible as well because each cable system determines its own line-
up. The networks would have to negotiate with each cable system individually and get 
them all to agree to provide the same channel. Another problem is the limited broadcast 
hours of some of the networks. Air time for the networks in this study ranged from a low 
of four hours during the day in Michigan to 24-hour-a-day programming in Connecticut, 
Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington. If a network is only on the air during the 
day, it is difficult to build awareness among a public that works during the same time. 
Who Is Watching? 
Still, some information exists about who is watching statewide public affairs 
television. The quantitative component of this study yielded data showing the non-elite 
audience was larger and more diverse than anticipated, although in terms of overall 
numbers, the sample size was extremely small. The random national telephone survey 
garnered 605 responses. Of those, 284 respondents (46.9 percent) said their state had a 
statewide public affairs television network, while 163 (26.9 percent) said their state did 
not, and 151 (25 percent) said they did not know whether their state had a network or not. 
The question was phrased so that it asked about the networks by name (i.e., The 
California Channel, The Florida Channel, PCN, TVW, etc.) in an effort to make sure 
respondents understood what was being asked. Of the 284 respondents who said their 
state had a public affairs television network, 10.5 percent said they watched the 
programming more than once a week, 15.2 percent said they watched once a week, 12 
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percent watched once or twice a month, 20.3 percent said they rarely watched, and 42 
percent said they never watched. 
The survey also asked about the reasons why respondents watched their public 
affairs networks. By far the largest number—46 percent, or —said they watched to learn 
about the day’s events. Next was hearing experts discuss the issues, with 18.7 percent 
citing that as their primary reason for watching. That was followed by tracking a specific 
bill or issue (17.5 percent), keeping tabs on what specific legislators were doing (11.5 
percent), and watching to see what the journalists who cover state government had to say 
about the proceedings (6.8 percent). Again, the actual numbers of respondents was small, 
but indicative of a trend that warrants further exploration. 
Demographic information gathered from the respondents showed that among 
those who watched statewide public affairs television, women outnumbered men (51.8 
percent to 48.2 percent), roughly a quarter had college degrees (23.6 percent), and most 
fell into the 45- to 64-year-old age group (39.9 percent), followed by those who were 25 
to 44 years old (33.5 percent). In terms of political affiliation, more viewers were 
Democrats (40.2 percent) than Republicans (30.4 percent) or Independents (26.5 percent). 
The information also showed that 63.4 percent of viewers were employed, as opposed to 
being retired (22.3 percent), or unemployed (14.3 percent), and 41.1 percent of viewers 
earned less than $30,000 a year. Just under a quarter of statewide public affairs television 
viewers earned more than $75,000 a year. Finally, the survey found that 76.6 percent of 
statewide public affairs television viewers were Caucasian, 12.6 percent were African-
American, 6.3 percent were Hispanic, and 1.8 percent were Asian. 
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Table 3 compares the characteristics of statewide public affairs television viewers 
that emerged in the telephone survey with those of C-SPAN viewers. The biggest 
differences were found in the education and age categories. 
Table 3. Comparison of Viewers 
 Statewide Public Affairs 
Television 
C-SPAN 
Education 23.6 % have college degrees 29% have college degrees 
Age 42.4% are between 25 and 44; 
33.9% are between 45 and 64 
40% are between 25 and 44; 
33% are between 45 and 64 
Ethnicity 76.6% are Caucasian 89% are Caucasian 
Political activities Discussing politics, contacting 
public officials, contributing 
to campaigns, writing letters to 
officials 
Discussing politics, 
contributing to campaigns, 
writing members of Congress 
 
The telephone survey data also were examined to see whether a relationship could 
be determined between viewers of statewide public affairs television and their political 
preferences, their participation in the political process, and the attention they pay to news 
coverage of politics and public affairs. The statistical analysis consisted of a series of 
cross-tabs comparing the viewership variable with variables encompassing different 
aspects of political preferences, participation, and attention to politics and public affairs. 
A chi square test was run in each case to determine statistical significance. 
Only two of the relationships were found to have statistical significance. The 
relationship between those who watch statewide public affairs programming and the 
attention they pay to news coverage of politics and public affairs was significant at a 0.05 
level. In addition, the relationship between those respondents who said their state had a 
statewide public affairs television network and their belief that news coverage of politics 
and public affairs helps to solve problems was found to be significant at a 0.08 level.  
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An analysis of those who watched compared with the ways in which they 
participate in the political process found that 48.1 percent had tried to persuade someone 
to support or oppose a political issue, 36.9 percent had contacted a public official about 
an issue, 34.9 percent had contributed to a political campaign or organization, and 22 
percent had written a letter to the editor or called in to a public affairs talk show. Other 
analysis looked at those who watched compared to whether they thought news coverage 
of politics and public affairs was fair or accurate and whether respondents took liberal, 
moderate, or conservative positions on social, economic, and foreign affairs issues. None 
of these comparisons was found to have any statistical significance.  
 The biggest shortcoming of this study clearly is the small sample size that 
ultimately was obtained and the descriptive nature of the data it yielded. Out of 605 
respondents, only 284 said their state had a public affairs television network devoted to 
covering state government and an even smaller number—160—said they had ever 
watched it. Despite the small numbers, the survey did provide sufficient data to explore 
further the determinants of who watches statewide public affairs television, and the 
author estimated an ordered logistic regression model in which the dependent variable 
“watches network” is depicted as a function of several independent variables: 
1.  Attention to news about politics and public affairs, which measures 
respondents’ attention news about politics and public affairs in their state on a 10-
point scale. 
2.  Perceived accuracy of news coverage of politics and public affairs, which 
measures respondents’ perceptions of how accurate news about politics and public 
affairs is in their state on a 10-point scale. 
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3.  Perceived fairness of news coverage of politics and public affairs, which 
measures how fair respondents perceived news about politics and public affairs to be 
in their state on a 10-point scale. 
4.  Use of news media, which measures how frequently respondents watch 
national television news and local television news, or how frequently they read a 
newspaper. 
5.  Types of public affairs participation, which measures the kinds of public 
affairs-oriented activities in which respondents engage—writing a letter to the editor 
or calling in to a news talk show, contacting a public official, persuading someone to 
believe in their point of view, and contributing to a political campaign or 
organization. 
6.  Respondents’ perceptions of how liberal or conservative they are in their 
political philosophy. 
7.  Merges political perception variable, which merges the negative and positive 
halves of the scale measuring the intensity with which respondents identified 
themselves as liberal or conservative into a scale ranging from 0 to 6. 
8.  Gender. 
9.  Racial identity, which asks respondents to specify whether they are African-
American or non-African American. 
10. Education, which asks respondents about their level of educational 
achievement. 
11. Employment, which asks respondents whether they are employed full time or 
not. 
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12. Political party identification, which measures the strength of political party 
affiliation. 
13. Merged political party identification variable, which merges the negative and 
positive halves of the scale measuring respondents’ political party affiliation into a 
scale ranging from 0 to 6. 
 The dependent variable, “Watches Network,” measures the degree to which 
respondents watched their statewide public affairs television network. The variable is 
measured as 5-point scale, ranging from “watch more than once a week” to “never 
watch.” The ordered logit analysis shows that not much in the model is significantly 
related to the dependent variable.  In fact, only the variables Use of news media and 
Gender are shown to have significant effects on individuals’ use of statewide public 
affairs television (see Table 4). The finding that those respondents who made more 
frequent use of national and local television news and newspapers are also more likely to 
watch statewide public affairs television is not surprising. The most likely explanation is 
that individuals view statewide public affairs television as yet another tool with which to 
keep informed. Since they already are inclined to follow the news, individuals who are 
heavy media users are likely to use these networks as another source. In contrast, the 
relationship between those who watch statewide public affairs television and gender is a 
negative one. That is, women are less likely than men to watch the networks. This fits 
with a substantial amount of research that finds that, in general, men tend to pay more 
attention to the news than women. 
What is most interesting about the results of the regression is the variables that proved 
to be unrelated to building the model of who watches statewide public affairs television. 
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For example, neither political party identification nor the intensity of respondents’ 
political party identification has any bearing on whether they watch statewide public 
affairs television, and while the data show an unexpectedly negative relationship between 
level of education and the frequency with which respondents watch statewide public 
affairs television, it is not statistically significant. The education finding is especially 
unexpected because research has shown that people with higher levels of education tend 
to pay more attention to the news. Indeed, in their study of C-SPAN, Frantzich and 
Sullivan (1996) point to a 1995 Mediamark Research Inc. survey that found that 12.5 
percent of the national network’s viewers were college graduates, while 10.1 percent had 
attended college. The expectation with the survey of statewide public affairs television 
viewers is that education would play the same role. That is not the case. In fact, what the 
analysis shows is that the higher the level of education, the less likely respondents are to 
watch statewide public affairs television. One possible explanation for this negative 
relationship may be that people with higher levels of education generally have access to 
more sources of information than those with less education, and they may not feel it 
necessary to watch these networks. Still the data are revealing in that they confirm that 
there is an audience for statewide public affairs television outside the walls of state 
capitols—an audience that is driven primarily by its usage of other media and to some 
extent by gender. 
Distribution and marketing are two of the biggest obstacles statewide public 
affairs television faces in trying to build audience awareness. The demand for the content 
these networks provide is small to begin with, compared to the audience for commercial 
television, but they are not helped by the lack of consistency in channel allocation and the 
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Table 4. Parameter Estimates (Ordered Logit Coefficients) for Model of Who 
Watches Statewide Public Affairs Television 
 
Variable b z 
   
Dependent Variable: 
       Watches network 
  
   
Attention to news about politics & public affairs 0.058 0.84 




Perceived fairness of news about politics & public 
affairs 
-0.071 -1.38 
Use of news media 0.065 2.75* 
Types of public affairs participation 0.119 1.07 
Respondents’ perceptions of how liberal or 
conservative they are 
0.055 0.45 
Merged political perception variable 0.011 0.14 
Gender -0.479 -1.73** 
Racial identity 0.081 0.19 
Education -0.128 -1.16 
Employment -0.044 -0.15 
Political party identification -0.137 -1.17 
Merged political party identification variable 0.031 0.18 
   
Intercept 1                                                     0.127  
Intercept 2                                                     0.914 
Intercept 3                                                     1.598 
Intercept 4                                                     2.816 
 
N                                                                    220 
Pseudo-R2                                                      0.035 
Wald X2                                                         22.57 
 
**prob < 0.1, one-tailed test 
*prob < 0.01, one-tailed test 
 
inability to schedule programming in well-ordered blocks of time. That, in turn, makes it 
difficult to develop effective marketing campaigns, and most networks have neither the 
money nor the staff to devote to full-time promotional efforts. Further, there is a sense—
particularly among those systems that are dependent on the state for money, equipment, 
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and staff—that legislators would not look favorably on spending taxpayer money for 
marketing efforts. On the other hand, the data from the telephone survey suggest that 
there is an audience for statewide public affairs television and that it consists of both 
elites and non-elites. If that is the case, then it would seem to be in the networks’ best 
interests to cultivate the non-elite segment of their audiences. Demonstrating 
conclusively to legislators that their constituents are watching could only help strengthen 
the networks’ position in the institutional process. 
Research Question 7 
Does statewide public affairs television provide a viable alternative to commercial 
broadcasting in fulfilling the public information and education role originally envisioned 
when television was first developed? 
These networks, which at first glance seem to be a pale version of the traditional 
media, have developed into a distinct broadcasting model with some specific 
characteristics. What this question sought to determine was what type of model has 
emerged and whether it is capable of providing the public with the information necessary 
to keep track of policy issues that affect it and what legislators are doing about those 
issues. 
Political Economy of Networks 
Although the basic model for statewide public affairs television is the same for all 
of the networks, some noticeable differences exist among the systems. For instance, 
funding mechanisms vary among the 20 operating systems. Ten of them are funded solely 
by their respective states, four are financed by cable subscriber fees, five have mixed 
funding sources, and one receives all of its operating money from foundations. Among 
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the states in this study, CT-N, the Florida Channel, Minnesota House Television and 
Senate Media Services, and Capitol Television in Rhode Island are all state-funded. The 
California Channel and MGTV are financed by the cable industry. KET, the Ohio 
Channel, PCN, and TVW have mixed funding structures. WisconsinEye, which is still in 
the developmental stages, is trying to put forgo both state and cable funding and is 
looking to private foundations for support.  
While these networks take pride in the fact that they are not commercial 
operations dependent on advertising revenue, it also is true that at least three of them 
have moved a little closer to their commercial counterparts by accepting underwriting for 
some of their programs. Thus, TVW allows underwriting for its self-produced content but 
not its gavel-to-gavel coverage. The Ohio Channel, on the other hand, signed Honda 
Motors to underwrite the entire operation of the network. Honda could not sponsor a 
specific program under the terms of the contract or air advertising for its products, but it 
could run brand identity spots. The whole idea of underwriting is problematic for these 
networks because it raises the question of who actually is controlling the content. Yet it is 
an attractive option because legislative funding is sometimes subject to the whims of the 
body, while the cable funding is beginning to drop because of the decreasing number of 
subscribers and the consolidation of the industry. One of the biggest differences between 
statewide public affairs television and the traditional media is the lack of a profit motive. 
At the same time, however, underwriting pushes the networks closer to the corporate 
capitalist model that dominates broadcasting in this country. 
Another facet of the statewide public affairs television model is the overarching 
focus on gavel-to-gavel coverage. As noted elsewhere, these networks build their 
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programming around coverage of legislative floor sessions. This is in marked contrast to 
the commercial media, where the demands of the capitalist model make it difficult to 
provide more than cursory coverage of state government. Turning the cameras on in the 
chambers and letting them run simply does not fit with a model that requires shorter and 
shorter stories, more sensationalistic video, and glitzier production values. In addition, 
while commercial broadcasters seek as wide an audience as possible, statewide public 
affairs television is generally content with its niche audience. 
The networks differ from their commercial counterparts in terms of their 
programming as well. Where local commercial stations program for 24 hours a day, 
many of the statewide public affairs television network are only on the air for part of the 
day. The rest of the time they either share the channel space with another entity, or they 
put up static graphics that tell viewers when programming will resume. For the handful of 
networks that run 24-hour-a-day operations, finding content to fill the air time can be a 
challenge. That, in turn, has led to some unusual arrangements. So, for example, PCN 
runs high schools sports coverage as well as infomercials. CT-N runs a bloc of news talk 
shows produced by the local commercial stations, and the Ohio Channel has arranged to 
pick up programming from that state’s PBS archives. 
One element the commercial media and the networks do share is the vertical 
integration of operations. Many scholars have decried the vertical integration of media 
operations that developed out of the corporate capitalist model, concluding that it stifles 
creativity and closes off alternative views. Yet for statewide public affairs television, 
such integration is what enables it to operate as inexpensively as possible. Everything is 
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kept in-house. Another element these networks have in common with the commercial 
media is the development of norms and routines specific to their needs. 
Network Norms and Routines 
Over the nearly three decades that statewide public affairs television has existed, 
some common operating patterns—norms and routines—have developed that are 
different from those associated with traditional media. The most important is that 
coverage of legislative floor sessions takes precedence over everything else. 
Programming is built around how and when the legislature is covered. Other norms 
include covering events or sessions or hearings from start to finish, meaning they cannot 
be packaged into neat hour-long or half hour-long slots. That makes putting together a 
broadcast schedule something like solving a puzzle and creates a need for filler material 
of varying lengths to make up the differences. 
Production norms also vary from those of traditional media. So, for instance, the 
gavel-to-gavel coverage is minimally edited and unfiltered. What editing does take place 
usually is done to remove dead spots in the footage when the House stands at ease for an 
indefinite period, for example. Hours of operation also vary, unlike traditional media, 
which has an established standard for when the national evening news programs and the 
local evening news programs air. That is, every night at 5:30 one can find the CBS 
Evening News or the NBC Nightly News. Statewide public affairs television networks are 
constrained by legislative schedules and by the fact that events don’t necessarily start 
when they are scheduled. Other production norms include the use of robotic cameras in 
most of the systems—Kentucky and Rhode Island are exceptions. Timeliness is a factor 
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in running legislative session programming, but other content can be run whenever there 
is room. So, committee hearings might be shown a few days after they occurred. 
In California, the statewide public affairs television entity is a split system. The 
General Assembly and the Senate both have television operations and both use a system 
of robotic cameras for their coverage. Each chamber has two channels that it broadcasts 
internally, and the California Channel picks up two of the feeds and decides which one to 
air. “We try to maintain parity … in terms of hours. We also try to make sure all the 
committees get equal shots,” said one network staff member. 
The California Channel is on the air from 9 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Monday through 
Friday. In addition, it can stream all four feeds on its Web site. Floor sessions take 
precedence in the programming although the network also tries to run legislative 
committee hearings when possible. In general, the network relies on the Senate and 
Assembly operations to cover committee hearings. If they do not or cannot, the channel 
must send over a crew with a camera to record the event for later airing. 
In Connecticut, the legislature owns all of the broadcast equipment and contracts 
with CT-N to operate the equipment and provide coverage. Programming decisions are 
the purview of CT-N, but legislative floor sessions are the priority. “We had an operating 
agreement that set up the parameters for our operation that was never signed. It was just 
… the understanding that you’re not going to take reaction shots, or you’re going to use 
graphics to explain who the people are … we always have to cover the House and Senate 
regardless of how long they are, those types of things,” said the director of the system.  
CT-N has a fairly structured process for determining its broadcast schedule. Every 
week calls are made to legislative committee clerks, major state agencies, and the 
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executive offices to see what’s being scheduled and what the important issues are. In 
addition, the legislative calendar is checked. After the information is gathered, the 
assignment editor compiles a list of possibilities for coverage and the staff holds a 
programming meeting. From there they decide crew availability, scheduling, and 
importance, and a schedule is drawn up. A show profile is prepared for each event which 
gives the basic information, who is doing the show, who the contacts are, all the numbers 
a producer might need, the time, place, and so forth. The profile also contains director’s 
notes and the information for the graphics. 
CT-N’s broadcast runs from about 3 or 4 o’clock in the afternoon to the same 
time the next day. On a typical day, if both chambers are meeting, the House session is 
broadcast live because it comes in first. The Senate session is recorded and then when the 
House has adjourned, it is aired. Then the entire package is rebroadcast. CT-N also 
emphasizes graphics at the bottom of the screen. Beyond identifying who is speaking and 
what the topic is, the graphics also explain what the issue is and why it is important so 
viewers have some sort of context. The network records everything on a file server, 
which is also the automatic playback system. That allows the staff to maintain a 9 a.m. to 
5 p.m. workday on most days. 
In Rhode Island, the production routine is different. Capitol Television cannot go 
live until the afternoon because it shares a channel with some college educational 
programming. That programming airs until approximately noon. The earliest the network 
goes on the air is 1 p.m. when the House Finance Committee meets. The network stays 
with the committee until it adjourns for the House floor session at 4 p.m. At that point, 
the coverage shifts to the House. Since the Senate usually comes in at the same time as 
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the house, Capitol Television records the Senate proceedings. When the House adjourns, 
the network either goes back to the House Finance Committee if it reconvenes or it shows 
the Senate session on a delayed basis. The Senate programming may be delayed even 
further if other committees are meeting after the floor sessions adjourn because the 
network will go to them first. 
From a civic engagement perspective, statewide public affairs television seems a 
viable solution to the problems of citizen apathy and ignorance. The networks provide 
gavel-to-gavel coverage of legislative floor sessions and committee hearings, thereby 
giving the public more access to state government than it has with the traditional media. 
Meeting coverage runs uninterrupted, allowing citizens more opportunity to see the 
process at work without the traditional media filter. Many of the networks also offer other 
public affairs programming to help put the process into some context, which is something 
local television stations and newspapers rarely do. And audience members generally can 
dip into the content as they see fit, rather than having to depend on the vagaries of 
traditional media coverage.  
The norms and routines these statewide public affairs television networks have 
developed enable them to produce their programming in as efficient a manner as possible 
and in as consistent a manner as possible. The routines guarantee that gavel-to-gavel 
coverage is the centerpiece of network programming and the rest of the schedule is built 
around that. All of these systems also must create a process for deciding which chamber 
is shown live or which committee hearing is shown live when there are simultaneous 
meetings. Typically, the decision on the chambers revolves around which one comes in 
first. The decision on which committee hearing to show live is a little more problematic, 
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but network staff generally are able to head off any problems by conferring with 
legislative staff to get their input before deciding. In terms of equipment, the use of fixed 
robotic cameras means that the views the audience sees are generally the same from 
legislature to legislature. The cameras focus on whoever is speaking, while the rest of the 
chamber remains out of view. Limited informational graphics are another characteristic 
of most of the networks, as is the minimal editing of content. The result is that no matter 
which system someone is watching, there is a sameness to the type of programming that 

















DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The primary research question for this project asked whether statewide public 
affairs television had achieved institutional status after nearly 30 years of existence. 
Selznick (1957) defined institutionalism as a process, while Hughes (1936) described an 
institution as having “some sort of establishment or relative permanence” (p. 180), and 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) offered this explanation: “Institutionalization involves the 
processes by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rulelike 
status in social thought and action” (p. 341).  
From the beginning, the development of statewide public affairs television has 
followed a process. First were the battles just to set up the networks. In almost every 
instance there has been resistance to establishing a network. Often that resistance has 
come from legislators who were afraid the network would give undue power to the 
governor or the majority power. Others feared the presence of the cameras would 
encourage grandstanding among legislators, thereby detracting from serious debate and 
making a mockery of the decorum needed to keep things running smoothly. And some 
legislators simply believed that the public did not need to be exposed to all of the 
machinations of the governing process. Sometimes the resistance came from the cable 
industry upon whom statewide public affairs television is dependent for carriage and 
channel allocation. In that case, cable executives were reluctant to give up precious 
channel space because of the loss of advertising revenue.  
Eventually, however—at least in the 20 states that have networks—the objections 
were pushed aside, and the decision was made to open up the chambers to the possibility 
of more public scrutiny. Again, the process moved the development of the networks 
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along. Wiring was installed, cameras were placed in the legislative chambers, control 
room equipment was turned on, and the proceedings were broadcast unfiltered and 
uninterpreted over air waves or the Internet or both.  
The process is the same whether one is describing TVW or CT-N, the Ohio 
Channel or the Florida Channel, MGTV or PCN. At some point—when networks 
executives and legislators are comfortable with the cameras and what they can do—the 
programming moves beyond the gavel-to-gavel coverage that forms the centerpiece of 
statewide public affairs television content. Legislative committee hearings typically are 
the next step in network coverage, followed by self-produced programming. The self-
produced programming takes many forms but in general it includes interview shows 
focusing on legislators and other newsmakers, expert panels put together to discuss 
specific issues, and some type of non-legislative content to try to draw people in. The 
non-legislative content runs the gamut from book programs to cultural/tour programs to 
sports. As the networks gain credibility and trust, some work to expand their coverage to 
include state agency hearings and state Supreme Court oral arguments. The tipping point 
seems to be when network staff feel confident enough to cover legislative press 
conferences, which usually are one-sided affairs; develop legislative highlights programs, 
which necessarily involve some editing decisions; or set up election coverage, which 
must be balanced carefully to avoid accusations of partisanship.  
Only a few of the networks have moved through all of these steps, in part because 
of the fear of offending legislator sensibilities, but also because of the constraints created 
by limited resources. What became clear in examining the data was that several elements 
affect a network’s capacity to move beyond the basic gavel-to-gavel coverage of sessions 
 154
and committee hearings. Those elements include the credibility of the network, the 
receptiveness of legislators, and a secure funding source. For most of the networks in this 
study, structural constraints and concerns about funding continue to be obstacles to 
programming innovations. At the same time, even the most restricted systems try to work 
around those obstacles to provide viewers with something other than the often dull gavel-
to-gavel coverage.  
Selznick (1957) also described the process of institutionalization as “something 
that happens to an organization over time, reflecting the organization’s own distinctive 
history, the people who have been in it, the groups it embodies and the vested interests 
they have created, and the way it has adapted to its environment” (p. 16-17). The 
development patterns and variations among the networks dovetail neatly with Selznick’s 
description. The variations among the networks can be explained by the different abilities 
and visions of the people who run them, the particular interests of the legislatures they 
cover, the political and social cultures in which they were formed, and the ways in which 
they have adjusted their operations to fit the funding, operational, and distribution 
constraints imposed on them. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) talked about the “rulelike status” required for 
institutionalization, while North (1990) argued that institutions have both formal and 
informal rules of conduct, much like team sports. Statewide public affairs television has 
some clear rules of operation—norms and routines—that have developed over time and 
reflect both formal and informal guidelines. So, the cameras focus on whoever is 
speaking in the chamber or the committee room. They do not pan and they do not show 
reaction shots. The coverage is broadcast in its entirety with minimal editing of content. 
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The minimal editing happens in those states where the legislature has a penchant for 
standing at ease for a half-hour to an hour or more. In those instances, the networks will 
edit out the dead air, but otherwise the coverage airs intact. House and Senate floor 
sessions take precedence over all other types of programming. If the chambers in a state 
are meeting simultaneously, clear guidelines exist for which is shown live and which is 
taped and shown immediately afterward. The appearance of neutrality and balance is 
critical. So if a Republican legislator is quoted, a Democrat must be found to provide a 
different views. If a Democratic legislator is invited to appear on an interview show, a 
Republican legislator either must be invited to appear with him or must be the guest the 
next time an interview show is run. In addition, the content of the network coverage is not 
allowed to be used in political campaigns. While all of the networks have this rule on 
either a formal or an informal basis, the reality is that they can do little to stop would-be 
candidates from using the material once it has been broadcast.  
Further, statewide public affairs television has affected the norms and routines of 
statehouse reporters, legislators, legislative staff members, and lobbyists. Reporters are 
able to spend less time on the chamber floors or in committee hearing rooms because 
they can watch the proceedings from their offices. That, in turn, allows them to be more 
efficient in their work because they can monitor the proceedings, write another story, and 
make phone calls on a third story. The trade-off is that they sometimes miss some of the 
sideline action out of the view of the cameras or some of the nuances of what is 
happening. Legislative staff members and lobbyists also have found that having access to 
statewide public affairs television allows them be more productive because they do not 
have to spend as much time sitting in committees or on the floor. 
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The biggest surprise in the data was the impact statewide public affairs television 
has had on the legislative process. The potential for increased grandstanding was not 
unexpected, but the somewhat chilling effect on debate was. Legislators’ reluctance to 
vigorously debate controversial issues or bills is disturbing because the overriding 
mission of all of these networks is to open up the government process to citizens. 
Nevertheless, most of the people in these groups—statehouse reporters, legislators, 
legislative staff members, and lobbyists—said their lives would be much more difficult if 
their network were suddenly to go away. 
Statewide public affairs television as it has developed also fits the early definition 
of institutionalism Hughes (1936) proposed. Hughes argued that an institution would 
have some sort of relative permanence over time. The earliest statewide public affairs 
television network was established in Kentucky in 1978, a year before C-SPAN began 
broadcasting. Since then the number of state networks has continued to grow. The 
number has increased in fits and starts, but it has grown steadily larger to today where 20 
states have networks, one network is close to starting up,  a couple of other operations are 
thinking about expanding into full-blown networks, and discussions have begun in at 
least two states without networks about how to set one up. In addition, the national 
organization for statewide public affairs television—the National Association of Public 
Affairs Networks—has its own initiative underway called “50 States, 50 Networks” to try 
to build support for a network in every state.  
At the same time that these networks have become part of their state’s 
institutional fabric, another phase in the process is taking place. Essentially, the norms 
and routines that these networks have developed and continue to develop have given 
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them a consistency across the states. That is, what shapes each of these networks is the 
peculiar mix of cultural and political elements that make each state unique. The norms 
and routines, on the other hand, foster a certain consistency across the networks so that 
the programming is predictable, as are the production values. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) had an explanation for why disparate units that share a common goal eventually 
change and evolve into a unified group. They argued that there are three ways in which 
institutions can change to become more like each other—through coercive isomorphism, 
mimetic isomorphism, or normative isomorphism, or some combination of the three. 
Coercive isomorphism is the result of political influence or pressure and the cultural 
expectations of the society that surrounds the entity. Mimetic isomorphism stems from 
the tendency of organizations to copy the operations of entities similar to them in order to 
ensure success, and normative isomorphism comes from the development of professional 
standards for the organization. 
The civic engagement and policy-making aspects of the data show the effects of 
coercive isomorphism on the process of institutionalization. Initially these networks were 
created in response to outside pressure for more access to state government. As noted 
previously, the mission of all of these networks is to open up the governmental process to 
members of the public and give them the means to take a more active role. Further, as the 
networks have developed, many have begun to move beyond the simple gavel-to-gavel 
coverage to look for more to foster civic engagement. Their programming has become 
more creative and innovative in response to the need to look for other avenues to reach 
the public and in response to requests from state officials who also are looking for more 
ways to get their message out to the public.  
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From a policy-making standpoint, statewide public affairs television at its best 
offers a more direct way for the public to see the process at work, and it enables them to 
have some input into the decision-making if they wish. At the same time, these networks 
are under tremendous pressure from legislators to make certain their coverage of the 
policy-making process is neutral and balanced. This takes on even more importance when 
the network operates in a state where the majority party in the legislature is different from 
the party the governor represents or when the chambers in the legislature are divided with 
one party controlling the House and the other controlling the Senate. As politics becomes 
increasingly polarized as a result of term limits and other factors, the pressure on these 
statewide public affairs television networks to be even-handed and fair becomes greater 
and the more they work to develop routines and practices to ensure their coverage of 
policy issues is politically neutral. 
Mimetic isomorphism comes to light with an examination of how the data fit with 
the diffusion of innovation and social network analysis theories. The two essentially go 
hand in hand. Advances in broadcast technology and the lowering of the costs associated 
with that technology have made it more practical to establish statewide public affairs 
television networks. Commercial broadcast operations are expensive. Statewide public 
affairs television operations do not have to be as costly. For one thing, the equipment is 
less expensive and the networks do not need as much of it. For another, the number of 
staff members required to operate cameras and other equipment is smaller than that of 
commercial stations because of the robotics and automated systems involved. That means 
personnel costs are less. Finally, the newer equipment takes up less room, which is a 
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primary consideration when talking about old capitol buildings where space is always at a 
premium, and it can be installed in such a way as to minimize its intrusiveness.  
In essence what happens is that as one network sets up an operation, managers at 
other networks look to see how it will be structured, what sort of equipment it will use, 
and what type of programming will be presented. The social network they have 
established then allows them to talk to each other to figure out the best practices and 
ideas and go back to their own networks to adapt what they have learned. The end result 
is a similarity in the look of the networks, the equipment they use, the staffing levels they 
maintain, and the content they offer. 
The last piece of DiMaggio and Powell’s framework is normative isomorphism, 
and norms and routines theory illuminates it. What the data show is that statewide public 
affairs television has developed its own norms and routines—its own standards—for 
covering state government, and they differ in some respects from traditional media norms 
and routines. Most notably, the networks engage in only minimal gatekeeping. Some 
gatekeeping is required simply by virtue of the fact that a decision must be made about 
which committees are covered live and which are not, or which chamber session is 
broadcast live and which delayed. Otherwise, the coverage runs unfiltered, which is in 
marked contrast to the traditional media model. Further, the networks will run the 
coverage in its entirety rather just select excerpts of it. The networks also provide little in 
the way of explanatory information for viewers, which can be seen as a shortcoming in 
some ways, but it fits with the need to maintain strict neutrality. The same can be said of 
the camera work of these networks. The reaction shots that are so prized by the traditional 
media have no place in statewide public affairs television. 
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Taken together, the components of DiMaggio and Powell’s framework show 
clearly that statewide public affairs television has achieved institutional status. The 
degree of institutionalism varies according to the state, with some networks more 
developed than others, but the fact remains that statewide public affairs television has 
found a place in state government. More importantly, it has become a viable alternative 
for the dissemination of public affairs information, particularly when compared with the 
more traditional institutions of commercial television and public broadcasting television.  
The most important facets of all of these broadcast models are funding, 
operational procedures, programming, and production values. Statewide public affairs 
television gets its funding primarily from state government, the cable industry, and 
private foundations, which is in sharp contrast to commercial television. As a result, 
statewide public affairs television is not subject to the market pressures that drive 
commercial television. That leaves it free to ignore formal viewer counts and audience 
surveys purporting to determine what people want to watch. At the same time, statewide 
public affairs television differs from the public broadcasting model because very little of 
its programming is underwritten or paid for by viewer contributions. That also frees it 
from the prospect of having to program according to donor demands. As noted 
previously, statewide public affairs television is not immune to pressure since most of its 
funding comes from legislators and/or cable company executives. It is just that the 
pressures are different from what commercial television and public broadcasting 
television face. 
The structure of its operating procedures also sets statewide public affairs 
television apart from commercial television and public broadcasting. Statewide public 
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affairs television networks vary markedly in their on-air time. Some run programming 24 
hours a day; others are only on when their legislature is in session. In addition, the 
programming schedules for statewide public affairs television rarely conform to neat 
half-hour or hour-long time formats. Gavel-to-gavel coverage is unpredictable, and 
beginning and end times are uncertain. That means many scheduling decisions are made 
on short notice, which in turn makes its hard to promote the networks. Commercial 
television and public broadcasting, on the other hand, live and die by the clock. 
Everything is scheduled far in advance, and content is edited to fit into rigid time blocks. 
Most commercial and public broadcasting stations also program for a 24-hour cycle. 
They seldom go off the air. 
Clear differences also exist among the models from a programming perspective. 
Statewide public affairs television’s programming is aimed primarily at elite audiences 
with the goal of giving them both access to information about state government and a 
means of managing that information so that it can be used effectively in the governing 
process. Public broadcasting’s programming also is aimed mostly at elite audiences, but 
its primary goals are to inform and to entertain. Hence the content is a mix of cultural and 
news programs. Commercial television’s programming, on the other hand, is geared 
toward attracting the widest possible audience, and to that end, its content is designed 
more to entertain than inform. 
Production values are the third area where the structural differences among 
statewide public affairs television, commercial television, and public broadcasting 
television emerge most clearly. Statewide public affairs television focuses on unfiltered, 
uninterrupted, minimally edited content. State government proceedings are covered from 
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start to finish, allowing all of the discussion and debate to be heard. Cameras angles are 
limited, and in-house, studio productions are no-nonsense, minimalist affairs. Few of 
these networks provide on-screen graphics to give viewers any context for what they are 
watching. In addition, deciding which chamber or committee hearing to cover when 
several are meeting simultaneously involves diplomatic negotiation rather than arbitrary 
decision-making. 
In sharp contrast, commercial television works with more elaborate sets, more on-
screen graphics, and a wider variety of camera angles. Commercial television also 
measures its coverage of state government proceedings in terms of seconds rather than 
minutes and hours, and officials’ comments are edited heavily to fit into short broadcast 
stories. Public broadcasting television falls somewhere between the two extremes in its 
news coverage. The time it has to devote to news coverage is more flexible than 
commercial television, but its content is still heavily edited. 
All of these structural elements have developed over time, as institutional theory 
suggests. What has emerged among the statewide public affairs television networks is an 
institutional structure characterized by a consistency in funding, operating procedures, 
programming, and production values. The social network among the managers of these 
systems has helped reinforce this institutional structure, making it easier for managers to 
gather information, emulate best practices, and discard what does not work. The civic 
engagement component also has helped to build the institutional structure that governs 
programming because it creates certain expectations about content and the uses to which 
the content will be put. In other words, the same expectations exist regardless of which 
network one is discussing. 
 163
Diffusion of innovation has helped the networks build the institutional production 
structure by bringing a consistency to the equipment used, the types of programming 
offered, and the production values used to create the programming. Finally, the policy-
making discussions preceding the creation of these networks and the debates surrounding 
their operating procedures have been the same across those states that have networks and 
have helped to give them their distinctive structure. The result is an evolving institutional 
structure that has helped statewide public affairs television become an important part of 
state government. This means elite audiences are making far more use of statewide public 
affairs television than members of the public, but this is not necessarily a bad thing. 
Rather, it fits with previous research that finds the public typically only pays attention to 
what government is doing when it feels a compelling need to so.  
For the future, several issues suggest themselves for further investigation. One is 
the role of the Internet in statewide public affairs television. With one exception, all of 
the networks studied in this project have an Internet component. The Internet offers more 
accessibility and flexibility for these networks in that they can air simultaneous live 
sessions or hearings, they can make archives easily available, and they can promote a 
Web site more easily than specific channels. In the past few years, several other states 
have set up Internet-only coverage of their legislatures, but they were not part of this 
study because of its emphasis on the television component of these networks. An 
Internet-only operation, however, limits access to those who can afford a computer and 
the price of hooking up to the Web. That, in turn, would seem to fly in the face of the 
mission of these networks, which is to open up state government to the public.  
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Another issue that needs further exploration is the audience for statewide public 
affairs television. Although the survey that forms part of this project provided some clues 
about who is watching, much more needs to be determined before the audience can be 
accurately characterized and its use of the content of these networks gauged. 
The programming expansion a few of the systems are undertaking also bears more 
investigation because they seem to be moving away from the state government niche and 
more toward a commercial broadcast model that looks to be all things to all people. If 
such a shift proves successful and the audience increases for these networks, then it is not 
too much of a stretch to believe that corporate America will take notice and try to 
determine how to make them profitable. CT-N in Connecticut already is feeling such 
pressure from the NBC affiliate in Hartford. 
Another avenue of exploration would be an examination of the structures of the 
various statewide public affairs television networks and how they align with their state’s 
political and commercial media cultures. This study has argued that the institutionalism 
of statewide public affairs television has led to a predictability in funding mechanisms, 
programming, operational procedures, and production values among the networks. At the 
same time, variations exist, and further research into these variations, why they exist, and 
what their impact is would seem to be warranted.  
And finally, another issue that needs further research is the seeming step 
backward statewide public affairs television represents in the development of the 
communications transmission model and whether that helps or hinders its mission. 
Bennett (2003), for example, suggested that the Internet is changing the communications 
transmission model from one in which elites disseminate information to group members 
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to one in which information travels in distributed, patterned, and chaotic ways. In this 
context, statewide public affairs television would seem to be a step backward since the 
information put out by these systems travels from elites to group members—albeit 
without the commercial aspect—and not through any sort of distributed, patterned way. 
The question would be whether these networks truly represent a step backward or 
whether they represent a new model for journalism. 
In the end, the value of statewide public affairs television lies in its potential to 
make information available, not in how many more members of the public it persuades to 
take an active role in the governing process. That is both the blessing and the curse of 
democracy. Ultimately, making the information available and accessible is all one can 
expect of government. What the public chooses to do with it is where the democratic 
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Gavel-to-Gavel Alaska Alaska 
The California Channel California* 
CT-N Connecticut* 
The Florida Channel Florida* 
Hawaii State Legislature Legislative Broadcasts Hawaii 




House Television and Senate Media Services Minnesota* 
TVMT Montana 
NET Television Nebraska 
Gavel-to-Gavel New Jersey New Jersey 
New York State Legislative Proceedings Channel New York 
The Ohio Channel Ohio* 
OPAN Oregon 
PCN  Pennsylvania* 
Capitol Television Rhode Island* 
The South Carolina Channel South Carolina 
TVW  Washington* 
 


































Alaska 1996 X X   
California 1991   X  
Connecticut 1994 X    
Florida 1996 X    
Hawaii 1993   X  
Illinois 2003  X   
Kentucky 1978 X X   
Massachusetts 1984 X    
Michigan 1997   X  
Minnesota 1988 X    
Montana 2001 X    
Nebraska 1984 X    
New Jersey 1996   X  
New York 2006 X    
Ohio 1997 X   X 
Oregon 1997 X    
Pennsylvania 1994   X X 
Rhode Island 1984 X    
S. Carolina 2003 X    












































Alaska X X X X X   
California X X X X Limited  X 
Connecticut X X X X X X X 
Florida X X  X  X X 
Hawaii X X X    X 
Illinois X X X X X X X 
Kentucky X X X  Limited  X 
Massachusetts X X     X 
Michigan X X X X X X X 
Minnesota X X X    X 
Montana X X X X X X  
Nebraska X X      
New Jersey X X      
New York X X X     
Ohio X X  X  X X 
Oregon X X  X X X X 
Pennsylvania X X X  X  X 
Rhode Island X X Limited  Limited   
S. Carolina X X X    X 




















APPENDIX D: INTERNAL INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
 
Date of interview: 
Location of interview: 
Description/notes about location: 
Name of interviewee: 
Title: 




1. How long has the network been in operation? 
 
2. What do you see as the network’s primary mission? 
 
3. How did the network get started? 
 Legislative effort 
 Grass-roots citizen effort 
 Cable industry initiative 
 Local PBS station initiative 
 




5. How is the staff divided? 
 Who does what? 
 
6. In general, what sort of professional background does your staff members have? 
 
7. What is the network’s primary funding source? 
 State 
 Cable industry 
 Private donations/foundations 
 
8. Does the network have any other sources of funding? 
 Sponsorships/underwriting 
 
9. What are the network’s hours of operation? 
 
10. What is the primary type of programming for the network? 
 Gavel-to-gavel 
 Legislative committee sessions 
 Supreme Court arguments 
 State agency hearings 
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11. Are there any other types of programming your network offers? 
 Interview programs 
 Journalist round tables 
 Candidate debates 
 Press conferences 
 Other 
 
12. What sort of programming do you provide when your legislature is not in session? 
 
13. Where are your cameras set up? 
 House and Senate chambers 
 Legislative committee rooms 
 Others 
 
14. How are they set up? 
 Front of chamber/room 
 Back of chamber/room 
 Sides 
 
15. How many cameras do you have in each chamber? In each committee room? 
 
16. Why do you think the Legislature agreed to allow its proceedings to be televised? 
 
17. Do you think the presence of cameras in the chambers has had any impact on how the 
Legislature conducts business? 
 
18. What kind of cameras/equipment does the network use? 
 Same in both chambers? 
 
19. Who controls the operation of the cameras? 
 
20. Who makes the coverage decisions? 
 
21. Where does the network’s signal reach inside the capitol building? 
 
22. Where does the signal reach outside the capitol? 
 Entire state? 
 Areas not reached? 
 
23. How is the network’s signal distributed? 
 Dedicated channel 





24. Who are the network’s viewers? 
 Elected officials 
 Other government officials 
Journalists 
 Lobbyists 
 Members of the public 
  
25. Can commercial television stations access your signal for carriage on their stations? 
How? 
26. Does the network have any sort of archiving system? 
 
27. Does the network provide any sort of feedback mechanism for the public? 
 Call-in shows 
 E-mail 
 Phone calls 
 Mail 
 Information at end of programming about where to go to get further information 
 
28. What sort of pressures does the network face? 
 Elected officials 
Public 
Funding 
 Staffing  
 Programming 
 
29. How do you handle these pressures? 
Are there specific response mechanisms in place? 
 
30. How stable do you feel the network’s operation is and how are you able to maintain 
stability? 
 
31. What are your biggest concerns for the network? 
 
32. What are your biggest hopes? 
 
33. What are the key relationships you believe the network has established and how have 
they helped in building the network? 
 
34. Ultimately, who do you feel has the most ability to shape the network’s direction, 
programming, operation, etc.? 
 
35. Where do you see the network going in the future? 





36. Where do you look for new ideas? 
 Other state public affairs networks 
 National Association of Public Affairs Networks 
 Others 
 
37. What role would you say the network has in the state government process? 
 












































Date of interview: 
Location of interview: 
Description/notes about location: 
Name of interviewee: 
Title: 




1. Have you ever watched any of the programming on (your state’s public affairs 
network)? 
 
2. How often would you say you watch the network? 
More than once a week 
Once a week 
Once a month 
Almost never 
 
3. When do you watch the network? 
Year-round 
Only when the Legislature is in session 
Only when I know there is a program of interest to me 
Occasionally, for example, if I run across a program that interests me 
 
4. What programs do you watch? 
Gavel-to-gavel 
Legislative committee sessions 
Supreme Court arguments 
State agency hearings 
Interview programs 





5. What programs would you like to see that are not offered? 
 
6. Why do you watch the network? 
 
7. Have you ever participated in any of the network’s programming? 
 
8. Have any of your constituents ever told you that they’ve seen you on the network? 
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9. What was their reaction? 
 
10. Do you feel that the network’s coverage of the Legislature and state government, 
in general, is balanced? What do you do if you believe it is not balanced? 
 
11. Why do you think members of the Legislature agreed to allow their proceedings 
to be televised? 
 
12. Do you feel that the existence of the cameras in the legislative chambers has had 
any impact on how the Legislature conducts business? If so, how? 
 
13. What value do you see in the coverage provided by the network? 
 
14. What role would you say the network has in the state government process? 
 
15. Is there anything you’d like to add or anything else you think would be helpful for 































APPENDIX F: MEDIA INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
 
Date of interview: 
Location of interview: 
Description/notes about location: 
Name of interviewee: 
Title: 




1. Tell me how long you’ve been covering the legislature (general assembly, etc.). 
 
2. How is your paper’s/station’s legislative coverage set up? 
a. How many reporters assigned? 
b. Has there been an increase or decrease in the past 5 years that you know 
of? 
c. Do you have a separate bureau located at the capitol? 
d. Are you reporting just for your organization or for a group of media 
outlets in the state? 
e. Does your paper place a special emphasis on legislative coverage given 
that it is the state capital newspaper? 
 
3. What seems to work best about this set-up? What doesn’t work? 
 
4. Tell me how the process works. 
a. Cover from the floor with seats for reporters/cameramen? 
b. Cover from a gallery area that overlooks the floor. 
c. Cover from a common press room away from the floor. 
 
5. Do you have access to the coverage of the state public affairs television network? 
a. Do you have a feed? 
b. Where do you have access? 
 
6. How does it work? 
a. Piped into your office? 
b. The press room? 
c. Via the Internet? 
 
7. How do you use the feed? 
a. To follow debates and votes on the floor? 
b. To keep tabs on committee meetings/hearings? 
c. As a source of footage for TV reports? 




8. If you don’t use the feed, why not? 
 
9. Has having access to the public affairs network feed changed the way you cover 
the legislature? 
a. If yes, in what way? 
b. Do you go to the floor/gallery/press room as often as before the coverage 
existed? 
c. Are you able to follow issues and bills more efficiently? (i.e., not wasting 
time sitting in unproductive committee meetings or floor debates?) 
d. Do you find that your level of contact with legislators has changed? 
e. Have you become more selective about stories? 
f. Has it changed the type of stories you write? 
 
10. What do you like about the coverage? 
 
11. What don’t you like about it? 
 
12. Do you think that having access to the network’s coverage has helped you 
improve your coverage of the legislature?  
a. If yes, why?  
b. If no, why not? 
 
13. What changes in the network’s coverage would help your coverage? That is, if 
you were in charge, what would you like to see happen? 
 






















APPENDIX G: TELEPHONE SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
 
1. How much attention do you generally pay to news about POLITICS AND PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS IN YOUR STATE? [Using a 10-point scale where indicates paying little or no 
attention and 10 indicates paying very close attention]  
 
2. How do you get most of your news about POLITICS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN 
YOUR STATE?  
1. Local news programming 
2. Local newspapers 
3. Radio 
4. The Internet 
5. A statewide public affairs television channel?   
 
3. How confident are you in the ACCURACY of news coverage of POLITICS AND 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN YOUR STATE? [Using a 10-point scale where 1 indicates  
little or no confidence and 10 indicates a great deal of confidence] 
 
4. How would you rate the FAIRNESS of news coverage of POLITICS AND PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS IN YOUR STATE? [Using a 10-point scale where 1 indicates that news 
coverage is generally fair to all sides and 10 indicates that news coverage 
strongly favors one side over another] 
 
5. How would you rate news coverage of POLITICS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN 
YOUR STATE in terms of whether news coverage helps solve problems or makes 
problems more difficult to resolve? [Using a 10-point scale where 1 indicates news 
coverage helps to solve problems and 10 indicates that it makes problems more difficult 
to resolve] 
 
6. Have you ever heard any public figure or political leader that you trust or agree with 
claim news coverage of POLITICS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN YOUR STATE was 
biased or inaccurate?   
 
7. Does your state have a public affairs channel—that is, a state-level C-SPAN that 
covers your state legislature and state government?  
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 
8. How often do you watch the programming on NAME OF SYSTEM? 
 1. More than once a week 
 2. About once a week 
 3. Once or twice a month 
 4. Rarely or Hardly Ever 
 5. Never  
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9. What type of programs do you watch on this channel? [Check all that apply] 
1. Coverage of political events 
2. Legislative sessions 
3. Committee hearings 
4. Press conferences 
5. Cultural programs, such as book review programs or community cultural events 
6. Other 
 
10. What is the primary reason you watch this channel?  
1. Track specific bills or issues 
2. See what a specific legislator is doing 
3. To hear what experts or interested parties have to say about an issue 
4. To hear what journalists covering the legislature have to say 
5. To hear about the day's events 
   
11. If your state provided a public affairs network covering state government  
and politics, how often would you watch? 
 1. More than once a week 
 2. About once a week 
 3. Once or twice a month 
 4. Rarely or Hardly Ever 
 5. Never  
 
Now I would like to ask you some questions about your participation and  
involvement in the political process. In the past two years, have you ...  
  
12. Written a letter to the editor or called into a public affairs talk show  
on an issue?  
  1. Yes 
2. No 
 
















APPENDIX H: CODING CATEGORIES 
 
Cameras 
The Cameras category is a combination of the original Cameras category and the 
Legislator Behavior category. The original Cameras category contained coded data 
reflecting the specific placement of cameras within the Capitol buildings and other state 
government branches. The Legislator Behavior category focused on data that showed 
how legislators reacted to the presence of the cameras. The merged category was created 
because the data in the two original categories were intertwined. The presence of one—
the camera—had an effect on the other—legislator behavior. This category is an example 
of the policy-making theory that forms part of the theoretical framework of this project, 
as well as the diffusion of innovation and norms and routines theories. The concern 
revealed in the data is that the presence of the cameras exacerbates some aspects of 
legislator behavior that are not necessarily conducive to sound policy-making, such as an 
unwillingness to speak when an issue is controversial, thereby keeping constituents from 
fully understanding a legislator's thinking, or grandstanding while speaking with the 
result being more focus on the theatrics and less on the policy issue under debate. 
Criticism of Networks 
The Criticism of Networks category examines data related to some of the 
shortcomings of statewide public affairs television. It is part of the civic engagement 
component of the project because these shortcomings affect both the access of citizens to 





The Democratic Process category focuses specifically on civic engagement and 
how statewide public affairs television helps provide opportunities for citizens to become 
better informed about the legislative process and to make decisions about whether or how 
they wish to get involved. 
Distribution of Networks 
The Distribution of Networks category merged the original Distribution of 
Networks category, the Accessibility in the Capitol category, and the Web sites category. 
The original Distribution of Networks category focused on the availability of the signal 
outside the Capitol buildings; Accessibility in the Capitol examined the data related to the 
availability of the feed within the building. The Web sites node captured the data on the 
network’s Internet presence, the content of the site, and how the site was or was not used. 
Combining the three brought the accessibility issue under one category and allowed for a 
more thorough comparison of the data. This category also is central to the civic 
engagement theory that is part of this project because obviously accessibility helps 
determine how engaged citizens can be.  
Expansion of Networks 
The Expansion of Networks category is a combination of the original Expansion 
of Networks category and the Future Goals of Networks category. The Expansion of 
Networks category examined the data to see how these statewide public affairs television 
networks moved their content beyond gavel-to-gavel coverage and looked at what areas 
the programming covered. The Future Goals category looked at what these networks 
want to do in the future with their programming and distribution. Both of these category 
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have to do with data that reflects how statewide public affairs television is moving 
beyond its original programming mission, expanding its reach, and becoming part of the 
state government institution. 
Feedback from the Public 
The Feedback from the Public category illustrates the civic engagement 
component of the project by gathering the data related to how citizens respond to the 
programming presented by statewide public affairs television. 
Journalism Routines 
The Journalism Routines category combines the Journalist Routines, Traditional 
Media, Use of Networks, and Media in the Capitol categories. The Journalist Routines 
category examined the data to see how they illustrated the norms and routines of 
traditional media and how they affect the way statehouse reporters do their work. Since 
the bureau set-ups and legislative access data reflect journalism norms and routines, it 
was merged into the routines category. The Traditional Media category focused on data 
that examined the presence of the commercial media in the statehouse—whether it is 
staying constant, increasing, or declining. A diminished media presence clearly has 
implications for how reporters are able to do their job, i.e., their norms and routines. But 
the larger impact is found in civic engagement and the growing inability of the traditional 
media to provide an adequate stream of information to the public. The Use of Networks 
category captured data that revealed how elites use the programming of statewide public 
affairs television. Elites would be legislators, legislative staff members, lobbyists, 
journalists, and avid followers of politics. This category illustrates several of the 
theoretical arguments underlying this project—civic engagement, norms and routines, 
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and institutionalism. The Media in Capitol category focused on data that revealed how 
the traditional media set up their statehouse bureaus and what access they had to 
legislative proceedings. 
Legislative Process 
The Legislative Process category is a combination of the Institutional Impact 
category and the Policy-Making category. Both focused on data that reveal how statewide 
public affairs television has affected the work of legislators and legislative staff. What the 
data showed were some subtle changes in how both groups do their work, which extends 
the norms and routines theory more commonly applied to journalists. 
Lobbyist Routines 
Like the Legislative Process category, the data in this category examined how the 
presence of statewide public affairs television has altered the work routines of lobbyists 
and also provided a way to extend the norms and routines theory of journalism. 
Networking Among Systems 
The Networking Among Systems category covered the data related to how 
executives at the various statewide public affairs television networks stay in contact with 
each other and what impact that contact has on their operations. The category also serves 
to illustrate the social networking and diffusion of innovation theories that are part of the 
theoretical framework for this study. 
Network Norms and Routines 
Network Norms and Routines is a category combining the Network Production 
Routines and Legislative vs. Network categories. The two categories were combined 
because both looked at data that revealed how the networks develop and provide content. 
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From a theoretical perspective, this node falls within the policy-making component, as 
well as expanding the norms and routines theoretical framework so that it can include 
statewide public affairs television.  
Political Economy of Networks 
The Political Economy of Networks category was created out of four others—
Network History, Alternative Models for Networks, Set-up Problems, and Network 
Philosophy. The data in each of the four categories dealt with how the various networks 
were established, and offered a more comprehensive picture of the networks together 
instead of separately. The combined category also makes it easier to examine the data 
through the lenses of diffusion of innovation and policy-making theory. The Network 
Philosophy category looked at data pertaining to the mission of statewide public affairs 
television and what the staff members of these networks believe their mission to be.  
Political Pressures 
The Political Pressures category combines the original Political Pressures 
category and the SPAN Credibility category. It focuses on data that illustrate how the 
content of statewide public affairs television can be shaped by the demands of legislators 
and other state officials on the one hand and how these networks can resist such pressures 
as they put together their programming on the other hand. How a network responds to 
political pressure is one way of evaluating how institutionalized it has become, which is 
the central theme of this study. The SPAN Credibility category, in particular, examines 
data related to how credible members of the public and members of the elite—legislators, 
legislative staff members, lobbyists, and journalists—find statewide public affairs 
television's programming. Credibility is another component of institutionalism and the 
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data would be expected to help build the case for the institutionalism of statewide public 
affairs television. 
Programming 
The Programming category focuses on the content provided by statewide public 
affairs television. Merged into it was the category Questions about Programming 
Decisions. Since both categories dealt with content, they were combined into one so the 
data could be examined through the civic engagement framework. 
Public Awareness of Networks 
The Public Awareness category combines three others—SPAN Audience, 
Audience Use of SPANs, and SPAN Marketing. The data in all three focused on who 
watches statewide public affairs television, so it made more sense to combine them and 
see what they revealed about audiences within a civic engagement framework. SPAN 
Marketing focused on how the networks do or do not market themselves and the 
problems created by the lack of public awareness. These data also illustrate the civic 
engagement aspect of the project. If citizens don't know where to find the statewide 
public affairs television signal or aren't aware of what programs the networks offer, then 
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